

Draft. Do not cite without authors' permission.  
Comments welcome!

*April 30, 2009*

**Egalitarian Gender Paradise Lost?**  
**Re-examining Gender Inequalities in**  
**Different Types of Welfare States**

**by**

**Walter Korpi, Tommy Ferrarini, and Stefan Englund**

Swedish Institute for Social Research  
Stockholm University  
106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

Corresponding author:  
Walter Korpi (walter.korpi@sofi.su.se)

---

Paper prepared for the EMPLOY-FAMNET Workshop in Berlin, May 11-12, 2009

### **Abstract**

Can welfare states decrease gender inequalities? From earlier answers largely in the affirmative, in recent years sociologists and labor economists have underlined what they see as serious unintended negative consequences of gender egalitarian policies, consequences including increasing occupational segregation, intensified employer statistical discrimination, and decline of women's career ambitions. Pointing to major methodological problems for these interpretations, we re-examine potential effects by unpacking welfare state policies into a multi-dimensional typology of gender-relevant institutional policy structures in 18 countries. The broad spectrum of dependent variables includes occupational and work segregation, motherhood penalties, as well as gender gaps in access to paid work, top earnings, managerial positions, corporate boards, and influential roles in democratic politics. Our gender policy typology identifies major differences in outcomes among countries, but fears of perverse effects of egalitarian policies can not be verified.

What role have welfare states played in causal processes changing patterns of gender inequalities among Western countries during the past half-century? In the long debates on these issues among social scientists, we find some drastic twists and turns.<sup>1</sup> Early gender analysts often interpreted the welfare state as an extension of patriarchy to maintain the subordination of women to men. Such a view was soon widened to consider the state not as a monolithic system but as involving complex structures and actors, and gender research took a comparative turn.<sup>2</sup> Within this broader perspective, a central theme concerned “variation in the effects of social policies on gender” (Orloff 1996:56). Comparative analyses turned the searchlight to the Nordic countries, the politics and welfare state institutions of which came to be widely seen as promoting gender egalitarianism via “woman friendly welfare states” (Hernes 1987). Thus, for example, Bryson (1992:110) praised such welfare states, where “‘the vicious circle’ of women’s political, economic, and social disadvantage is being replaced by a ‘virtuous circle’ through which gains in one area interact with gains in another, to produce a general picture of cumulative progress.” What sometimes appeared as a celebration of an emerging Egalitarian Gender Paradise was however soon tempered when scholars in sociology and labor economics argued that in such a Paradise of germinating gender equality, treacherous snakes are hiding: its gender egalitarian policies have unintended effects perversely increasing major aspects of gender inequality!

These critics argue that while succeeding in expanding women’s labor force participation, gender egalitarian policies have major costs indicated by very high occupational segregation, a concentration of women to female-typed jobs, and increased employer statistical discrimination hindering women from reaching high-wage jobs and powerful positions. Such adverse effects are seen as amplified by a negative selection of women with respect to work involvement and human capital into large public sectors, as well as by interactions between such selectivity and public sector work environments further depressing women’s career ambitions. Such a questioning of gender egalitarian policies has stimulated valuable debates on the many problems facing policies to decrease gender inequalities entrenched over millennia. As will be shown here, the empirical evidence for this questioning has however been marred by serious methodological problems including neglect to consider the multi-dimensionality of gender relevant policies and mistakes in analyses of glass ceilings hindering women’s access to high wages and top positions.

Against the above background, we reexamine earlier analyses of gender inequalities and bring in new theoretical perspectives and empirical data on consequences of different types of welfare states for gender inequalities, focusing on intended as well as on unintended effects. In these debates it is fruitful to consider the distribution of the totality of necessary work in a society, unpaid as well as paid, thereby helping to clarify the role of work associated with production as well as with reproduction for resulting gender inequalities. Labels such as “woman friendly” or “family friendly” policies conceal that within countries, we frequently find competing values and conflicting goals concerning relationships between women, men, and families. One important task is to identify significant actors with potentially conflicting goals concerning gender relations; here political parties and culture-based actors, especially churches, are of key relevance. In analyses of consequences of different types of gender policies, we decompose concepts of the welfare state, gender inequality, and work, and

---

<sup>1</sup> For a review, cf Hobson (2005).

<sup>2</sup> These works include, *inter alia*, Crompton 2006; Koven and Michel 1993; Leira 1992; Lewis 1992,1993; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996.

discuss relationships between gender and class. Most comparative analyses of welfare states and inequalities have related their findings to some form of welfare state typologies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Fraser 1994; Lewis 1992, 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996). We argue that in analyses of causal processes underlying differences in gender inequalities among countries, it is fruitful to use a multi-dimensional typology based on welfare state policies mediated by institutional structures. Drawing on strengths of previous research, we decompose the concept of the welfare state by identifying separate models of welfare state institutions likely to mediate effects from policy makers in ways resulting in a divergence of gender inequalities between countries. Being results of policy making, these specific institutional structures serve as intervening variables between, on the one hand, political, economic, demographic, and cultural driving forces and, on the other hand, observed gendered outcomes. The concept of gender inequality has to be specified to capture its different aspects, two major ones being economic inequality and agency inequality, with women's labor force participation relevant for both aspects. Earlier research by sociologists, labor economists, and political scientists has often focused on separate empirical expressions of inequalities, each at a time, such as occupational segregation, earnings, and labor force participation. We argue that social processes assumed to generate gender inequalities are of such a broad scope that an evaluation requires a simultaneous analysis of multiple effects of welfare states with respect to agency inequality as well as economic inequality. In these social processes, inequalities related to gender and class are likely to be intertwined. Our analyses therefore includes a broad range of indicators for potential effects of welfare states on gender inequalities: labor force participation, work segregation, occupational segregation, wage gaps, and elite-level gender discrimination in terms of women's access to top wages, managerial jobs, and powerful positions in corporate boards and in democratic decision-making positions.

To set the context for the following analyses, we begin by outlining the relevance of agency and capabilities in the context of the totality of necessary work in a society, and by a discussion on the role of partisan politics and of churches for differences in policy goals. Contrasting the Power Resources Approach and the Varieties of Capitalism perspective, we identify major political tendencies likely to be relevant in this context. Thereafter we discuss earlier research, especially studies claiming to show major counterproductive effects of gender egalitarian welfare states. One serious weakness in these studies is that they have relied on one-dimensional measures of gender relevant policies, thereby failing to decompose contrary policy indicators and hazarding validity of their interpretations. We select empirical indicators reflecting specific policies to form different dimensions of welfare state institutions of relevance for gender inequality; some of them contrary, others in synergy. Our empirical indicators of gender-relevant institutional structures delineate three relatively clear-cut clusters of countries with different models of gender policies. Consequences of these institutional models are explored for the several aspects of gender inequalities noted above. Previous work has concluded that the perverse effects of gender egalitarian policies are amplified by a negative selection of women with respect to work involvement and human capital into large public sectors, as well as by interactions between such selectivity and work environments further depressing women's career ambitions. These conclusions are however based on analyses limited to women in employment. We show that gender egalitarian countries bring in comparatively more women into paid work than do other countries, especially women without university level education. When accounting for such differences among welfare states in composition of the labor force, outcomes are modified in ways clearly

questioning earlier interpretations. In analyzing women's access to top earnings, we point to serious problems for causal interpretation related to the indicator of glass ceilings used by labor economists. We extend analyses on gender wage gaps over total earnings distributions, gender gaps in access to managerial jobs, and, for the first time, bringing in comparative data on women's representation in boards of large corporations. For two key countries, we use diachronic "before-after" data to examine if the introduction of an egalitarian gender policy model has increased women's possibilities to reach top wages. Most research on women's possibilities to access powerful positions has focused on the private sector; we examine an alternative power structure, democratic politics. Our analyses show that the three types of institutional structures of gender-relevant policies clearly differentiate clusters of countries in terms of gender inequalities; they call into question claims of serious counter-productive effects of egalitarian gender policies. The concluding discussion considers the interplay between class and gender in debates on different strategies to favor gender equality.

Following the research strategy of most comparable cases (Lijphart 1975), this paper is based on analyses of 18 countries with uninterrupted political democracy after the Second World War and at least one million inhabitants: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.

### **Agency, Totality of Work, and Political Forces**

In Western societies, inequality has traditionally been conceptualized primarily in terms of economic and material standards of living. During the past few decades, however, analysts have increasingly attended to inequalities with respect to human agency, conceiving of inequality in terms of individuals as purposive actors differing with respect to resources enabling them to make choices over a broad range of alternative activities. Feminist researchers have illuminated the dark history of long-standing gendered agency inequalities in Western countries (for example, O'Connor 1993, 1996; Pateman 1988; Vogel 1991; Lewis 1992). The introduction of agency inequalities into evaluations of public policies, institutional structures, and individuals' life situations has been a gradual process. Pioneered by Johansson (1970, 1973) in the Nordic countries, the "Level of Living" approach conceptualized a citizen's level of living in terms of her control over resources enabling her to choose and to direct her own life. A parallel tradition has been developed by Sen with a focus on agency and capabilities. Sen (1992, p. 34) views the freedom to choose as the key to well-being and defines freedom in latent terms as "alternative sets of accomplishments that we have the power to achieve." He uses the term functioning to describe an individual's accomplishments, and views her capabilities to achieve functionings as constituting her well-being (p. 40).<sup>3</sup>

In debates and analyses of gendered agency inequality, a classical theme has focused on what Pateman (1988) once termed "Wollstonecraft's Dilemma," that is, women's choice between paid and unpaid work. The continued centrality of this dilemma reflects that while in Western societies the labor market is the key arena where economic and other inequalities among citizens are based and developed, on this arena women have traditionally been more or less marginal participants. Among feminist scholars, this issue has generated debates on what in broad terms has been referred to as "difference vs. equality (sameness)," the question being to what extent policies for improving women's positions should refer to similar criteria for women as for men, or on criteria reflecting women's traditional role in unpaid care. As

---

<sup>3</sup> On agency inequality in this context see also Nussbaum (2000), Siim (2000), and Korpi (2000).

underlined by Fraser (1994), an increased participation in care work by men can contribute to an equality strategy. To clarify arguments in the long debate on women's paid and unpaid work, it is helpful to consider what has been termed the totality of necessary work in a society (Glucksmann 2002). The totality of necessary work includes production of goods and services but also reproduction involving social care related to children and the elderly (Daly and Lewis 2000) as well as household maintenance related to food and cleaning. With the development of industrialism, production of goods and services came to be located outside the household as paid work, largely performed by men, while reproduction work long remained within the home as unpaid work for women. A key issue in debates on policies to decrease gender inequality concerns the extent to which social care should be located as unpaid work in the home, as paid work in the private sector, or as paid work in the public sector; choices here are likely to be of central importance for women's agency.

In analyzing causal processes generating gender inequalities, it is fruitful to identify potential actors of relevance for the location of social care work in a society. Here political parties as well as churches espousing moral messages loom large. In this context, we find disagreement between the Power Resources Approach and the Varieties of Capitalism perspective, both claiming to explain welfare state development as well as gender inequalities. With its focus on differences in resources which actors can use to make claims and to defend their interests in distributive conflicts, the Power Resources Approach points to the central role of political parties involved in distributive conflict from different types of power bases.<sup>4</sup> In Western democracies, two major types of power resources have key roles: economic resources (capital) and labor power (human capital). Economic resources can be concentrated to individuals and small groups of actors to a much greater extent than labor power; in employment relations, employers therefore typically dominate individual employees. Employers and employees cooperate in production but there are no enduring rules for how these actors are to allot results of production among themselves. While collective action can increase the efficacy of both types of power resources, it is crucial for labor power. This leads to the hypothesis that to increase the efficacy of their labor power in distributive strife, employees and other economically disadvantaged actors are likely to combine for collective action via political parties, trade unions, and women's movements. This approach points to the centrality of distributive conflict and to the potential role of partisan politics for inequalities in outcomes by differently influencing the location of social care work in a society.

