DOES CLASS MATTER EQUALLY FOR MEN AND WOMEN?

A study of the impact of class on wage mobility in Sweden 1999-2003

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Abstract

It has been argued that class schemas are appropriate for analysing class relations among men but not women. But is this the case? Arguably, wage mobility is a crucial aspect of class relations. Different reasons why class would be less effective as predictor for women than men are discussed, i.e. that other factors blur the relationship between class and wage mobility for women (e.g. discrimination), or/and that women are over-represented in parts of the labour market (e.g. the service sector), where this link is less strong. The analyses are based on a Swedish panel data set of employees (age 30-35 years) in large private firms and in the public sector with the same employer in 1999 and 2003 (N about 99.000). Class is measured by the new European Socio-economic Classification - ESeC. The analyses do not support the idea of a 'gender bias' in class schemas.

From the 1970s the industrial sector has declined while the service sector has grown throughout OECD. In the same period of time women have become a large part of the work force. One implication of these trends is that women in the service sector have outnumbered men in manufacturing in some of these countries (cf. Oesch 2006). These changes, together with the finding that women are heavily concentrated in one or two social classes in contemporary class schemas, has led some sociologists to believe that class schemas are not well-adapted to capture class relations for women (Crompton 1998; Oesch 2006; Savage et al 1992. Cf. Bottero 1998). Thus, the argument is that current class schemas are outdated and worked better when the labour market was dominated by the three 'm's; the *male manual manufacturing* worker. The critique clearly concerns the most often used class schema in Sociology of today, the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero class schema (also known as the Goldthorpe or the CASMIN schema; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 2000).

But are class schemas less decisive for relevant outcomes for women? Earlier empirical studies based on British data indicate that the EGP class schema indeed has a high degree of validity in general (Evans 1992; Evans & Mills 1998a; Evans & Mills 2000), and also about equally high for women and men (Evans 1996; Evans & Mills 1998b). This study deviates from those validity studies by addressing wage mobility differentials, which arguably is a crucial aspect of class differences, and by directly focus on differences between different segments of the labor market e.g. the manufacturing and the service sector. According to Goldthorpe (2000) classes differ in employment relationships (ER), where the 'salariat', is characterized by a 'service relationship' and the manual classes by a 'labor contract' (c.f. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). An important feature of the service relationship is that jobs with such an ER tend to offer long-term advantages in terms of wage increments. In this study a unique panel data set based on the Swedish earnings structure statistics, covering employees with the same employer in 1999 and 2003 in the age 30 to 35 years (approximately 99.000), is used in order to study class patterns in wage mobility for women and men. In the first part of the paper, the ER-theory is further explained and reasons for why class differentials would be smaller for women than men in terms of wage mobility are discussed.

Class and wage mobility

According to Goldthorpe (2000), when it comes to employees, the EGP class schema aims at grouping occupations with similarities in requirements of specific human capital; SHC (Cf. 'human asset specificity' in Goldthorpe 2000), and in similar levels of monitoring problems; MP.[1] The composition and amount of SHC and MP, in turn, tend to give rise to the service relationship (high on both), the labor contract (low on both) and two mixed forms of contracts (combining high MP with low SHC and vice versa). SHC concerns the degree to which on-the-job training and experience within the job is necessary in order to perform the work tasks at hand. MP ultimately refers to the possibilities to measure the quality and the quantity of what is 'produced'. Employees within occupations characterized by a service relationship are offered long-term benefits by the employer in order to (1) keep replacements costs low by diminishing the risk that employees with expensive on-the-job training leave the firm, and (2) keep work incentives high when the work is difficult to monitor. Long-term advantages include promotion opportunities in terms of climbing career ladders, a prosperous wage development, and a high level of job security. The labor contract is characterized by the lack of long-term rewards and the mixed contracts are somewhere in between those.

In sum, the ER-theory predicts that individuals who stay with the same employer over time have different levels of long-term rewards, e.g. in terms of wage mobility, which is a function of their class position and its relation to composition and amount of SHC and MP. Tåhlin (2006) has argued that SHC is not the crucial mechanism for class differentials in wage mobility, since analyses using Swedish data indicate that *general* human capital (requirements) is more important, and since seniority within firms have no positive effect for the Salariat (the classes with a service relationship). This is an interesting challenge for the ER-theory. However, especially if these findings are confirmed in more research, I believe that the ER-theory should be revised, by changing focus from *firm* SHC to *business* SHC, by letting both employees and employers be

[1] This is the way the class schema is described in Goldthorpe 2000, and the description is similar in Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992. Earlier the class schema was said to cluster occupations on additional characteristics as similarities in income levels and autonomy in the work place (Goldthorpe 1987. Cf. Evans 1992; Tåhlin 2006).

active rational actors seeking for alternative employers/employees, and by including movements between firms in the theory. In short; the typical salariat employee is rewarded by the employer in order to stay at the firm with her business SHC, at the same time as the employer has alternative candidates with training from other firms, and the employee is offered and looks for offers at other firms where her business SHC is highly valued. Hence, changing work place may involve a wage premium even for the salariat. This would also solve what I consider to be an anomaly in the 'original' theory; an individual with strict *firm* SHC, i.e. SHC that is only of use at the work place where the employee works, would perhaps not benefit from long term rewards as this employee has few alternatives than continuing working for the same employer. Future research may shed more light on the importance of SHC, including both *firm* and *business* SHC, for ER. However, that is outside the scope for this paper, for which it is enough to assume that wage mobility is a crucial aspect of class relations.