In offering explanations for the development of welfare states as well as of gender inequalities, the Varieties of Capitalism perspective takes companies as the prime movers in the development of employee skills, production systems, welfare states, and gender inequalities.<sup>5</sup> The main distinction goes between liberal market economies requiring general employee skills, and coordinated market economies requiring skills specific to industries and firms. Because of women's potential career interruptions in connection with children and family, employers tend to apply statistical discrimination against women, a discrimination having its most serious consequences in coordinated market economies by decreasing women's possibilities to acquire specific skills. As argued by Estevez-Abe (2006, p. 174), coordinated market economies are generally more gender biased than liberal market

---

<sup>4</sup> Korpi 1983, 1985, 2006; Myles 1984; Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001.

<sup>5</sup> Hall and Soskice (2001); Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001); Estevez-Abe (2006)

economies.<sup>6</sup> The varieties of capitalism perspective thus views partisan politics as having little relevance for the development of gender inequalities.

In discussions on the role of partisan politics for gender inequalities, it is important to recall that up to the first decades after the Second World War, differences among our countries in gender-relevant policies were relatively limited.<sup>7</sup> After about 1970, however, policies affecting the gendered distribution of the totality of necessary work among these countries have diverged in ways generating important differences with regard to social care work. In some countries, major parts of social care work have been transferred into paid work in the public sector; in other countries it largely appears as paid work in the private sector; in still other countries it is to a significant extent retained as unpaid work within the home. We expect these divergent patterns of change to largely reflect differences in gender policies of political parties, pressures from women's movements within or outside political parties, and normative roles of churches. Among our countries, major political parties can be positioned on a left-right continuum. In Europe, however, this left-right dimension is partly cross-cut by Christian Democratic parties, which have been of key importance in developing distinctive welfare state institutions in countries of Continental Europe (Korpi and Palme 1998; Korpi 2006).

Why can we expect different types of political parties to diverge in policies affecting gender relations? Among them, distinctive views on the role of women are found among Christian Democratic parties reflecting teaching of the Catholic Church, the ideal of which has been the traditional family with a *pater familias* at its head and a mother devoted to the home. Over centuries, this ideal has been expressed in papal encyclicals. When gender policies started to change in the late 1960s, following this tradition Pope Paul VI (1971, paragraph 19), assailed "that false equality which would deny the distinction with woman's proper role, which is of such capital importance, at the heart of the family as well as within society."<sup>8</sup> While Protestant churches long shared similar ideals, their political influence has been much more limited. Among secular parties, views on gender inequalities have differed along the left-right continuum. To varying extents, secular center-right parties have held middle-class ideals of "separate spheres" for men and women (Reskin and Padavic 1994).

Parties on the left have long tended to be somewhat more receptive to gender equality than other major secular parties (Tingsten 1937; Norris 1987, chap. 6). In an early analysis, Tingsten (1937, chap.1) showed that in German elections up to the 1930s, social democrats elected a greater proportion of women than confessional and conservative parties. Tingsten noted that women did not particularly favor the left parties "which have worked for their constitutional and legal equality with the men and which to a large extent have chosen women candidates, and put forward the specific claims of women" (p. 46). In Germany as well as in several other European countries, women's votes did instead markedly favor confessional and conservative parties. Fearing women's support to confessional parties, in France and Belgium anti-clerical Liberal parties opposed women's suffrage up to the 1940s. How are we to explain the early and relatively continuous penchant of left parties to be somewhat more open than confessional and secular center-right parties to gender egalitarian ideas? Our hypothesis is that by having their main power resources in broad-based collective action, for left parties it has been important to avoid splitting this power base by internal conflicts between women

---

<sup>6</sup> For a critical discussion of Charles (2005).

<sup>7</sup> In a few countries, such as France, pro-nativity policies were relevant (Pedersen 1993).

<sup>8</sup> Similar exhortations have been repeated since the famous "Workers' Encyclical" of 1891.

and men. In some countries, a left party strategy became to mobilize women, for example, via auxiliary women's organizations.<sup>9</sup> Our hypothesis is thus that confessional parties have been averse to gender egalitarian policies increasing women's paid work, while left parties have tended to support gender egalitarianism by public policies widening citizen's claim rights in ways tending to transfer social care as paid work into the public sector. Reflecting their distrust of political interventions into markets, secular center-right parties have avoided extending claim rights to facilitate women's advancement, while often focusing on extending women's liberties by abolishing discriminatory rules and practices limiting their advancement (O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999).

### Previous Research

While acknowledging the relative success of gender egalitarian policies in bringing women into paid work, as noted above, one widely shared critique of gender egalitarian policies has long been that it increases gendered occupational segregation and female-typed work in countries where social care is provided primarily via the public sector. In their landmark study on occupational gender segregation, Charles and Grusky (2004, p.10) thus pose as one of their central puzzles: "Why are gender-egalitarian countries extremely segregated?" As indicated above, labor economists and sociologists are arguing that the transfer of social care to public sectors unintentionally decreases women's commitment to paid work and increases employer statistical discrimination, thereby lowering women's probabilities to reach top jobs and high earnings. In this context, the frequently used concept of glass ceilings implies that women's difficulties markedly accelerate over the total wage distribution to become especially great at top levels of wage ladders. In examining gender wage gaps over whole earnings distributions in Sweden and in the United States, labor economists Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman (2003) define the glass ceiling in terms of differences among countries in the increase of gender wage gaps from the 50<sup>th</sup> up to the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile of the total wage distribution. Finding a larger difference in the size of wage gaps between median and top wage levels in Sweden than in the United States, they conclude that there are glass ceilings in Sweden but not in the United States. As an important factor contributing to this glass ceiling, the authors point to high Swedish wage floors making it difficult for career-oriented women to hire cheap maid services (2003, p.172). They view the glass ceilings in Sweden as resulting primarily from an interaction between negative selectivity of women in terms of human capital and work involvement into the public sector and tendencies of work environments in this sector to discourage intensive work and career involvement among women. Thus Albrecht et al (2003: 172) state:

"Daycare and parental programs give Swedish women a strong incentive to participate in the labor forces. ... At the same time benefits may discourage strong career commitment on part of the parents mostly involved in child rearing. In practice it means that women may have strong incentives to participate in the labor force but not to do so very intensively."

Using similar indicators based on increases in gender wage gaps from median to top levels, several labor economists have reported glass ceilings from many European countries (Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan 2007; Booth 2006). Some analysts claim that these policies

---

<sup>9</sup> Thus, for example, among the Nordic countries, national women's social democratic organizations were formed in Norway 1901, Finland 1906, and Sweden 1920. No such national organization was however established in Denmark.

have generated a “welfare state-based glass ceiling” (Datta Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2008, p.80).

In this context we must however consider the possibility that separate factors may affect gender gaps at median and at top levels of earnings distributions. Thus, for example, differences between Sweden and the United States in the increase of gender wage gaps from median to top levels may reflect that Sweden has lower gender gaps than USA at median levels rather than higher gaps than USA at top levels. The relevant comparison here is instead between what could be called the gender ceiling height at the top, indicated by the size of gender wage gaps at top levels of wage distributions.

Also sociologists have assumed that gender egalitarian policies have major perverse counter-effects through an interaction between a partly negative selectivity of women into large public sectors and negative aspects of job characteristics and work environments in these sectors. In this vein, Mandel and Semyonov (2005, pp. 950, 952) claim that by employing women in the public sector, gender egalitarian policies

“are likely to increase rather than to decrease earnings gaps between men and women [since] the nature of these jobs and convenient work conditions available in the public sector do not appear to enhance the economic opportunities of women in terms of occupational positions and earnings. Rather they appear to reinforce women’s tendency to compromise on convenient working conditions in the female-typed jobs and to deter them from attaining high-paying positions.”

In a parallel paper, Mandel and Semyonov (2006: p.1917) argue that “in highly developed welfare states the ‘glass ceiling’ has become lower and wider [resulting in] low access for women to positions of power, authority, and high economic rewards.” They explicitly refrain from differentiating between types of gender policies, contending that in general

“state actions do not enhance women’s occupational and economic achievements, since none or them seriously challenges the traditional distribution of market-family responsibilities of men and women” (p. 1911).

Similar views are shared by Mandel and Shalev (in press, p. 8). To illustrate their argument, they contrast “egalitarian Italy” with “inegalitarian Sweden,” maintaining that the Scandinavian experience of gender egalitarian care policies teaches us that

“public care unintentionally depresses women’s earnings by intensifying their concentration in feminized service jobs and lowering their representation in highly-paid male-dominated positions.”

One problem with the causal conclusions of Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) is that their key independent variable, the “Welfare State Intervention Index,” fails to differentiate between contrary types of gender policies. Furthermore, Mandel and her coauthors take differences among countries in terms of proportions of employed women in high-paying jobs as basis for their causal conclusions about effects of egalitarian welfare states on chances for women in a country to reach top earnings. Thereby, they disregard relevant differences among countries in the selection of women into employment. We return to these problems of causal interpretation below.

Since countries with gender egalitarian policies employ major parts of women in the public sector, differences between public and private sectors in wage setting are here relevant.

Comparing seven countries, Gornick and Jacobs (1998) explored earnings differentials between public and private sector employees around 1990, with a focus on the extent to which public sectors provide high-paying jobs for women.<sup>10</sup> In all countries, earnings compression was higher in the public than in the private sector, and public/private earnings ratios tended to be negatively correlated with public sector size. In Sweden, representing countries with large public sectors, private sector employees had higher wages than their equals in the public sector, but wage differences were more pronounced for men than for women. Studies from Sweden contribute to nuance the effects of the public/private sector divide for achievements of men and women; the choice between working in the public or private sectors is consequential not only for women but also for men. Confirming the above observations, le Grand, Szulkin and Thålin (2001a) found that among comparable individuals, wage differences between public and private sectors were greater for men than for women. Examining gender gaps in attainment of supervisory and managerial positions from 1965-1991, Hultin (2001) showed that women were substantially more restricted than men in attaining supervisory positions, especially at lower and intermediate white collar positions in the private sector. Analyzing changes during the postwar period, Korpi and Stern (2004) found higher gender gaps in promotion rates in the 1960s and 70s, decades with major female labor force expansion, than in the preceding 1950s as well as in the following 1990s. The higher gender promotion gaps in the 1960s and 70s may reflect cohort effects generated by the expansion of the public sector employment in these decades.<sup>11</sup>

### **Gender Policy Institutions: Policy Indicators, Dimensions, and Models**

In comparative social science studies on effects of public policies in a limited number of countries, important debates have centered on the applicability of multivariate regression analysis and alternative ways of data analysis (for a seminal paper cf Shalev 2007). Since we here focus on the relevance of different types of policy sets for long-term outcomes, we rely primarily on typologies for analyzing our data in ways sensitive to cases, contexts, and historical backgrounds. We use a typology based on policies forming separate institutional structures as a heuristic tool in characterizing patterns of variation among countries and in exploring long-term causal processes likely to underlie differences in outcomes among countries.