When it comes to operationalizing the class schema an update of the EGP class schema is available from 2006. Within the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) project (led by David Rose in collaboration with Eric Harrison at Essex University) occupations are grouped after similarity in ER operationalized with variables of the British Labour Force Surveys (for the ESeC project see www.iser.essex.ac.uk/esec). After that seven national research teams have given their opinions, with help of national and cross-national data, on this clustering of occupations (measured by ISCO-88) in order to reach an agreement about a class schema that arguably is valid throughout Europe. The schema produces expected outcomes regarding indicators of SHC and MP (although less so for those with a presumably mixed contract), unemployment risks, age-gradients in wages, and even with less direct indicators of employment relationships as poverty and health in a wide variety of European countries (Bihagen et. al. 2006; Hausen et. al. 2006; Kunst et. al. 2006; Rose & Harrison 2006; Schizzerotto et. al. 2006; Watson et. al. 2006). The analyses of this paper are conducted with this new social class schema, and aim to contribute to the validation process of the ESeC schema by addressing cross-gender validity and wage mobility directly. It is worth emphasizing that the new ESeC schema produces very similar results as the old often used EGP algorithm constructed by

Ganzeboom (Bihagen et. al. 2006. C.f. Ganzeboom & Treiman 1996). Arguably the ESeC schema is preferable to the Ganzeboom algorithm; the derivation of the ESeC schema is more carefully documented, ESeC covers all ISCO codes, the ESeC algorithm is more straightforward, the ESeC schema is more systematically tested. In Table 1 the classes of employees in the ESeC schema, and the similarity with the EGP schema is further described.

--Table 1 about here--

Why would class be less important for women than men when it comes to wage mobility?

There are different reasons why class would be less associated with wage mobility for women than men. First, different factors may 'blur' the relationship between class and labour market outcomes for women (e.g. discrimination), and second women are over-represented in parts of the labour market (e.g. the service sector), where this link may be less strong. Class analysis may of course be of relevance even if career opportunities also are dependent on factors related to gender. Hence, a weaker relationship between class and wage mobility for women than men does not diminish the relevance of class analysis per se. However, if mechanisms related to class are hardly at work in parts of the labor market, as the service sector, the case for class analysis, as a general framework for understanding labor market outcomes, is weakened. Below, 'blurring factors' are first considered. Secondly, 'compositional factors' are discussed.

It is rather obvious that women still take larger responsibilities for the family in terms of homework than men. Sweden is often considered to be a relatively gender egalitarian country (Cf. Acker 1994; Towns 2002). Still women tend to work part time in Sweden and use the lion's share of the relatively generous parental leave (Sundström 1997). As a consequence, it is argued, women lower their career aspirations (e.g. Hultin 2001. Cf. Hakim 2000), where a lower level of wage mobility may be one result. Hence, we could expect women with a service relationship at work, the Salariat, to have less beneficial wage development, than men, as their lower aspiration levels would result in a tendency

to turn promotion offers down. However, this difference between men and women in the Salariat should decrease when controlling for work attendance indicators (see below).

Nonetheless, such a decrease may not occur. If women face statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972), e.g. that young women are less often promoted than men since young women as a group have higher risks of being absent from work, or plain preference discrimination, e.g. that men in leading positions prefer men as colleagues rather than women, the result will be smaller career opportunities and a lower degree of career mobility (e.g. Acker 1990; Kanter 1977; Rosenfeld et. al. 1998). Since, the ER-theory suggests that career opportunities are mainly present within the Salariat, we can assume that women in the Salariat have a smaller relative wage mobility than men.

Concerning the 'compositional factors', it may be the case that women are over represented in parts of the labor market where the relationship between class and wage mobility is less strong. The labor market is sex segregated (Charles & Grusky 2004; Nermo 2000) and women are over represented in service jobs, and in Scandinavia at least; in service jobs related to health and education primarily in the public sector (Bäckman 2001; Gornick & Jacobs 1998; Gustafsson & Johansson 1998; Kolberg 1991). First, processes related to segregation may hamper the career opportunities of Salariat positions within female dominated jobs (if we assume again that mainly Salariat positions offer career opportunities). As a consequence of 'structural' discrimination, i.e. 'female occupations' may be regarded as having lower value than other, or crowding, i.e. the supply of women with human capital designed for female dominated occupations is large in relation to the demand, women's career opportunities may be lower than men's (Cohen & Huffman 2003; England 1992; Sorensen 1990). Another possibility is that advantages associated with occupations to a high degree are the results of social exclusionary practices by unions and other federations of incumbents of occupations (Cf. Tilly 1998; Weeden 2002; Parkin 1979, Doeringer & Piore 1971), where women as a group may have been less successful than men.