Esping-Andersen's (1990) outline of conservative, liberal, and social democratic welfare state regimes has long provided fruitful landmarks for discussions of welfare states. This typology is based on patterns of correlations between driving forces, outcomes, and institutional aspects of policies, patterns which are seen as forming three broad types of welfare state regimes. A major strength of this typology is that it reflects the key partisan political cleavages found in Western countries since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century discussed above: the left-right dimension appearing in all countries but being partly crosscut by Christian Democratic parties in Continental Europe. Esping-Andersen's typology identifies such a three-cluster pattern, however with somewhat diffuse boundaries and some countries difficult to classify. This typology has been very valuable for orientation among different types of welfare states and in examining to what extent separate countries fit into the three regime

---

<sup>10</sup> Countries included were Canada, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States.

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of cohort effects on gender gaps, see Morgan (1998).

types. In analyses of causal processes behind gendered outcomes and their changes over time it has been less helpful because of its static nature and mixed base including outcomes and causes as well as institutions.

For causal interpretations, it is fruitful to focus on structures of welfare state institutions seen as intervening variables between driving forces and outcomes. To construct a typology of policy institutions as an analytic tool for causal interpretations, we unpack policy measures broadly described as woman-friendly or family-friendly into separate policy dimensions likely to differ in their consequences for women's choices between paid and unpaid work. We select specific policy indicators in areas of transfers, services, and tax systems, combine sets of such indicators into policy dimensions likely to have different consequences for women's choices between paid and unpaid work, and locate countries into these different dimensions to examine to what extent they cluster in ways indicating separate institutional models of gender policies. By identifying institutionalized policy models relevant for women's choice between paid and unpaid work based on policies promoted by different political and other forces, such a typology is fruitful in attempts to account for long-term causal processes generating differences among countries in observed gender inequalities and for changes in such inequalities over time. An early version of this typology was outlined by Korpi (2000), developing a two-dimensional version of policy indicators. This typology has been elaborated by Ferrarini (2006) and is here updated and extended by a dimension reflecting policies encouraging fathers to care for their minor children. Our typology of gender policy institutions is thus multi-dimensional and can easily identify changes over time in positions of countries as well as relevant policies within countries.

Up to the end of the Second World War, most Western governments largely left it to families and markets to tackle issues related to social care and to women's roles without attempting to shape gender relations by developing public policies granting claim rights to citizens.<sup>12</sup> Since the 1960s, however, gender policies have developed along two divergent dimensions. One dimension can be described as a traditional-family dimension, with policy indicators supporting women's unpaid work and the family. The presumption here is that wives have the major responsibility for reproduction work and enter paid work primarily on a temporary basis as secondary earners, the husband remaining the main breadwinner. A second dimension includes policies attempting to strengthen the capabilities of women, particularly of mothers, to continuous participation in paid work, that is, a dual-earner dimension. Such policies encourage and enable continuous and extensive labor force participation of women by transferring significant parts of social care from the home to the public sector. Since the early 1970s, some countries have introduced policies to redistribute child care within the family by stimulating fathers to take an active part in the care of their minor children, that is, a dual-carer dimension; these efforts are however still in a nascent stage. As discussed below, the dual-carer and dual-earner dimensions work in synergy.

Classifying gender-relevant policy indicators found in our countries around 2000 into the above policy dimensions, we arrive at a three-dimensional space within which we can describe policy differences in terms of their goals as well as in terms of their strength.<sup>13</sup> Yet we must recall that institutions are always embedded in wider social contexts of relevance for

---

<sup>12</sup> In some countries, especially France, for economic and military reasons, policies were developed to increase nativity (Pedersen 1993).

<sup>13</sup> There are alternative ways of labeling these models. Thus, for example, Lewis (2003) has here used the "adult worker" term to describe the dual-earner model. For discussions on these models cf Fraser (1994), Gornick and Meyers (2003), and Crompton (2006).

policy outcomes, contexts reflecting factors such as economic and labor market policies as well as citizens' attitudes, norms, and values. Gender relevant institutions are resultants of often diverging force; policy configurations are alloys, not elements. As underlined by Ferrarini (2006), in some countries partisan conflicts have introduced contradictory parts into gender policies (cf also Hiilamo and Kangas 2007; Leira 2006). Comparativists recognize that it is often very difficult to find reliable and valid indicators for relevant aspects of social policy dimensions. In this context, especially the quality of available information on daycare services for pre-school children is problematic. From the point of view of enabling dual-earner families, daycare services should be affordable and cover full days and whole working weeks for all children below school age (Rostgaard 2002)

The traditional-family dimension is based on a weighted average of four policy indicators:

1. Child allowances for minor children paid in cash or via the tax system (expressed as a percentage of a single workers' net wage at the level of industrial workers in the country).<sup>14</sup> (Weight 1.0),
2. Part-time public daycare services for somewhat older children (from three years up to school age), relating numbers of places or children in care to children in the relevant age group). (Weight 1.0),
3. Home care allowance to a parent for care of children below school age. (Weight 0.5),<sup>15</sup>
4. Marriage subsidies via tax benefits to head of household having an economically non-active spouse. (Weight 0.5).

Child allowances are early forms of family support likely to be neutral with respect to labor force participation of spouses. Part-time public daycare presumes that mothers are engaged in homemaking or part-time employment. Because of low earnings replacements, the home care allowance tends to be chosen by the parent with the lowest earnings, typically the mother. The marriage subsidy (Montanari 2000) describes differences in the net post-tax earnings between, on the one hand, a single person, and, on the other hand, a two-person household where only one spouse is economically active, this difference expressed as a percentage of the net average wage of a single worker.<sup>16</sup> Weights are introduced to reflect that the two first-named indicators are found in all countries and concern all families, while the latter two indicators are of relevance in fewer countries and for fewer families.<sup>17</sup>

The dual-earner dimension is an unweighted average of three policy indicators:

1. Full-time public daycare services for the youngest children (0-2 years of age), relating numbers of places or of children in care to children in the relevant age group,
2. Full-time public daycare services for children over-threes, and
3. Earnings-related parental insurance (a multiplicative variable reflecting the percentage of replacement of previous earnings and duration of benefit).<sup>18</sup>

This index reflects the extent to which public policies enable a shift of child care work from the family to the public sector in a way enabling mothers to maintain a major and continuous

<sup>14</sup> As a baseline for comparisons between countries and over time, we have here used the average wage of industrial workers, the primary relevant category for which comparable and longitudinal data are available.

<sup>15</sup> These programs are sometimes also referred to as child-care leave benefits.

<sup>16</sup> The term "marriage subsidy" alludes to the term "marriage premium" used by economists to refer to the positive wage differences between married and single men. Tax benefits include tax allowances and tax credits and are computed at average industrial worker wage levels. They can also be described as tax penalties for secondary earners.

<sup>17</sup> We have tested different ways of weighting indicators but they do not result in major changes.

<sup>18</sup> Replacement rates refer to a year with one spouse receiving replacement at average production worker net wages while the other is not working.

occupational commitment. The provision of full-time and continuous child care for the under-threes as well as for the somewhat older children is here important.<sup>19</sup> Central here are also policies for earnings-related parental leave, encouraging young women to start and to maintain an occupational career while enabling parents to have an interlude for the care of infants. To differentiate earnings-related parental leave from homecare allowances with low flat-rate benefits but often long duration, we here use a multiplicative indicator.<sup>20</sup>

Since the early 1970s, some countries have introduced programs to stimulate fathers to take a more active part in the care of their minor children, thereby redistributing childcare within the family. With earnings-related benefits, such programs cater also to men and are either earmarked for fathers or permit sharing between parents. The dual-carer dimension is an unweighted average of two policy indicators based on earnings-related parental and paternity insurance:

1. Number of weeks of paid leave which can be used either by the mother or the father, or at the same time by both, and
2. Number of weeks of paid leave reserved for fathers.

In Figure 1, we compare positions of different countries in a three-dimensional space formed by the traditional-family, dual-earner, and dual-carer dimensions. The horizontal axis reflects the degree of dual-earner support and the vertical axis the degree of traditional-family support; country positions on each dimension reflect the sum of standardized policy indicators (with average set equal to zero and standard deviation to unity). The third dimension, dual-carer support, is reflected in the relative size of country blots.<sup>21</sup> In the 1950s and 60s, most of our countries would probably have been found in the lower-left corner of this figure, with low levels of traditional-family support as well as of dual earner support (Ferrarini 2006). Since about 1970, however, driven by partisan politics as well as by women's movements, several countries have moved out of this corner but in two different directions. Up to 2000, these changes have generated three relatively clear-cut clusters of countries. With high values on traditional-family support but relatively low values on dual-earner support and little of dual-carer support, in the upper left corner we find Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands forming a cluster with a traditional-family model. During the postwar period, these six countries have all had influential Christian Democratic parties.<sup>22</sup> Distinguished by the clearly highest values on dual-earner support as well as by relatively well developed dual-carer support, in the lower right corner Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden share what can be described as a dual-earner /dual-carer model, in the following referred to as the earner-carer model.<sup>23</sup> After the Second World War, in these countries left parties came to be very influential in terms of vote shares and cabinet participation; they have also had significant women's movements. Dual-carer support has emerged primarily in countries which pioneered

<sup>19</sup> Of relevance here is also the scheduling of hours within primary schools, which may facilitate or hinder parental employment (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997).

<sup>20</sup> Gornick and Meyers (1999:130) added duration and replacement rates of all types of benefits, thereby to some extent overstating employment supporting effects.

<sup>21</sup> Raw as well as standardized values on these policy indicators can be obtained from authors.

<sup>22</sup> All of these countries have been characterized by coalition governments, in which left parties have participated relatively often. With the exception of Austria, in all of them confessional parties have had longer government tenures than the left parties. In France the confessional party disappeared after the re-introduction of majoritarian elections in 1958.

<sup>23</sup> In the earner-carer countries, traditional-family support reflects relatively generous child cash benefits largely neutral with respect to paid and unpaid work. Contradictory gender policies in Denmark, Finland, and Norway include home care allowances and marriage subsidies.

the development of dual-earner support; sprinklings of such support are also found in Canada as well as in Belgium and France.<sup>24</sup> The dual-earner and dual-carer dimensions are thus clearly correlated, indicating similar driving forces, yet having partly separate effects in terms of gender-relevant outcomes. The scatter plot indicates the contrary relationship between dual-earner and traditional-family dimensions.<sup>25</sup>

*(Figure 1 about here)*

In the lower left corner, with low degrees of traditional-family support as well as of earner-carer support, we find eight countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, and United States. The primary common denominator for this very heterogeneous set of countries is the abstention from claim rights associated with traditional-family policies or dual-earner policies, thereby leaving it largely to market and kin to reconcile work and child care. While we here describe them as having a market-oriented model of gender policy, their heterogeneity in terms of historical and political factors of relevance for gender equality must be kept in mind. In countries changing their gender policies, we can identify relatively clear political actors; non-decisions leading to abstention from change can result from combinations of many different factors. Among them it appears reasonable to take Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, but also Australia and New Zealand as something of “prototypical” market-oriented countries in the sense that this outcome is likely to largely reflect active political choice. These five countries lack confessional parties and have electoral systems based on majority voting and two major parties, settings less unlikely to generate policies introducing claim rights in either direction. Women’s movements in these countries have however been active and successful in expanding women’s liberties by supporting legislation decreasing obstacles to women’s progress on labor markets (O’Connor et al. 1999). In Australia and New Zealand, we also find traditions of legislated wage-setting institutions making significant public interventions in market processes (Castles 1985). Up to the early 1990s, Australian industrial relations commissions on federal and state levels played important roles in narrowing gender wage gaps according to equity principles (O’Connor et al. 1999, p. 89).

Unlike the above five countries, while sharing market-oriented gender policies, Ireland, Switzerland, and Japan appear as more of special cases. Ireland has been strongly Catholic; because of its late nation formation, it did however not develop a Christian Democratic party of the Continental European model. In Switzerland, national policy making has been highly restricted by the federal political structure, independent cantons, and the frequent use of popular referenda (Immergut 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001), restrictions contributing to maintain a market-oriented model. In a much different context, such a gender policy model is also found in Japan, where a secular center-right party has dominated during the post-war period.

As noted above, the Varieties of Capitalism perspective claims that the major cleavage of relevance for gender inequalities runs between Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies. With exceptions of Japan and Switzerland, countries described here as having a market-oriented gender policy model are also seen as being Liberal Market

<sup>24</sup> In Canada, after a Supreme Court decision, men were permitted to have the same 10 week leave as mothers, while Belgium and France had half a week of paid leave for fathers.

<sup>25</sup> Mandel and Semyonov (2006, fn 15) argue that their main independent variable (Welfare State Intervention Index) has a close positive correlation with our dual-earner dimension. Their correlation does however largely reflect that market-oriented countries have similar positions on both indicators. Leaving countries in this category aside, the correlation between dual-earner and traditional-family support is negative and high (-.92).

Economies. In our perspective, Coordinated Market Economies are however split into two different clusters: one having a traditional-family model, the other an earner-carer gender policy model. The Varieties of Capitalism implication, to be tested below, is thus that there are no major differences in gender inequalities between these two clusters.

### **Gendered Total Work and Occupational Segregation**

Focusing on the distribution of the totality of necessary work, we find two major types of differentiation within countries. What can be described as primary work segregation is indicated by the extent to which women are homemakers remaining outside the labor force to take care of family and home, as well as by gender differences in labor force participation rates. Within production work we find a secondary form of segregation, that is, in occupational segregation. Research on gendered work segregation has largely been bifurcated with one stream focused on labor force participation and another on occupational segmentation. Most analyses of gendered occupational segregation have thus failed to simultaneously consider also primary work segregation, which in many countries consigns sizable proportions of women to unpaid work within the home, that is, to archetypical female work.<sup>26</sup> During the last three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, women's increasing labor force participation rates have markedly eroded gender gaps in participation, a decline somewhat amplified by a simultaneous decreases in male participation rates. However, some significant variation among countries has remained.

Lacking good class indicators in most databases on labor markets, we take formal educational level as a proxy for class, and look at differences among countries in labor force participation rates in 2002 among women (25-64 years) with different levels of formal education (Table 1).<sup>27</sup> Participation rates generally increase with increasing formal education. Labor force participation among women with less than secondary education show considerable differences among countries, ranging from one third in Italy to two thirds in Sweden. On average, countries with earner-carer gender policy institutions have the highest levels with about 60 percent or more of women with low education in the labor force.<sup>28</sup> Among prototypical market-oriented countries, in this educational category average participation rates are about ten percentage points lower in USA, Canada, and the UK but not quite that low in Australia and New Zealand. Participation rates at roughly a similar level are also found in Switzerland while Ireland has a very low rate. Among countries having traditional-family policy institutions we see more variation, with participation rates among low-educated women close to 50 percent in Austria, Germany, and The Netherlands but higher in France and lower in Belgium. The clearly lowest percentage is however found in Italy. Among women with secondary education, the clearly highest participation rates again appear in earner-carer countries, where they approach levels of women with tertiary education. Differences among market-oriented and traditional-family models are muted, as are most country differences among women with tertiary education. In this context, Japan appears as an exception with little differences in participation rates according to formal education.

*(Table 1 about here)*

---

<sup>26</sup> For a positive exception cf Nermo (2000).

<sup>27</sup> Data from Organization for Economic and Cultural Development (2002, p. 77 and 2004, pp. 306-310).

<sup>28</sup> In Switzerland, a sizable number of temporary immigrants are likely to be included in labor force figures but not in population figures; because of this problem in comparability, Swiss figures are here put within parenthesis.

The above patterns thus indicate that an important part of what critics have seen as a lower selectivity into the labor force in earner-carer countries reflects that they have drawn comparatively large proportions of women without tertiary education into the labor force. These differences are likely to be relevant for the location of employed women along the total wage distribution.

A conspicuous form of primary work segregation appears in the proportion of partnered women (35-64 years) who describe themselves as homemakers, concentrating on unpaid work at home (cf Methodological Appendix). The clearly lowest percentage of homemakers is found in countries with the earner-carer model. These proportions are higher in USA and the UK, prototypical market-oriented countries. With additional obstacles to women's employment found in Ireland and Switzerland, percentages of homemakers are still higher. Among countries with traditional-family model, the proportion of homemakers in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium is roughly at the US level, but considerably higher in Austria and especially high in Italy.

Gender-policy institutions are related to gender employment gaps among partnered persons (Table 1, columns 5-7). In the absence of children, in earner-carer countries gender employment gaps among partnered persons are low and have nearly disappeared in Finland and Sweden. Among prototypical market-oriented countries, USA, Canada, UK, and New Zealand have gender employment gaps not much higher than earner-carer countries, but these gaps are considerably higher in Australia. They are high also in Belgium and the Netherlands, but very high in Italy. The "motherhood penalty" is indicated by differences in employment rates between women with and those without minor children (England 2005; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2006). Comparing families without and with minor children, we find motherhood penalties in all countries but markedly lower ones in earner-carer countries. Among prototypical market-oriented countries, USA, Canada, UK, and New Zealand tend to have considerably higher motherhood penalties than earner-carer countries; still higher penalties appear in Australia.<sup>29</sup> Countries with the traditional-family model share these larger penalties, which are exceptionally high in Italy. Our typology of gender policies thus indicates considerable differences in gender gaps in primary work segregation and in motherhood penalties, with earner-carer countries having lowest figures. Four prototypical market-oriented countries – USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand – form a middling category, while gender gaps in the remaining countries, among them traditional-family countries, vary at mostly high levels.

As noted above, gender egalitarian policies have been widely assumed to generate very high occupational gender segregation. In analyses of segregation, a much used measure is the dissimilarity index (D), reflecting the percentage of men and women that would have to be removed from a data set to make for a perfect correspondence between the sex composition of each occupation and the entire labor force (Duncan and Duncan 1955). This index is sensitive to differences among countries in the size of occupational categories. We therefore also use the Index of Association (A), which reflects the extent to which sex ratios within different categories of occupations deviate from the mean of ratios calculated across all categories of occupations (Charles and Grusky 2004, p. 42).

In examining horizontal occupational segregation as traditionally defined on the basis of the distribution of employed men and women among 23 different occupational categories (cf

---

<sup>29</sup> Limiting analyses to women 22-44 years, Harkness and Waldfogel (1999) find the highest motherhood penalties in the UK, reflecting its sizable proportion of women on low-paid short part-time jobs.

Methodological Appendix), we find relatively muted overall differences among countries with different gender policy institutions, and earner-carer countries consistently fail to appear as distinctive (Table 2).<sup>30</sup> According to the D-index, half of our countries are found within a narrow band of values (46-48), namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, UK, Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands. A somewhat higher value appears in Finland, while the lowest ones are found in Italy, USA, France, and Austria. The A-index shows a relatively similar pattern, with somewhat higher values in Finland, UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, and again low values in France, Italy, Germany, and USA, now with Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium in between.

*(Table 2 about here)*

For a broader index reflecting total work segregation, we include homemakers as an additional category in bases for computing segregation measures. Again, however, earner-carer countries fail to come out as distinctive. On the dissimilarity index (D), Denmark, Norway, and Sweden thus tend to cluster in the company of UK, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and The Netherlands. The highest D-values are found in Ireland, Switzerland, and Finland while the lowest ones appear in USA and Italy. Also the index of association (A) shows USA, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands in a middling category. The A-index has its highest values in Ireland, UK, Switzerland, Norway, and Belgium, while the lowest values are found in Italy, Germany, and France. Contrary to what has been widely assumed, earner-carer countries do thus not appear to have more occupational or total work segregation than countries with other types of gender policy models. As also noted by Charles and Grusky (2004: p. 71), Sweden appears to have middling levels of occupational segregation.

Jobs dominated by women have traditionally been disadvantaged in terms of wages, work conditions, employment security, and skills (England 1992). Critics of gender egalitarian policies have applied this traditional lens when characterizing large parts of care work in public sectors of earner-carer countries in terms of menial and unqualified jobs. Thus, for example, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) take large proportions of women in same occupational category as a significant criterion for gender inequality. Pointing to Denmark and Sweden, they claim support for the view that in these countries, large public sectors

“did not alter the traditional division of labor between men and women, [instead] it actually transferred the gendered division of labor from the private sphere into the public domain, ... while men get hold of more desirable jobs. [In] a large ‘protected’ public sector women are likely to be relegated mostly to female-typed service jobs, [into] feminine niches [offering] job protection and convenient working conditions” (2006, pp. 1916,1917).

Mandel and Semyonov would thus appear to conjure an image of public sectors in these two countries as having crowds of women in less qualified but convenient and protected jobs, work reminding us of child-minders looking after children but not doing it very intensively. They have however not recognized that in the earner-carer countries with large public sectors, such as Denmark and Sweden, early childhood education and care has developed to high professional standards, where preschool teachers in center-based and preprimary care are required to have at least three years of university training (Gornick and Meyers 2003, pp. 220-223). Anglophone countries with small public sectors tend to have much lower requirements for staff education. In Sweden, working-class women in the public sector tend to have more intrinsic engagement in their work and to have job qualities on par with or better than their

<sup>30</sup> Information for Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have not been available.

sisters in the private sector.<sup>31</sup> In the Nordic and also in some other European countries, female dominance in social care is likely to primarily reflect what Charles and Grusky (2004, p. 17) call horizontal segregation, where “deeply rooted and widely shared cultural beliefs about gender differences are ideologically compatible with liberal egalitarian norms.” Such gender differentiation is likely to largely reflect socialization (England 2005).

### **Gender Wage Gaps and Gender Policy Models**

The level of a person’s earnings is an important indicator of inequality in economic outcomes and status.<sup>32</sup> As shown by economists and sociologists, in our countries on the average women have lower gross earnings than men (Blau and Kahn 1996, 2003; England 2005); especially care work tends to have low wages (England, Budig, and Folbre 2002). Gender wage gaps can be measured in terms of differences between men and women in gross earnings per time unit, usually hourly earnings. Gender earnings inequalities are affected by forms of wage setting, where especially broad-based collective bargaining has tended to decrease gender wage gaps at medium and low levels of earnings (Blau and Kahn 1996, 2003). In the presence of such encompassing collective bargaining, what may appear as a relatively high gender wage gap at the top may instead reflect a lower wage gap at median levels of wage distributions. As discussed above, to examine country differences in gender wage discrimination at the top, we focus on gender ceiling heights at the top, indicated by differences in wage gaps at higher levels of wage distributions.

Following established practice, we examine gender wage gaps in terms of percentage point differences between men and women in logged hourly earnings, focusing on gross wages for the period 1998-2000 at the 20<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, 80<sup>th</sup> and at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles (Table 3). In this context we must consider that estimates of gender wage gaps are fraught with major problems reflecting differences among countries in sources of information and in ways of reporting earnings and as well as hours worked. Because of these problems, figures given here must be seen as estimates associated with considerable uncertainties (cf Methodological Appendix). In this context, Japan appears as special case with extremely high gender wage gaps at medium and higher levels of the income distribution. Comparing wage gaps at the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile, we do not find systematic differences among gender policy models. In terms of percentage point differences, the largest gender wage gaps (25+) appear in Canada, the UK, USA, and Finland, with somewhat lower ones in (20-24) Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Lower wage gaps (up to 19) are found in the remaining countries, with the clearly lowest one in Italy.<sup>33</sup> Moving up to the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile, a roughly similar pattern reappears. Among countries with the largest gender wage gaps (25+) we now find UK, USA, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, while somewhat lower gaps (20-24) are found in Germany, and Canada, and still lower ones in the remaining countries. Considering uncertainties in estimates of wage gaps, at these two top levels earner-carer countries do not appear to clearly deviate from USA, UK, and Canada.