Besides processes related to the proportion of women in jobs it may be the case that service sector jobs, and public sector jobs, generally offer less wage mobility or/and career opportunities than within manufacturing and the private sector. I find it likely that service sector business is characterized by being more work intense than within manufacturing, i.e. that wages are the main expense of the work organizations within the service sector. Hence, there may be less room for wage increments for Salariat positions within service than that within manufacturing. This may even more be the case in the public sector due to limited economic resources, especially since the public sector, in Sweden as well in many other countries, have had to cut down costs in the 1990s (cf. Bihagen 2005; Cappellari 2002; Hansen & Lauridsen 2004; Yaish & Kraus 2003). Perhaps long-term rewards, due to limited economic resources in the public sector and even in the service sector, are less manifested as wage increments and more in terms of career transitions, as change of job titles, and as job security. It has been indicated in previous research that wages are more compressed in the public sector in a number of countries, that wage mobility is lower in the public sector, but that lifetime earnings are more stable in the public sector as a consequence of a higher job security (Cf. Cappellari 2002; Postel-Vinay & Turon 2005). Hence, there is some support for the idea about differences in reward structures between the sectors although it is difficult to make any clear predictions about differences in class differentials between the sectors.

Moreover, it appears to me as though many Salariat positions, e.g. secondary school teachers and medical professions, especially within the Scandinavian type public sector are highly standardized in terms of educational requirements of the job, work tasks and typical work organizations where those occupations are allocated. Hence, those positions may not imply attainment of business SHC; e.g. a teacher may easily shift between employers since their work tasks are almost identical across work organizations. Hence the wage mobility within Salariat positions may be lower in the public than the private sector.

Finally, there are other reasons why class differences may look different in various segments of the labor market, although only being speculation. Let us for instance

assume that there are other incentives to perform well in case of high MP, or not to leave the firm in case of high SHC, than long-term rewards. Oesch (2006) has for instance depicted some service work as being characterized by "inter-personal work logic", which is a logic that perhaps results in work commitment. If so, the result may become a less beneficial wage development than what the composition of SHC and MP would determine.

In sum, we assume that the relationship between class and wage mobility is less strong for women than men since women lower their career aspirations as a way to solve the "work-family squeeze", are discriminated, or are over-represented in the public sector and in service sector jobs. In the analyses the question is whether the class-wage mobility link actually is weaker for women than men, and, if so, why this is the case.

Data and variables

Statistics Sweden (SCB) has provided us with a specially designed data set based on 'The earnings structure statistics' (Lönestrukturstatistiken) 1999 and 2003 and constructed variables from firm registers, allowing us to construct a panel with employees who had the same employer in 1999 and 2003.[2] The data set also includes a number of variables from other registers collected in the LISA data base (Longitudinell Integrationsdatabas för Sjukförsäkrings- och Arbetsmarknadsstudier). The reason to restrict the panel to them with the same employer, between the years, is based on the ER-theory where long-term rewards are assumed to be the outcome of rational considerations of the employer. The panel used is based on all employees within the public sector and all employees in the private sector working at firms with 500 and more employees. Since the class differential in wage development is heavily related to age with a quickly falling premium for the advantaged classes, vis-à-vis less advantaged classes until the age of about 40, where no such premium is found (this analysis is not shown in the paper), I have chosen to restrict the analyses to people in the age from 30 until 35. Hence, the panel consists of relatively young employees working in large firms (since organizations of the public sector tend to

[2] Employees with several concurrent employments, who are very few, are excluded from the constructed data sets.

be large as well). Compared with a representative sample public sector employees are over-represented in this panel and a weight is used in order to let the proportions of public and the private sectors resemble the proportions in the labor market 1999.

The data sets are based on information provided by the different employer organizations in cooperation with Statistics Sweden (SCB). The response rate is close to complete in the public sector and about 92 to 93 percent in the private sector for each year of investigation, according to unpublished information from SCB. Because the data were collected without the participation of the employees, there is no reason to believe that there are any kinds of specific attrition problems affecting the results, e.g. there is no reason to suspect that those with poor wage development more frequently drop out from the panel than others.

The information about earnings, per hour for 'workers' and per month for a full-time 'white collar' employee, is of very high quality. In order to transform the workers' wages to monthly earnings, the wages are multiplied by 165. In reality, the required work hours vary in different parts of industry and between different firms, but I do not consider this to be a large problem, as the analyses are based on changes over time for the same employees.

With regard to wage development, I would like to control for general occupation-specific changes in wages between 1999 and 2003 so as to not confound general changes with changes specific to the panel. For instance, if a certain business is flourishing, the wages will probably rise *generally* for specific occupations of this business, which is a rise that is not associated with *time* spent in the job (with the same employer). We know from earlier research that the higher Salariat in the private sector increased their wages relative to other classes in the 1990s (Bihagen 2005; le Grand et. al. 2001). Hence, if we do not take this into account we risk exaggerating the level of wage mobility of the private sector Salariat. A solution to this is to construct a weight which reduces the wage in 2003 for each occupation with the percent of general wage increase in the same occupation between the years as estimated with cross sectional data sets (the complete cross sectional

data sets). Alternatively it increases the wage in 2003 with the level of general wage losses between the years. Hence, the standardized wage of 2003 can be perceived as the wage when general changes between the years are wiped out. The estimations are made separately for the private and the public sector, for each occupation (see below).