*(Table 3 about here)*

Examining profiles of gender gaps along the total wage distribution, we find one pattern of interest. The four earner-carer countries together with Australia and New Zealand are the only

<sup>31</sup> Paper by authors.

<sup>32</sup> Because of additional problems in classification of occupational titles, we here focus on gender wage gaps, indicators likely to be somewhat less problematic in comparative analyses of occupational achievements.

<sup>33</sup> In this context it should be noted that figures for Italy and Ireland are net of taxes; assuming progressive taxation and higher earnings for men, this may give lower gender gaps.

ones showing tendencies to continuous increases in wage gaps from the 20<sup>th</sup> over the 50<sup>th</sup> up to the 80<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the earnings distribution. In these countries we thus find sizable differences in gender wage gaps between top and median wage levels. As noted above, before interpreting such patterns of differences among countries as indicators of especially severe gender handicaps at the top, we must examine alternative causal processes related to forms of wage setting. Since the end of the 1960s, in Sweden the trade union's "wage policy of solidarity" contributed to raise the floor for the lowest wage earners, thereby markedly increasing especially women's wages.<sup>34</sup> Women's wages were also improved in the context of increasing labor demand generated by expanding public sector social services. Partly parallel wage setting efforts were also made in the other three Nordic countries.<sup>35</sup> As noted above, in Australia and New Zealand statutory setting of minimum wages long played central roles (O'Connor et al. 1999, p. 89).

To test the hypothesis that the introduction and maturation of gender egalitarian policies has resulted in markedly increasing top-level wage gaps signifying increasing gender handicaps at the top, an examination of diachronic data for market-oriented USA and earner-carer Sweden is of relevance.<sup>36</sup> US wage gap profiles over the whole wage distribution, available for 1992, 1997, 1999, and 2000, can be taken as points of departure in evaluating potential effects of specific wage policies and gender policies introduced since the early 1970s in Sweden.<sup>37</sup> Over these years, US wage gap profiles show relatively similar forms, being lowest around the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile, where minimum wage laws are likely to be of relevance, increasing gradually up to the median and thereafter declining somewhat up to the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile (Figure 2A). At the very top of the US wage distribution, top coding of earnings in databases affect primarily men and could modify gender gaps and also differences among years. Over most of the wage distribution, wage gaps for 2000 are somewhat lower than are gaps for the preceding years.<sup>38</sup>

*(Figure 2 about here)*

In Sweden, panel-based data covering more than three decades provide a unique possibility to a "before-after" empirical test of potential effects on gender wage gaps over the total wage distribution from wage policies and gender egalitarian policies, in this period driven in tandem by trade unions and Social Democratic governments. The earliest earnings data refer to 1968, that is, before the intensification of the "wage policy of solidarity" and before the introduction of the major gender egalitarian policies in the early 1970s.<sup>39</sup> The combined effects of these two major policy changes can be traced in changing profiles of gender wage gaps from 1968 to 1974, 1981, 1991, and 2000 (Figure 2B). At low and medium wage levels, as expected, we see major declines in gender wage gaps from 1968 over 1974 and up to 1981,

<sup>34</sup> Edin and Richardsson (2002).

<sup>35</sup> Asplund, Barth, Lundborg, Matthíasson, and Westergaard-Nielsen (forthcoming)

<sup>36</sup> Differences among countries and changes over time in handling very low and very high earnings introduces problems in comparisons of wage gaps at these levels. In the following comparisons focus on the 5-95 percentile range of the total earnings distributions.

<sup>37</sup> USA has retained its market oriented gender policy model since 1960.

<sup>38</sup> Data Gupta, Oaxaca, and Smith (2006) interpret this decrease to reflect improvements in women's occupational attainment, experience, and education.

<sup>39</sup> Major reforms of relevance here were legislations on separate taxation of spouses 1971, parental leave in 1974, expansion of day care services for children 1976, the right for parents with infants to a period of six-hour working day in 1979, and the Equal Opportunities Act in 1980 (for a discussion, cf Eduards 1991). From 1968 over 1974 and up to 1983, female labor force as percent of women 15-64 years increased from 56.6 to 64.9 and 76.6, while government employment as percent of total employment increased from 18.4 to 24.8 and 32.0 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1995: Table 2.8 and 2.13).

after which wage setting was more decentralized. Yet, against the backdrop of widespread claims that gender egalitarian policies generate glass ceilings, the absence of increasing wage gaps at the top of the wage distribution is astounding.<sup>40</sup> Over more than three decades of emergence and maturation of egalitarian gender policies, we see – if anything – some decrease in wage gaps from about the 75<sup>th</sup> to the 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles and relative stability at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile.<sup>41</sup> This non-emergence of increasing wage gaps at the top provides a stark challenge to hypotheses that gender egalitarian policies decrease women's access to high earnings.

### **Women's Chances to Reach Top Earnings**

Analyses claiming to show that women in countries with egalitarian gender policies have comparatively low probabilities to access top wages are based on examinations of wage differences among employed women. As shown above, however, countries with the earner-carer model have larger proportions of women without university education in employment. These differences in the composition of employed women in terms of education and class backgrounds are likely affect the location of employed women along the total earnings distribution. The hypothesis that a macro-characteristic of a country – its gender policy model – affects the probability of women in the country to achieve top wages can therefore not be tested by examination of women in employment; we must also consider the selection of women into employment.

To take account of differences in such selection, we look at women in the top quintile of the earnings distribution both as proportions of employed women and as proportions of all women in a country. The first column in Table 4 shows the proportion of employed women in the top earnings quintile. Replicating earlier findings (Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Mandel and Shalev, in press), we find differences among countries with respect to gender policy models. One of the highest proportions is found in Italy; one of the lowest in Sweden. On the basis of similar figures, Mandel and Semyonov (2006, p. 1917) have proclaimed a Welfare State Paradox, reflecting that “in highly developed welfare states the ‘glass ceiling’ has become lower, [resulting in] low access for women to ... high economic rewards.” But when we examine women's representation in the top quintiles as proportions of all women, this paradox disappears. In all gender policy models, proportions of women in the top-earnings quintile are low but quite similar, about one tenth; the only exception here is Japan with a considerably lower proportion. Mandel and Shalev have taken an important step forward by including class in micro-analyses of women in employment; we extend this analysis by showing that class is relevant already in the selection of women into employment.

*(Table 4)*

### **Women as Managers and Members of Boards in Large Corporations**

As discussed above, it has been widely claimed that gender egalitarian policies deter women from reaching top positions of authority in the private sector of the economy, with employer statistical discrimination being a major hindrance. This hypothesis is here evaluated

---

<sup>40</sup> In this context it should be noted that Swedish income data are taken from tax registers; compared to surveys, this procedure markedly improves reliability and coverage.

<sup>41</sup> Gender wage gaps at 75<sup>th</sup>, 80<sup>th</sup>, 85<sup>th</sup>, 90<sup>th</sup>, and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles in 1968 were 31, 33, 35, 37, and 35 percentage points, and 22, 21, 25, 25, and 34 in 2000. At the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile, the lowest observations of 29 percentage points came in 1981 and 1991, the increase up to 2000 probably reflecting major increases in private sector male earnings.

by an examination of differences in compositions of managerial occupations among employees in countries with different types of gender policy models.<sup>42</sup> As has been shown in earlier studies, countries differ in terms of proportions of occupations classified as being managers, with USA having a larger proportion than most other countries (Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund 1995). To control for such country differences, we here examine gender gaps among all employees within a country; because of likely differences among countries in classification of managerial positions, we also introduce earnings levels and select managers at the top half, top third, and top fifth of the earnings distribution among all employees (cf Methodological Appendix). Looking at all managers as a percentage of all employees, as expected we find considerable differences among countries with the highest proportion in USA (Table 5). Among all managers, gender gaps are almost absent in some countries, among them USA, but are present to some extent in some other countries. Focusing on gender gaps among managers in the upper half, the upper third, and the upper fifth of the total earnings distributions among employees, the US gender gap increases to roughly similar levels as found in other countries. Most relevant here is the absence of clear patterns of differences among countries with different gender policy models.

*(Table 5 about here)*

The hypothesis that gender policy models differ in terms of the extent to which they permit women to enter positions of authority and power in the private sector can be further evaluated by examining women's access to positions on company boards in the largest firms in 16 countries, using data which have only recently become available (cf Methodological Appendix). Among European countries, proportions of women in corporate boards are affected by a gender quota in Norway and in some other countries by legislation requiring employee representatives in company boards.<sup>43</sup> We begin by presenting figures on women's share of all board members, thereafter adjusting these figures by excluding employee representatives to estimate women's share of board members representing shareholders.

Female total shares of boards in large companies range from low 4 percent in Italy to 41 percent in Norway (Table 6). The high board representation of women in Norway is partly due to a legislated quota, since 2006 requiring 40-60 percent sex balance in publicly listed companies.<sup>44</sup> Also other countries with the earner-carer model have relatively high percentages of women in boards of the largest companies: Sweden 26, Finland 20, and Denmark 17. Here Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, USA, and the UK form an intermediate cluster where between 12 and 15 percent women in boards of the largest companies. In Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, and Switzerland, less than ten percent of board members are women.

*(Table 6)*

Across the European Union, among employee representatives in the boards of large companies, women account for around 20 percent with the highest proportions in Germany and the Nordic countries. Excluding employee representatives and focusing on women among

---

<sup>42</sup> It can be noted that proportions of self-employed differ considerably among countries, and among them relatively large proportions are classified as managers.

<sup>43</sup> In most countries, employee representatives on company boards formally have the same rights as board members representing the shareholders, with the exception of issues related to industrial disputes.

<sup>44</sup> The share of women in boards of the largest companies in Norway thus increased from 31 to 41 percent between 2005 and 2008.

board members representing shareholders does not reverse this general picture; however the percentage of women decreases in Denmark, Austria, and Germany.<sup>45</sup>

## Women in Democratic Politics

Debates on consequences of gender egalitarian welfare states for women's access to positions of power have almost exclusively focused on the private sector. Processes and mechanisms assumed to stifle women's possibilities for advancement in gender egalitarian welfare states – negative selectivity of women into large public sectors further discouraging women's ambitions – are however of such a broad nature that we can expect them to have similar consequences also in democratic politics. Women's achievements reflect their individual capacities based on human capital but also their collective capacity via women's movements, inside and outside political parties, to influence societal norms and values related to gender relations. In the private sector, advancement depends on selection by superiors; in democratic politics selection reflects choices by fellow citizens. One expression of collective capacities of women's movements to influence societal norms is the introduction of gender quotas within parties in several countries (Dahlerup 2006). Gender quotas have not descended as gifts from above; they are results of long and arduous work by women's movements, combined with their strategic action. Yet, in public as well as in private sectors, advancement requires that women themselves are willing to compete with others, men as well as women, to achieve such positions. In assessing the fruitfulness of hypotheses on the counter-productive role of gender egalitarian policies for women's possibilities to reach positions of power, an examination of gender differences in access to decision-making positions within representative democratic organs is therefore of key importance.