The general wages for 1999 and 2003, separately for combinations of occupations and sector, are regressed by the following two equations in the cross sectional data sets (representative for all employees both years. N is 2.062.248 and 2.204.383):

(i)

$$\ln(W_{99}) = \alpha_1 + \beta_{11}*age + \beta_{12}*age^2 + \varepsilon$$

and

$$\ln(W_{03}) = \alpha_2 + \beta_{21}*age + \beta_{22}*age^2 + \varepsilon$$

The coefficients from (i) are used to estimate the mean wage 1999 and the mean wage 2003 (as the mean of a person in the age of 32.5; the median age in the panel)[3]:

(ii)

$$\hat{W}_{99} = \exp(\alpha_1 + \beta_{11}*32.5 + \beta_{12}*(32.5)^2)$$

and

$$\hat{W}_{03} = \exp(\alpha_2 + \beta_{21}*32.5 + \beta_{22}*(32.5)^2)$$

The estimated mean wages from (ii) are used to weight the wage measure for 2003 in the panel data set and make the standardized wage measure of 2003.

(iii)

$$SW_{03} = W_{03}*(\hat{W}_{99} / \hat{W}_{03})$$

SW_{03} is used as dependent variable in OLS regressions.

Concerning the variable of occupation there are some validity problems stemming from difficulties the employer may encounter in classifying staff jobs. As seen in a study of the validity of the occupational coding there are some problems, and especially at the more detailed level (Statistics Sweden 2004). The validity of this variable is probably lowest

[3] The results are basically the same with other ages chosen.

among employees working at small firms in the private sector, where the administration is less developed. Because the employees in the private sector of our panel only consist of those working at large firms, our analyses are probably less affected by this possible validity problem. The variable of occupation is a national version of ISCO-88(com) called SSYK-96. In most parts of the private sector this variable is reported on the three digit level. Hence, the transformation matrix between ISCO at the three digit level to ESeC classes is used. A 'simplified' version is used since we have no information about supervisory status, where the more elaborated ESeC version allocates some employees differently according to supervisory status.[4] However, since being self-employed is the most common class for some occupations some respondents end up being in a self-employed class. Those are recoded with the class value for employees.

Besides sex, age, wage and the ESeC class schema the following variables are used in the study;

Employment rate and absenteeism

Two variables are used in order to measure work attendance. First, a variable measuring the average typical work hours, the employment rate, in proportion of full time work for the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, running theoretically from 0 to 1; second, a variable summing up the work absence in terms of days of sickness and days of parental leave (permanent and temporary in the case of children being sick) for those four years. This variable is calculated as the proportion of absenteeism (theoretically 0-1).

Childindex

This variable attempts to capture the average number of children in the household throughout the four years. I assume that the time required for child attendance is lowered linearly with children's age, and thus use an equivalence scale when adding the number of children. This variable is based on the sum of four variables for each year available in

[4] I have used the version where the simplified class value is based on the European Social Survey. Although using supervisory status as an additional factor is preferable, empirical results appear to be very similar with or without this factor (reference to be included later). However, ESeC 6 is a considerably smaller class with the simplified class schema, and empirical outcomes for this particular class is a bit different when relying on the simplified class schema (reference to be included later).

the data set, i.e. number of children in the household in the age 0-3, in the age 4-6, in the age 7-10 and finally 11-15. The following weights, admittedly arbitrary, are given to children in those ages, from the youngest to the oldest; 1.0, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3. As an example a respondent with a four years old child in 2000, who grows older, will get the sum; (1.0 + 0.7 + 0.7 + 0.7)/4. A linear regression line between age of the children and the attendance weights suggests that children in the age of 18 years do not require any attendance at all, which appeared reasonable to me.

Single with children

Since being single with children is a more frequent state among women than men, and may hamper career opportunities additionally, a variable distinguishes single living persons with children (below the age of 18) in the household for two years or more (1) from other singles, married and cohabiting persons (0).

Sector

The variable of sector combines information about if the employee is employed within the private or the public sector, with additional information about service sector work tasks in the private sector (with the use of an industry variable, Swedish version of NACE). The following areas are considered to belong to service sector work tasks; wholesale/retail trade, hotels/restaurants, transport/communication, financial intermediation, real estate activities, public administration, education, health and social work etc. (50-99 according to the international classification NACE). Since employees in the public sector in Sweden almost entirely have service jobs, no separation is required for the public sector.

Sex composition of occupations and change in sex composition

This variable is based on the sex composition of occupations in 1999 in the cross-sectional data-set using a weight in order to make the data set representative for the labor market. The variable distinguishes between female dominated (0-30 % men), neutral (31-69 % men) and male dominated occupations (70-100 % men). An additional variable attempts to capture changes in sex compositions of occupation between 1999 and 2003,

which is an event which may occur for those who change occupation. Due to multicollinearity problems, stemming from the fact that there are no female dominated occupations in some classes (see below) a variable is constructed which denotes a change from male dominated occupations to neutral *or* female dominated as 1. Other transitions and non-transitions are denoted 0.

Educational attainment and change in educational attainment

Four different educational levels are distinguished; two years upper secondary and less (e.g. vocational tracks), three years upper secondary, short tertiary education (less than three years university) and longer tertiary (three years and more). Moreover, a proxy variable attempts to capture increases of years in educational attainment between 1999 and 2003, where the educational qualifications have been given the values 11.0, 12.0, 14.0, 15.5 from the shortest to the longest education. It would of course have been useful with an additional variable of human capital, namely work experience. However, no such variable is available in the data-set.

In table 2 and table 3 descriptive statistics of the variables of the study are shown. Besides the panel a cross-sectional data-set with all respondents in 1999 in the age of 30 to 35 years, working in the public sector or at large firms (500 or more employees) in the private sector is constructed in order to be able to compare the distributions with those of the panel (see Table 2). All respondents with any internal non-response are excluded from the panel (about 4 percent for men and 1 percent for women). Hence, we are able to see if there is a bias in the selection of the panel as compared to the cross-sectional data-set when it comes to the variables used in the study. This comparison is not possible for variables covering other, or more years, than 1999. However, a set of variables are constructed in order to compare statistics of absenteeism etcetera for 1999 (variables with a $ in the table). First, of all only about 44 percent of the male respondents and 38 percent of the females are included in the panel. The other have, logically, changed employer, stopped working (due to sickness, unemployment, death etc.) or have missing data for 1999 or 2003. Since we are looking at young people, and housewife is a very unusual choice in Sweden, the vast majority of them not included in the panel have probably

changed employer or have become unemployed. It is indicated in the table that both men and women in ESeC 1 and with higher educational qualifications are more likely than other to drop out from the panel. Moreover, those in the panel have more children. For men, more of those in male dominated jobs stay in the panel, and for women more single parents leave the panel. All in all the distributions are rather similar for the panel and the cross sectional data set of 1999 for both women and men. However, it is indicated that more men than women in ESeC 1 drop out from the panel. If those change employer to more prosperous jobs, we may speak of a selection effect which results in an underestimation of the wage mobility of ESeC 1 males. Nonetheless, the effect is probably not that large, and if we restrict the conclusions to be valid only for men and women with the same employer over time we are most likely on solid ground.

--Table 2 about here--

--Table 3 about here--

From Table 2 and 3 some gender differences are worth addressing (although most of them being well-known to researchers); women work less than men both in terms of employment rate and 'absence' (nb. includes parental leave) and women earn less than men. Several of the variables indicate that Sweden has a highly gender segregated labor market, with vertical segregation; where men are over represented at the top, as well as the bottom of the class hierarchy, and horizontal segregation; where a majority of men is employed within manufacturing and a majority of women in the public sector. A majority of men are found in male dominated occupations and a majority of women in female dominated occupations. It is interesting to note that the class distributions differ between men and women (see more below) while women and men have very similar distributions in regard to educational qualifications.

Before starting with the analyses it is interesting to look at the gender distributions of the ESeC schema using a representative data set for employees, since the concentration of women in certain classes is the starting point for this study. From table 3 it is obvious that the class distributions of women and men are very different. Women are especially overrepresented in ESeC 7 and also ESeC 3 & 6, while men are over represented in ESeC

8, 9 and 1. Hence, men are over-represented at both ends of the class hierarchy (cf. Charles & Grusky 2004: 7). A similar pattern, and to some extent even clearer, is seen when confronting female dominated occupations with male dominated. It is interesting to note that there are no female dominated occupations at all in ESeC 1 and 8. Thus, in the following analyses female dominated occupations are pooled with neutral in order to avoid multicollinearity. Worth mentioning is that gender neutral occupations are more overrepresented in ESeC 1 than male dominated occupations. A similar pattern to the differences between female and male dominated occupations is seen when comparing the public and the private sectors, where the public sector resembles the 'female' pattern. Actually, women are heavily overrepresented in the public sector in Sweden and many of the occupations within this sector are dominated by women when it comes to occupational sex composition (Bihagen and Ohls 2006). The private manufacturing sector is characterized by relatively few positions at the 'top' (ESeC 1) and relatively many at the 'bottom' of the class schema (ESeC 9).

--Table 4 about here--

Results

In table 5 and 6 the results of OLS regressions are shown (only the unstandardized regression coefficients are shown in the tables). By including wage at 1999 as an independent variable and using the natural logarithm of wage in 2003 (SW_{03}) as dependent variable the models predict relative differences in wage mobility between the years. The coefficients of the classes are roughly differences in percent (if multiplying them with 100) compared to routine occupations which is the reference category (a correct estimation is given by (exp(b)-1)*100). Four models are made, separately for women and men (table 5 and 6). In the first model age and class are included as independent variables. In the second model educational attainment is introduced. In the third model the variables related to work attendance and family composition are included. Finally in the fourth model the variables indicating differences in occupational structures are included; sector and sex composition. If there are large differences between women and men in terms of class to begin with and those are diminished in model 3, family

responsibilities appear to be the clue to those differences. If the differences are diminished in model 4 the compositional hypotheses are supported. In the last analyses, reported in Figure 1, separate analyses are conducted for women and men in different sectors of the labor market in order to see if class patterns vary across sectors.