Within democratically elected organs, legislatures and cabinets offer peak positions, and we can follow women's representation at these top levels during the decades after the end of the Second World War, more in detail from the early 1990s and up to 2005. As is well known, electoral models are relevant for female advancement; proportional elections provide easier access for women than majoritarian models. Among our countries somewhat different forms of majoritarian electoral models were found in USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Japan, France (after 1958), and New Zealand (before 1996). The other countries have had proportional elections, the most common form being party lists of candidates.

In our 18 countries, from 1950 up to 1970 legislatures had very few women; the average share of women was about five percent, with only minor differences among countries. After 1970, however, the walls of these male citadels began to erode, the speed of erosion differing among countries in ways reflecting gender policy models, partisan politics, as well as electoral institutions, with progress most clearly observable in the Nordic countries. In 1990, the dual-earner countries thus clearly deviate from all others, having increased women's representation in legislatures to around one third of seats, while in the other countries women had, at best, only one fifth (Table 7). Up to 2005, women's diet representation in three of the earner-carer countries increased slightly from already high levels, Sweden approaching a near-equal gender representation.<sup>46</sup> Among countries with other forms of gender policy

---

<sup>45</sup> Sprinklings of data available on women among central executive officers in the largest private corporations suggest that they are exceedingly rare in countries examined here.

<sup>46</sup> For analyses of factors affecting women's advancement in the Nordic countries cf Bergquist (1999) and Freidenvall, Dahlerup and Skeije (2006). An international analysis is found in Kenworthy and Malami (1999).

models, women's representation increased but remained considerably lower, especially in Japan, Italy, Ireland, France, and the US. The relevance of electoral institutions was indicated when the change to proportional elections in New Zealand in 1996 markedly increased female parliamentary representation.

*(Table 7 about here)*

Reflecting the near-absence of women in legislatures up to 1970, in our countries practically only men held the levers of cabinet power. In the early 1990s, however, we find considerable improvements for women in cabinet representation, especially in earner-carer countries, where at that time women held about 40 percent of cabinet seats in Finland, Norway, and Sweden with a somewhat lower level in Denmark. In the period 2003-05, among these countries high female cabinet representation continued in Finland and Norway, and in the Swedish cabinet women held half of cabinet posts. In the cabinet formed in Finland after the 2007 elections, women had a majority of seats. In Denmark however, women's cabinet representation remained at lower levels. Among countries with a traditional-family model, up to 2005 Italy had exceedingly low women's cabinet representation. Some progress was however made in the Netherlands and Belgium, considerably so in Austria and Germany. Among countries with market-oriented gender policies, the lowest levels of women's representation were found in Japan, Australia, USA, Ireland and Switzerland, while clear progress can be noted in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Among countries with proportional elections, in 2000 Italy had the lowest levels of women in legislatures as well as in cabinets.

## Discussion

Policies to decrease age-old traditions of gender inequalities are bound to run into problems. Gender equality has nowhere been achieved but we can analyze differences among countries in the efficacy of different types of policy models to approach this goal. Policies to decrease gender inequality involve transfers of social care work between different sectors in a society, transfers generating unavoidable tradeoffs between differently evaluated aspects. Scholarly debates are therefore welcome, and critical analyses of gender egalitarian policies have made fruitful contributions by bringing into the center of debates key issues, some of which have long been considered in the Nordic countries. While a critical stance is welcome, as we have seen several strong arguments advanced in this context have highly problematic empirical bases, problems including the categorization of contrary types of policy measures into single indicators seen as woman friendly and family friendly, limitation of analyzes of policy consequences to the composition of women in employment while neglecting socio-economic differences in selection into employment, , and the use of misleading empirical indicators for glass ceilings. The different dimensions in the typology of gender-relevant policies outlined here reflect central economic and cultural cleavages structuring broad-based collective action and partisan politics among Western countries: the left-right cleavage running through all countries but in Continental Europe is modified by Christian Democratic parties associated with Catholicism. These cleavages have significantly structured transformations of social care since the 1960's; especially in Ireland, Switzerland, and Japan, major additional factors have contributed to shape gender policies and inequalities. The Varieties of Capitalism approach has been very valuable in drawing attention to country differences in organizing economies; its disregard of partisan politics and of differences among Coordinated Market Economies in terms of gender policy models weakens its

relevance in analyses of gender inequalities. Differences among countries in the decrease of gender inequalities since the 1960's reflect partisan politics as well as women's collective mobilization to change social norms on gender relations. In the Nordic countries, early on left parties became agenda setters for this decrease, receiving significant support from liberal parties.<sup>47</sup>

Analyses here contradict assumptions of one-dimensional welfare state gender policies by Mandel and Semyonov. From an agency-equality perspective, the earner-carer model appears to have contributed more than prototypical market-oriented policies in USA, Canada, and the United Kingdom to increase labor force participation rates among women without university education, to decrease proportions of homemakers, and to lower motherhood penalties. Yet, in these areas countries with traditional family policies tend to have higher gender inequalities than prototypical market-oriented countries. In this context, France is somewhat exceptional in ways likely to reflect a Liberal counter-culture in opposition to the Catholic Church.<sup>48</sup> Since women have intermittent work more often than men, in all countries they face serious risks for employer statistical discrimination and difficulties for human capital accumulation. Our empirical data show that widely shared expectations of greater risks for women in earner-carer countries are not supported. In these countries it is relatively easy to find child care, and most women work full-time or have periodically long part-time jobs. By being, on the average, more affordable and having higher quality and continuity, provision of social care via the public sector is likely to have been more effective in supporting mothers' paid work than have provisions via the private sector. Judiciously designed parental leave programs improve incentives for women to enter and to remain in the labor force. In most countries with traditional-family or market-oriented gender policies, we find more of short part-time work, longer interruptions in connection of childbirth, and difficulties in finding child care, factors likely to generate even more severe motherhood penalties.<sup>49</sup> Earner-carer countries have long had a largely undeserved reputation for having extremely segregated occupational structures. As shown here, their occupational segregation is probably not worse than in many other countries. Bad as this may be, horizontal job segregation is often seen as compatible with egalitarianism, at least as long as it is not associated with lower job quality or lower wages.

Critics of gender egalitarian policies have gained a wide hearing for their view that compared to other countries, the earner-carer ones have severe gender discrimination in terms of women's access to top wages and managerial jobs. But these analyses have been misleading. Focusing on differences among countries in gender wage gaps at top levels we do not find major differences between earner-carer countries and prototypical market oriented countries. Another serious problem is that conclusions about specific deterrents for women in earner-carer countries to reach top wages have been based on analyses of the location of employed women while disregarding the role of gender policies for differences among countries in bringing women without university education into employment. When taking account of socio-economic differences in women's probabilities to join the labor force, women's chances to enter the top quintile in earnings appear similar at relatively low levels in all countries except Japan, with much lower probabilities. For Sweden, we have examined

---

<sup>47</sup> For the Swedish case, cf Hobson and Lindholm (1997).

<sup>48</sup> To a lesser extent this also holds for Belgium, where however proportional elections gave the confessional party a relatively strong position.

<sup>49</sup> Cf also Gornick, Meyers, and Ross (1998).

diachronic data covering more than three decades of the emergence and maturation of its earner-carer model. This first “before-after” test in what amounts to a natural experiment gives no support for the hypothesis that the introduction of gender-egalitarian policies has increased top-level wage gaps; it provides a stiff challenge to hypotheses on “welfare-state-based glass ceiling” effects of gender egalitarian policies. The general hypotheses that dual-earner policies soften the will as well as the capabilities of women to attain powerful and prestigious positions are also difficult to square with figures showing that since 1970, women in the earner-carer countries have achieved top politically elected positions to a clearly greater extent than have their sisters in other gender-policy contexts, as well as with recently available figures on women’s representation on corporate board. In these contexts, Japan with very high gender wage gaps at all wage levels appears as something of an enigma. From an egalitarian perspective, the higher potential of earner-carer countries to integrate into the labor force also women without university education and with working class backgrounds appears as a major achievement, decreasing both class and gender inequalities.

The transfer of social care to the public sector is associated with tradeoffs. One critical tradeoff concerns wage effects of public sector employment, tending to decrease wage dispersion at the lower as well as at the higher ends. Differences between private and public sectors with respect to top wages reflect differences in the nature of services produced as well as in constraints for wage setting. Public sector care services are in principle public goods, benefiting all, and therefore creating problems of free-riding when non-contributing beneficiaries can not be excluded (England and Folbre 1999). Many direct beneficiaries of care are economically dependent. Wage setting in the public sector is indirectly as well as directly influenced by decision-making in the context of political democracy where available wage funds are determined by relatively well organized and mobilized tax payers. In the private sector, the rule often is to take from typically unorganized customers what competition on markets can bear. Since the early 1980’s, in most of our countries, the very top wages in the private sector – mostly to men – have accelerated dramatically (Atkinson and Piketty 2007). In the Nordic countries, this change was of relevance for increases of public-private differences in wages, with larger increases for men than for women. In the same period, the long decrease of gender wage gaps in these countries came to a halt. Another type of trade-off appears to be associated with location of childcare and fertility. The earner-carer model tends to have positive effects on fertility rates (Björklund 2006; Ferrarini 2006; Neyer and Andersson 2008; Oláh and Bernhardt 2008). In Continental Europe, countries with traditional-family model tend to combine relatively low female labor force participation with low fertility rates. Possibilities to transfer this model to other countries have been debated (Gornick and Meyers 2008; Shalev 2008).<sup>50</sup> Some economists argue that earner-carer policies have a major drawback by being expensive and constituting burdens on public budgets (Datta Gupta et al. 2008). In parallel to expenditures for general education, however, also expenditures for early childhood education can be seen as investments in human capital, investments which are likely to give future payoffs. Studies indicate that the earner-carer model is likely to have positive effects on children’s wellbeing and development (Ministry of Social Affairs 2001; Waldfogel 2002, 2004) as well as on child poverty rates, especially among single mothers (Hobson and Takahasi 1997; Smeeding and Rainwater 1995).

---

<sup>50</sup> To improve its very low reproduction rates, in 2007 the German confessional-left cabinet introduced a Scandinavian model of parental leave.

It is somewhat ironic that while critics have described women's work in earner-carer countries as convenient, less demanding, and secure, they have largely bypassed a serious problem: the possibility that in the earner-carer countries, under some circumstances pressures on women in the public sector may increase more than on those in the private sector.<sup>51</sup> An example here is Sweden, which suffered a severe depression in the early 1990s, when the long postwar period of full employment was replaced by mass unemployment at two-digit levels. In combination with the political run-up to fulfill financial requirements for the new European Monetary Union, serious restrictions on public expenditures resulted in a massive shedding of personnel in the public sector. Since the demand for social care services certainly did not decrease, in the public sector the remaining personnel had to face greater strain. Surveys indicate that in the 1990s, the prevalence of negative stress among women increased more in the social care sector than in the private retail sector.<sup>52</sup> Although there were only minor increases in gender wage gaps in the public sector, in this period both men and women in the public sector saw their wages fall behind those in the private sector, where especially top wages for men have escalated.<sup>53</sup> Finland went through similar processes.