--Table 5 and 6 about here --

With starting point in the ER-theory we expect that the Salariat (ESeC 1 and 2), will have higher wage mobility than the reference category for both men and women. In all models ESeC 1 clearly deviates the most from other classes. The class differences are somewhat lowered when controlling for educational attainment, which is expected from a human capital perspective. Of pivotal interest for us, however, are the differences between women and men. Those are actually surprisingly small already in model 1; in the magnitude of 1-2 percent with the exception of classes with a mixed contract (ESeC 3 and 6) where the differences are larger. The small difference concerning ESeC 1 disappears when controlling for compositional factors. Nonetheless, the most striking result is the similarity in class patterns for women and men already in the first model. Hence, there is hardly any support for the ideas that certain factors blur the relationship between class and wage mobility for women, neither for the idea that class differences are very different in parts of the labor market where women are over represented. At least; such factors do not disturb the class patterns for women in general.

The gender differences for classes with a mixed contract (ESeC 3 and 6) deserve attention, and we may ask if those differences are due to 'blurring' or/and 'compositional' factors. Since, the difference is stable throughout all models, it does not seem to be due to women in those particular jobs more often having family 'obligations' than men or due to an over representation of those women in certain parts of the labor market. We would neither expect those classes to be positions where a substantial proportion is promoted, and as a consequence that discrimination is more at work for holders of such positions. According to the rationale of the class schema we would not

assume that classes with a mixed contract are especially associated with promotion chances. Hence, for now there is no plausible explanation to these gender differences.

Finally, concerning Table 4 and 5, it is worth mentioning that the theoretical part above was built on a number of assumptions that turned out to be correct; work attendance is positively associated with wage mobility (i.e. positive association with employment rate and negative with absenteeism), the public sector has a lower level of wage mobility than the private, and male dominated jobs have better wage mobility than other.[5] However, some assumptions are more dubious; contrary to some of the theoretical assumptions having children has hardly any effect on wage mobility and the small effect seen is positive (holding work attendance constant). Moreover, the differences between the private service sector and private manufacturing are small and even against the assumption regarding men; the wage mobility is slightly higher in the service than the manufacturing sector.

A final set of analyses are conducted separately for women and men in the public sector, the private manufacturing sector, the private service sector, for male dominated jobs and for neutral jobs. Since female dominated occupations are not found in all ESeC classes a separate analysis for those are not reported. In Figure 1 the relative differences are estimated in relation to ESeC 9 based on OLS regressions with the same independent variables as in Table 5 and 6; model 3.[6] Although the large N makes the coefficients robust even with sub samples, it is worth emphasizing that some combinations are rather untypical as is indicated by Table 4. ESeC 8 is for instance only common within male dominated jobs and within the private manufacturing sector, ESeC 3 & 6 is uncommon within male dominated jobs, and ESeC 7 is uncommon within the private manufacturing sector. From the diagram it is very clear that ESeC 1 deviates positively from other classes, irrespective of 'sector' and gender, which is in line with the theoretical rationale of the schema. However, ESeC 2 is generally less positive than expected in relation to

[5] The higher absenteeism coefficient for men than women is perhaps due to male's absence is mainly related to sickness while women's are related to parental leave, and that it is less detrimental for the career to be home with children than being sick.
[6] The estimations are based on the coefficients, i.e. (exp(b)-1)*100.

intermediate and working class positions. It is actually not at all obvious from the figure that the 'Salariat', taking both ESeC 1 and 2 into account, are more privileged positions than intermediate or even working class positions in some parts of the labor market. When it comes to gender differences the diagrams indicate some interesting findings; ESeC 1 women deviates more than ESeC 1 men from ESeC 9 in the public sector and the private service sector, while the opposite is true for the private manufacturing sector and male dominated occupations.

--Figure 1 about here--

It is worth mentioning that this advantage for women vis-à-vis men in the public sector and the private service sector is a bit of a chimera since women in ESeC 1 actually has a lower wage mobility than ESeC 1 men in all parts of the labor market if estimating absolute percentages of wage mobility (and not in relation to ESeC 9) from the same regressions. Hence, it is rather ESeC 9 positions among women in the public sector that have a relatively low degree of wage mobility, in relation to men, than ESeC 1 positions that have a high degree. Within the manufacturing sector and among male dominated occupations in large, the small class differences for women are due to women being relatively well off at ESeC 9 positions. Actually, there is a wage mobility penalty for women in all classes in all those parts of the labor market, except for some classes in the manufacturing and among male dominated occupations (ESeC 7, 9 in both and ESeC 3 & 6 among male dominated occupations).

Conclusions

The findings of this paper clearly point to the conclusion that class matters rather equally for men and women. Hence, contrary to some ideas reported in the paper the class differentials in wage mobility are very similar for men and women. Moreover, class patterns are not more evident in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the idea that class is an outmoded concept, since several decades, as a consequence of a shrinking manufacturing sector, and a growing proportion of women in the labor market, is not in line with the findings of these analyses. Hence, the findings support the conclusions by Evans 1996 and Evans & Mills 1998b, where it is indicated that the EGP class schema is valid for both men and women with use of British data and other indicators.

It is worth emphasizing that although class patterns are rather stable for women and men, and across sectors of the labor market, women and employees in the public sector have a lower level of wage mobility than others irrespective of class. Thus, wage mobility is not only affected by class. When it comes to gender differences, the results of this paper indicate that women face lower wage mobility in most classes in all sectors of the labor market. Two possible reasons for these gender differences are that women are less successful in negotiating for wage increments and that women are less often promoted to higher positions. However, there are exceptions to the finding of stable gender differences; within manufacturing (and male dominated occupations in large) there are no gender differences at some lower positions (ESeC 7 and 9). As a consequence, the class gradient in wage mobility for women within both manufacturing/male dominated occupations become less steep than in other sectors. I have no explanation to why there are no gender differences at those lower positions; the findings appear to be unexpected from the viewpoint of ideas about women being more discriminated in typical male work settings (Kanter 1977).

Although the results of the paper are supportive for class analysis, the results are troublesome for some ideas behind the class schema. First, it should be remembered that the analyses are restricted to employees in the age 30 to 35 years, since there are hardly any class differentials at all for employees above the age of about 40. Hence, it appears as

though the wage mobility premium for individuals at higher positions, staying at the same firm, only last for a rather small period of time. It would be of great interest to learn more about the impact of internal wage mobility for lifetime earnings, e.g. how much of a Salariat I class (ESeC 1) employees' lifetime earnings are due to wage mobility within firms, wage increments in relation to transitions between firms and how much is due to relatively high initial wages. Following the theoretical rationale behind the class schema the expectation would be that the differences between a working class person's lifetime earnings and a person from the Salariat would largely be explained by the latter having a much higher level of internal wage mobility. I have some doubts about that given the findings of this paper. Second, another problem concerns the position of Salariat II (ESeC 2), which is very different from Salariat I (ESeC 1) by being far less privileged. The differences between these two classes appear to be greater than the similarities (Cf. Evans & Mills 2000).

In short, the analyses of this paper do not support the idea of a gender bias in the class schema, but they point to some other potential problems with the theory behind the class schema. However, in order to judge how severe those problems are, and how universal they are, i.e. if they are found in other countries, more research is warranted.

Table 1; The ESeC classes for employees

The ESeC classes	Employment relationsship	Largest corresponding EGP category (% of each ESeC category with this EGP)	
ESeC 1; Large employers, higher managerial	Service	I	81.7 %
ESeC 2; Lower managerial, lower professional	Service	II	66.4 %
ESeC 3; Intermediate occupations	Mixed	IIIa	68.2 %
ESeC 6; Lower supervisors and technicians	Mixed	V	37.9 %
ESeC 7; Lower sales and service	Labor	IIIb	67.9 %
ESeC 8; Lower technical	Labor	VI	90.2 %
ESeC 9; Routine occupations	Labor	VII	75.2 %

Comments; The percentages are based on the European Social Survey (ESS) round 2 for 22 countries. Source; Bihagen et. al. 2006.

Table 2; Descriptive statistics of the variables based on the first wave of the panel (1999) and a cross sectional data-set for 1999 (percent for nominal variables)

	Cross-sectional 1999 men	Panel 1999-2003 men	Cross-sectional 1999 women	Panel 1999-2003 women
Variables measuring characteristics at 1999;				
ESeC 1; Large employers, higher managerial	16.1	13.1	9.4	8.0
ESeC 2; Lower managerial, lower professional	21.7	22.9	20.2	20.2
ESeC 3 & 6; Intermediate occupations & lo supervisors	10.1	9.5	19.6	21.1
ESeC 7; Lower sales and service	9.3	8.7	33.3	33.6
ESeC 8; Lower technical	15.4	16.7	2.2	2.1
ESeC 9; Routine occupations	27.3	29.1	15.3	14.9
2 years upper secondary school or less and yrkes	53.9	55.8	52.1	53.6
3 years upper secondary	8.0	8.8	11.1	12.1
2 years university or less	22.2	21.7	20.6	20.9
3 years university or more	16.0	13.7	16.1	13.5
Public sector (almost only service)	20.2	21.1	51.9	53.9
Private sector-manufacturing	52.8	52.4	18.3	14.3
Private sector-service	27.0	26.5	29.8	31.8
Female dominated occupations 0-30 % men	10.6	9.2	56.4	56.8
Gender neutral 31-69 % men	27.1	24.2	28.4	28.4
Male dominated 70-100 % men	62.3	66.6	15.2	14.8
Single with children below the age of eighteen $	3.0	3.0	13.4	11.9
Other household compositions $	97.0	97.0	86.6	88.1
ln(wage) 1999	M 9.93;S 0.26	M 9.93 ;S 0.24	M 9.77;S 0.22	M 9.76 ;S 0.2
Age	M 32.58;S 1.69	M 32.64;S 1.68	M 32.63;S 1.69	M 32.83 ;S 1.66
Employment rate, proportion $	M 0.97;S 0.12	M 0.99 ;S 0.81	M 0.86;S 0.22	M 0.87 ;S 0.18
Absenteeism (sickness & parental leave), mean proportion of days $	M 0.03;S 0.07	M 0.03 ;S 0.07	M 0.09;S 0.18	M 0.08 ;S 0.17
Childindex, average equivalent children $	M 0.69;S 0.79	M 0.74 ;S 0.8	M 0.90;S 0.72	M 0.97 ;S 0.70
N; All	110.414	(48.102)	141.004	(53.665)
N; Internal non-responses excluded	-	46.310	-	52.941

Comments: Both data sets are restricted to employees in the age 30 to 35 in 1999, working in the public sector or at firms in the private sector with 500 or more employees. Data is weighted so that the proportion in the public sector resembles the distribution in 1999. $ those variables are only used in this table