The above analyses point to tensions in the relationship between class inequality and gender inequality. These tensions bring up the question if gender inequality is to be decreased over the whole range of socio-economic positions, or if gender inequality at the top should be decreased even at the cost of increasing socio-economic inequalities. This policy dilemma emerges in the suggestion that the advancement of more women to top earnings should be facilitated by some women having access to cheap maid services generated by widening class inequality so that an increasing number of working-class women are willing to accept low-paid private service jobs. This alternative is now well underway in several Western countries, where increasing flows of immigrant women from low income countries form what has been referred to as an international chain of care to take such jobs in the rich countries (Crompton 2006). The earner-career model offers a much more complex alternative not premised on a widening of class inequality: the promotion of a more equal sharing of care work between parents. In the context of relatively generous parental leave benefits as well as affordable and good public child care, the first beginnings of such tendencies can be seen in earner-carer countries.<sup>54</sup> Since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, gender inequalities tended to decrease hand-in-hand with class inequalities; after the 1970s these two components of inequalities have parted company. Class inequality reflected in income distribution has turned to marked upsurge; the decline of gender inequalities has tended to accelerate.

After *Paradise Lost* (1667), John Milton wrote *Paradise Regained* (1671). In the Western world, an Egalitarian Gender Paradise has probably never existed. Yet, in paraphrasing Mark Twain, we conclude that rumors about the suicide of gender egalitarianism are greatly exaggerated.

---

<sup>51</sup> An exception here is Gornick and Jacobs (1998: p.108).

<sup>52</sup> Negative stress is defined as work which is strenuous while not allowing the individual to determine work pace (le Grand, Szulkin, and Thålin 2001b).

<sup>53</sup> le Grand, Szulkin, and Thålin (2001a). Wages were standardized for education and experience.

<sup>54</sup> In Sweden and Norway in 2003/4, fathers used around 15 percent of total parental leave days. In Denmark and Finland not having "use or lose" rules for father's leave, take-up was around 5 percent (Morgan 2008).

## **Methodological Appendix**

### *Homemakers*

Homemakers are defined among married and cohabiting women (35-64 years). For most European countries, homemakers are delineated in the EU- SILC (2004) in terms of self-defined current economic status (Fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities); in Germany and Netherlands, European Union labor force surveys (Unemployed persons not seeking employment because of personal or family responsibilities, Belief that no work is available, Other non-defined reasons); in Switzerland, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) (Doing homework), and in USA (Not employed; Homemaker); in the United Kingdom, the Luxembourg Employment Study (LES) is used by similar definitions.

### *Horizontal Work Segregation*

For the majority of countries segregation indexes are based on EU-SILC 2004 (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy). For Germany and the Netherlands data come from EU Labour Force Survey; for Switzerland 2002 and USA 2000 from LIS; for UK 1997 from LES. Occupations have been coded according to the ISCO-88 code (two-digit level) into 23 occupational categories. Because of small samples in some countries, we merged three categories of managers (11-13) into one, as we did of skilled agricultural and fishery workers (61) and agricultural, fishery and related laborers (92). For the UK and USA, we had to recode the occupation variable included in LES and LIS according to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) into ISCO-88.

### *Gender Wage Gaps*

Gender wage gaps are calculated as the difference between men and women in the logged hourly gross wages at respective 20<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, 80<sup>th</sup>, and 90<sup>th</sup> percentile with LIS as the main source (Australia 2001, Austria 2000, Belgium 2000, Canada 2000, France 2000, Germany 2000, Ireland 2000, Italy 2000, Netherlands 1999, United Kingdom 1999, Finland 1991, and Switzerland 1992). National sources for data are in Norway, the Level of Living Survey (2000); for Sweden (2000) Level of Living Survey, for Japan (2000) Japanese General Social Survey, and for USA (2000) the Current Population Survey (March Supplement). For New Zealand (2001) come from OECD (2002, p. 97). For Denmark, wage gaps are based on register information from employers to Statistics Denmark; we thank Mette Deding for helpful assistance. In general, data are limited to full and part-time employees, excluding very small firms as well as persons with very low or very high hourly earnings. Detailed descriptions of data handling are available from authors.

### *Managerial Jobs*

Managerial occupations are based on the 2004 EU-SILC using ISCO88 at the two-digit level (codes 11, 12, and 13). This data-set is relatively comparable among European countries. Data for USA come from LIS (2000), where we used Ganzeboom's algorithm for translation of occupational classifications into ISCO88. Farmers, military personnel, self-employed, and family workers are excluded.

### *Women's Shares of Corporate Boards*

European data come from the European Commission, stating women's share of boards in the largest publicly quoted companies (European Commission 2009 "Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making Bodies," covering a maximum of 50 largest publicly quoted companies in each country

([http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/women\\_men\\_stats/defcon\\_en.htm#L](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/women_men_stats/defcon_en.htm#L))).

Companies registered abroad are excluded. Comparable data for women in the largest companies in Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States have been assembled by Catalyst, a non-profit organization that specializes in issues related to women and work, and collects statistics on women in management and on corporate boards

(<http://www.catalyst.org>).

### *Legislatures and Cabinets*

Information on women in diets (referring to single or lower house) are from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (<http://www.ipu/wmn-e/world.htm>). Data on women in cabinets come from annual follow-ups in *European Journal of Political Research*.

## References


- Albrecht, James, Anders Björklund and Susan Vroman. 2003. "Is There a Glass Ceiling in Sweden?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 21 (1):145-177.
- Arulampalam, Wiji, Alison L Booth, and Mark L Bryan. 2007. "Is There a Glass Ceiling Over Europe? Exploring the Gender Gap Across the Wage Distribution." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 60 (2):163-186.
- Asplund, Rita, Erling Barth, F. Heyman, Per Lundborg, Thorulfrur Matthíasson, and Niels Westergaard-Nielsen. (Forthcoming). *Wage Structures and Wage Negotiation systems in the Nordic Countries*. ETLA: Helsinki.
- Atkinson, Anthony B. and Thomas Piketty. 2007. *Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bergquist, Christina 1999. *Equal Democracies? Gender and Politics in the Nordic Countries*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- Björklund, Anders. 2006. "Does Family Policy Affect Fertility?" *Journal of Population Economics* 19: 3-24.
- Booth, Alison L. 2006. "The Glass Ceiling in Europe: Why Are Women Doing Badly in the Labour Market?" Paper presented for the Economic Council of Sweden, Stockholm.
- Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 1996. "Wage Structure and Gender Earnings Differentials, An International Comparison." *Economica*, 63 (Supplement): 29-62.
- . 2003. "Understanding International Differences in the Gender Pay Gap." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 21(1): 106-144.
- Bryson, Valerie. 1992. *Feminist Political Theory: An Introduction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Castles, Francis G. 1985. *The Working Class and Welfare*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Charles, Maria and David B. Grusky. 2004. *Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.
- Crompton, Rosemary. 2006. *Employment and the Family. The Reconfiguration of Work and Family Life in Contemporary Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahlerup, Drude. 2006. *Women, Quotas and Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Daly, Mary, and Jane Lewis. 1999. "Introduction: Conceptualising Social Care in the Context of Welfare State Restructuring." Pp. 1-25 in *Gender, Social Care and Welfare State Restructuring in Europe*, ed. Jane Lewis. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Datta Gupta, Nabanita, Nina Smith, and Mette Verner. 2008. "The Impact of Nordic Countries' Family Friendly Policies on Employment, Wages, and Children." *Review of the Economics of the Household* 6: 65-89.
- Datta Gupta, Nabanita, Ronald L. Oaxaca, and Nina Smith. 2006. "Swimming Upstream, Floating Downstream: Comparing Women's Relative Wage Progress in the United States and Denmark." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 59 (2, January), 243-266.
- Duncan, Otis Dudley and Beverly Duncan 1955. "A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes." *American Sociological Review* 20(2): 210-217.
- Edin, Per-Anders, and Katarina Richardsson. 2002. "Swimming With the Tide: Solidarity Wage Policy and the Gender Earnings Gap." *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, vol. 104(1):49-67.
- Eduards, Maud L. 1991. "Toward a Third Way: Women's Politics and Welfare Policies in Sweden." *Social Research* 58 (3): 677-705.
- England, Paula. 2002. *Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

- England, Paula. 2005. "Gender Inequality in Labor Markets: The Role of Motherhood and Segregation." *Social Politics* (Summer): 264-288.
- England, Paula and Nancy Folbre. 1999. "The Cost of Caring." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 561:39-51.
- England, Paula, Michelle Budig, and Nancy Folbre. 2002. "The Wages of Virtues: The Relative Pay of Care Work." *Social Problems* 49:455-73.
- Esping-Andersen, Gösta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge (UK)*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Estevéz-Abe, Margarita. 2006. "Gendering the Varieties of Capitalism A Study of Occupational Segregation by Sex in Advanced Industrial Societies". *World Politics* 59: 142-75.
- Estevéz-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen and David Soskice. 2001. "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State." Pp. 145-183 in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferrarini, Tommy. 2006. *Families, States and Labour Markets: Institutions, Causes and Consequences of Family Policy in Post-War Welfare States*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Fraser, Nancy. 1994. "After the Family Wage. Gender Equity and the Welfare State." *Political Theory* 22:591-618.
- Freidenvall, Lenita, Drude Dahlerup, and Hege Skeije. 2006. "The Nordic Countries: An Incremental Model." Pp 55-82 in *Women, Quotas and Politics* edited by Drude Dahlerup. London: Routledge.
- Glucksmann, Miriam. 2000. *Cottons and Casuals: The Gendered Organization of Labour in Time and Space*. Cavendish: Routledge.
- Gornick, Janet C., Marcia K. Meyers, and Katherin E. Ross. 1997. "Supporting the Employment of Mothers: Policy Variation Across Fourteen Welfare States." *Journal of European Social Policy* 7 (1):45-70.
- .1998. "Public Policies and the Employment of Mothers: A Cross-National Study. *Social Science Quarterly*, 79 (1 (March), 35-54.
- . 2008. Creating Gender Egalitarian Societies: An Agenda for Reform. *Politics & Society* 36:313
- Gornick, Janet C., and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. *Families that Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Gornick, Janet C. and Jerry A. Jacobs. 1998. "Gender, the Welfare State, and Public Employment: A Comparative Study of Seven Industrialized Countries." *American Sociological Review*, 1998, 63 (October: 688-710).
- Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harkness, Susan and Jane Waldfogel. 1999. "The Family Gap in Pay: Evidence from Seven Industrialized Countries." CASEpaper 29. London: London Schools of Economics.
- Hernes, Helga Maria. 1987. *Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Hiilamo, Heikki, and Olli Kangas. 2006. *Trap for Women or Freedom to Choose? Political Frames in the Making of Child Home Care Allowance in Finland and Sweden*. Turku: University of Turku, Department of Social Policy.