Table 3; Descriptive statistics of the variables based on data about intermitting years of the waves and differences between the two waves of the panel (percent for nominal variables)

	Men	Women
Variables measuring characteristics 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003;		
Single with children below the age of eighteen > 1 year	4.0	15.5
Other household compositions	96.0	84.5
Employment rate, mean proportion per year	M 0.99 ;S 0.06	M 0.89 ;S 0.14
Absenteeism, mean proportion of days	M 0.03 ;S 0.06	M 0.07 ;S 0.11
Childindex, mean 'equivalent' children per year	M 0.78 ;S 0.71	M 0.81 ;S 0.57
Variables measuring change 1999 to 2003;		
Change in educational attainment (proxy in years)	M 0.08 ;S 0.4	M 0.11 ;S 0.44
Change in occupational sex comp.		
From male d. to neutral/female	4.1	2.0
No such change	95.9	98.0
Dependent variable; ln(standardized wage) 2003	M 9.99 ;S 0.27	M 9.81 ;S 0.22
N; All	(48.102)	(53.665)
N; Internal non-responses excluded	46.310	52.941

Table 4; ESeC by sex, occupational sex composition and sector for all employees 2003

	Sex;		*Occupational sex composition;*			*Sector;*		
	Women	Men	Female dominate	Neutral	Male dominate	Public	Private-manufact.	Private-service
ESeC 1; Large employers, etc	8.2	14.7	0.0	19.3	16.9	8.8	9.7	15.0
ESeC 2; Lower managerial etc.	22.3	20.9	23.1	25.5	16.8	34.0	14.8	15.8
ESeC 3 & 6; Intermediate	21.9	10.6	27.4	18.7	2.7	15.6	10.6	20.1
ESeC 7; Lower sales etc	32.7	10.4	38.6	17.0	7.3	32.7	3.2	23.8
ESeC 8; Lower technical	1.8	19.9	0.0	1.9	29.4	2.5	28.4	6.6
ESeC 9; Routine occ.	13.2	23.7	10.9	17.5	27.0	6.4	33.3	18.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N weighted	1.631.861	1.714.929	1.194.671	955.515	1.196.604	1.106.193	894.829	1.345.768
N	1.215.150	964.088	947.257	570.909	661.072	1.106.193	504.079	568.966

Comment; Based on a sample of all employees in the wage structure statistics 2003. Weighted to the total number of employees in Sweden in order to be representative for the total work force of employees.

Table 5; Regression coefficients of OLS regressions with Standardized ln(wage) 2003 as dependent variable, men

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	1.50	1.58	1.57	1.70
ln(wage) 1999	0.86	0.85	0.84	0.83
Age 1999	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
ESeC 1	0.17	0.13	0.13	0.13
ESeC 2	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06
ESeC 3 & 6	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.07
ESeC 7	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
ESeC 8	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
(ref. cat. ESeC 9)				
3 years upper sec.		0.02	0.02	0.02
2 years university or less		0.03	0.03	0.04
3 years university or more		0.07	0.07	0.08
(ref. cat. 2 years upp. sec. and less)				
Change in educational attainment 1999-2003			0.00	0.01
(ref. cat. No change)				
Employment rate 2000-2003			0.11	0.10
Absenteeism 2000-2003			-0.24	-0.24
Childindex 2000-2003			0.01	0.01
Single with children			-0.02	-0.02
(ref. cat. Other household comp.)				
Single with children*childindex			-0.00	-0.00
Private sector-manufacturing				0.04
Private sector-service				0.05
(ref.cat Public sector)				
Male dominated 70-100 % men				-0.01
(ref cat other)				
Change to female/neutral 1999-2003				0.00
(ref cat No such change)				
R^2	.73	.74	.74	.74

Comments; the high R^2 is basically driven by ln(wage) 1999 which alone produce R^2 .70

Table 6; Regression coefficients of OLS regressions with Standardized ln(wage) 2003 as dependent variable, women

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	1.66	1.77	1.74	2.09
ln(wage) 1999	0.84	0.83	0.82	0.78
Age 1999	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
ESeC 1	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.13
ESeC 2	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.05
ESeC 3 & 6	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04
ESeC 7	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03
ESeC 8	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
(ref. cat. ESeC 9)				
3 years upper sec.		0.02	0.02	0.02
2 years university or less		0.03	0.03	0.04
3 years university or more		0.06	0.06	0.07
(ref. cat. 2 years upp. sec. and less)				
Change in educational attainment 1999-2003			0.01	0.01
(ref. cat. No change)				
Employment rate 2000-2003			0.09	0.08
Absenteeism 2000-2003			-0.10	-0.12
Childindex 2000-2003			0.00	0.01
Single with children			0.01	0.01
(ref. cat. Other household comp.)				
Single with children*childindex			-0.01	-0.01
Private sector-manufacturing				0.04
Private sector-service				0.03
(ref.cat Public sector)				
Male dominated 70-100 % men				0.01
(ref cat other)				
Change to female/neutral 1999-2003				-0.02
(ref cat No such change)				
R^2	.73	.74	.74	.75

Comments; the high R^2 is basically driven by ln(wage) 1999 which alone produce R^2 .71

Figure 1; Estimated wage mobility in different parts of the labor market in relation to ESeC 9.
For men.



For women.



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