- Hobson, Barbara. 2005. "Feminist Theorizing and Feminisms in Political Sociology." Pp. 135-152 in *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, edited by T. Janoski, R. R. Alford, A. M. Hicks and M. A. Schwartz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, Barbara, and Marika Lindholm. 1997. Collective Identities, Women's Power Resources, and the Making of Welfare States. *Theory and Society* 26 (4):475-508.
- Huber, Evelyn, and John Stephens. 2001. *Development and Crises of the Welfare State: Parties and Politics in Global Markets*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hultin, Mia. 2001. *Consider Her Adversity: Four Essays on Gender Inequality in the Labor Market*. Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University, Stockholm.
- Immergut, Ellen. 1992. *The Political Construction of Interests: National Health Insurance Politics in Switzerland, France and Sweden, 1930-1970*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Johansson, Sten. 1970. *Om Levnadsnivåundersökningen*. Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget.
- . 1973. "The Level of Living Survey: A Presentation." *Acta Sociologica* 16:211-19.
- Kenworthy, Lane. 2004. *Jobs with Equality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78 (1): 235-268.
- Korpi, Tomas, and Lotta Stern. 2004. "Kvinna i Karriären – Kön, Familj och Karriär 1950-2000". Pp 226- 248 in *Familj och Arbete – Vardagsliv i Förändring* edited by M. Bygren, M. Gähler and M. Neramo. Stockholm: SNS förlag.
- Korpi, Walter. 1983. *The Democratic Class Struggle*. London: Routledge.
- . 1983. "Power Resources Approach vs. Action and Conflict. On Causal and Intentional Explanations in the Study of Power" *Sociological Theory* 3:31-45.
- . 2000. Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States. *Social Politics* 7 (2):127-191.
- . 2006. Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism. *World Politics* 58 (2):167-206.
- Korpi, Walter, and Joakim Palme. 1998. "The Paradox of Redistribution and the Strategy of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries." *American Sociological Review* 63:661-87.
- Koven, Seth, and Sonya Michel. 1993. *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States*. New York: Routledge.
- le Grand, Carl, Ryszard Szulkin, and Michael Thålin. 2001a. "Lönstrukturens Förändring i Sverige." Pp. 121-173 in *Välfärd och Arbete i Arbetslöshetens Årtionde*, edited by J. Fritzell, M. Gähler and O. Lundberg. Stockholm: SOU (2001:53).
- . 2001b. "Har jobben blivit bättre?" Pp. 79- 120 in *Välfärd och arbete i arbetslöshetens artionde*, edited by J. Fritzell, M. Gähler and O. Lundberg. Stockholm: SOU (2001:53).
- Leira, Arnlaug. 1992. *Welfare States and Working Mothers: The Scandinavian Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2006. "Parenthood Change and Policy Reforms in Scandinavia, 1970-2000s." In *Politicising Parenthood in Scandinavia*, edited by A. L. Ellingsæter and L. Arnlaug. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Lewis, Jane. 1992. "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes." *Journal of European Social Policy* 2 (3):159-73.

- . 1993. "Women, Work, Family and Social Policies in Europe." Pp. 1-24 in *Women and Social Policies in Europe*, edited by J. Lewis. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1975. "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research." *Comparative Political Studies* 8:158-77.
- Mandel, Hadas, and Moshe Semyonov. 2005. "Family Policy, Wage Structures, and Gender Gaps: Sources of Earnings Inequality in 20 Countries." *American Sociological Review*, 70: 949-967.
- . 2006. "A Welfare State Paradox: State Interventions and Women's Employment Opportunities in 22 Countries." *American Journal of Sociology*, 111 (6): 1910-49.
- Mandel, Hadas and Michael Shalev. In press. "How Welfare States Shape the Gender Pay Gap: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis". Forthcoming in *Social Forces*.
- Montanari, Ingalill. 2000. "From Family Wage to Marriage Subsidy and Child Benefits: Controversy and Consensus in the Development of Family Support," *Journal of European Social Policy* 10 (4): 307-33.
- Montanari, Ingalill. 2004. "Gendered Work and Gendered Citizenship". Pp 70-90 in *Welfare Policy and Labour Markets. Transformation of the Japanese and Swedish Models for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* edited by N. Maruo, C. le Grand, and A. Björklund. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell.
- Morgan, Kimberly J. 2008. "The Political Path to a Dual Earner/Dual Carer Society: Pitfalls and Possibilities." *Politics & Society*, 36 (3): 403-420.
- Morgan, Laurie A. 1998. "Glass Ceiling or Cohort Effects? A Longitudinal Study of the Gender Earnings Gap for Engineers, 1982 to 1989." *American Sociological Review* 63 (5): 479-494.
- Ministry of Social Affairs. 2001. *The Welfare of Children and Youth*, SOU 2001:55. Stockholm: Welfare Audit Committee.
- Myles, John. 1984. *Old Age in the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Public Pensions*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Nermo, Magnus. 2000. Models of Cross-National Variation in Occupational Segregation." *European Societies*, 2 (3): 295-333,
- Neyer, Gerda, and Gunnar, Andersson. 2008. "Consequences of Family Policies on Childbearing Behavior: Effects or Artifacts?" *Population and Development Review* 34(4):699-724.
- Norris, Pippa. 1987. *Politics and Sexual Equality: The Comparative Position of Women in Western Democracies*. Boulder: Rienner and Wheatsheaf.
- Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Connor, Julia S. 1993. "Gender, Class, and Citizenship in the Comparative Analysis of Welfare State Regimes." *British Journal of Sociology* 44:501-18.
- . 1996. "From Women in the Welfare State to Gendering Welfare State Regimes." *Current Sociology* 44:1-124.
- O'Connor, Julia S., Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver. 1999. *States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oláh, Livia, and Eva Bernhardt. 2008. "Sweden: Combining Childbearing and Gender Equality." *Demographic Research* 19:1105-1144.

- Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development. 2001, 2002, 2004. *Employment Outlook*. Paris: OECD.
- Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship – The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States." *American Sociological Review*, 58: 303-328.
- . 1996. "Gender in the Welfare State." *Annual Review of Sociology* 22: 51-78.
- Pateman, Carole. 1989. *The Disorder of Women. Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Pedersen, Susan. 1993. *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State - Britain and France, 1914-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pope Paul VI. 1971. *Octogesima Adveniens*. The Vatican.
- Reskin, Barbara, and Irene Padavic. 1994. *Women and Men at Work*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
- Rostgaard, Tine. 2002. Caring for Children and Older People in Europe- a Comparison of European Policies and Practice, *Policy Studies*, 23 (1): 51-68.
- Sainsbury, Diane. 1996. *Gender Equality and Welfare States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sen, Amartya. 1992. *Inequality Re-examined*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shaver, Sheila and Jonathan Bradshaw. 1995. "The Recognition of Wifely Labour by Welfare States." *Social Policy and Administration*, 29 (March): 10-25.
- Shalev, Michael. 2007. "Limits and Alternatives to Multiple Regression in Comparative Research." *Comparative Social Research*, Volume 24, 261–308.
- . 2008. Class Divisions among Women. *Politics and Society* 36:421-444
- Sigle-Rushton, Wendy and Jane Waldfogel. 2006. "Motherhood and Women's Earnings in Anglo-American, Continental European, and Nordic Countries." London School of Economics: GeNet Working Paper no. 19.
- Siim, Birte, 2000. *Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tingsten, Herbert. 1937. *Political Behaviour. Studies in Election Statistics*. London: P. S. King & Son.
- Vogel, Ursula. 1991. "Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?" In *The Frontiers of Citizenship*, eds. Ursula Vogel and Michael Moran. London: Macmillan.
- Wright, Erik Olin, Janeen Baxter, and Gun Elisabeth Birkelund. 1995. "The Gender Gap in Workplace Authority: A Cross National Study". *American Sociological Review* 60 (3):407-435.

**Figure 1** Dimensions and Models of Gender Policies in 18 Countries in 2000.

## a) Gender Wage Gaps in USA 1992-2000



## b) Gender Wage Gaps in Sweden 1968-2000




Fig. 2a-b.—Profiles of Gender Wage Gaps for Different Years in USA and Sweden

TABLE 1  
 LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN (25-64 YEARS) BY EDUCATION, HOMEMAKERS  
 AMONG PARTNERED WOMEN, AND EMPLOYMENT GENDER GAPS IN PRESENCE OF MINOR CHILDREN,  
 BY TYPES OF GENDER POLICY MODEL IN 2000 (%)

Type of Gender Policy Model		Labor Force Participation Rate by Education				Home-makers	Gender Employment Gaps by no. of Children		
		Less than Secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	0		1	2+	
Earner - Carer	Denmark	60	81	89	2	8	4	13	
	Finland	61	78	86	7	0	12	20	
	Norway	59	80	89	7	6	-	-	
	Sweden	67	83	89	6	0	10	9	
Market Oriented	Canada	48	73	82	-	6	15	24	
	United Kingdom	52	77	87	10	5	17	28	
	USA	50	73	82	13	7	17	29	
	Australia	56	66	80	-	16	33	48	
	New Zealand	54	74	78	-	6	20	31	
	Ireland	40	62	79	25	14	33	43	
	Switzerland	59	75	84	21	9	20	33	
	Japan	56	62	64	-	-	-	-	
Traditional Family	Austria	49	68	84	19	11	19	29	
	Belgium	41	71	84	15	17	24	25	
	France	57	76	84	10	10	19	33	
	Germany	48	69	82	13	7	22	36	
	Italy	33	67	81	24	26	41	50	
	Netherlands	48	74	83	13	16	24	31	

Note.—Sources: Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (2002), for labour force participation rates (316-318) and for employment gaps (77). Homemakers: Cf. Methodological Appendix.

TABLE 2  
 OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND TOTAL WORK SEGREGATION, BY TYPE OF  
 GENDER POLICY MODEL.  
 (D = INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY; A = CHARLES - GRUSKY INDEX OF ASSOCIATION)

Type of Gender Policy Model		Occupational Segregation		Total Work Segregation	
		D	A	D	A
Earner - Carer	Denmark	48	5.1	49	5.6
	Finland	52	5.6	54	5.8
	Norway	48	5.2	50	6.0
	Sweden	48	5.2	49	5.3
Market Oriented	USA	41	4.2	45	5.1
	United Kingdom	46	5.5	49	6.3
	Ireland	48	5.4	57	6.9
	Switzerland	48	4.5	55	6.2
Traditional Family	Austria	44	4.6	50	5.7
	Belgium	47	4.8	52	6.0
	France	44	3.2	48	4.6
	Germany	48	4.1	51	4.5
	Italy	36	3.5	46	4.4
	Netherlands	47	5.4	48	5.8

Note.—Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix.

TABLE 3  
GROSS GENDER WAGE GAPS IN LOGGED HOURLY EARNINGS BY TYPE OF  
GENDER POLICY MODEL (25-55 YEARS) AROUND 2000.

Type of Gender Policy Model		Percentiles			
		20	50	80	90
Earner - Carer	Denmark	10	13	23	30
	Finland	19	22	28	30
	Norway	13	14	22	29
	Sweden	11	14	21	25
Market Oriented	Canada	37	33	26	22
	USA	31	31	29	32
	United Kingdom	23	28	27	27
	Australia	8	9	12	13
	New Zealand**	7	13	17	-
	Ireland	17	19	14	14
	Japan	39	58	55	53
	Switzerland	40	30	24	30
Traditional Family	Austria	31	21	17	18
	Belgium	12	10	10	13
	France*	14	13	13	14
	Germany	32	21	18	22
	Italy*	10	7	2	4
	Netherlands	20	13	14	17

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix.

\* Net earnings;

\*\* 20-64 years.

TABLE 4  
 WOMEN (25-55 YEARS) IN THE TOP EARNINGS QUINTILE AS PROPORTIONS  
 OF EMPLOYED WOMEN AND AS PROPORTIONS OF ALL WOMEN AROUND 2000,  
 BY TYPES OF GENDER POLICY MODELS.

Type of Gender Policy Model		Women in the Top Earnings Quintile in Relation to	
		Employed Women	All Women
Earner - Carer	Denmark	0.12	0.09
	Finland	0.12	0.10
	Norway	0.11	0.09
	Sweden	0.12	0.10
Market Oriented	Canada	0.12	0.09
	United Kingdom	0.15	0.10
	USA	0.15	0.11
	Australia	0.16	0.11
	Ireland	0.20	0.11
	Japan	0.07	0.04
Traditional Family	Austria	0.11	0.08
	Belgium	0.10	0.07
	France	0.16	0.11
	Germany	0.10	0.08
	Italy	0.20	0.09
	Netherlands	0.15	0.10

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix.

TABLE 5  
GENDER GAPS IN OCCUPATIONS CLASSIFIED AS MANAGERIAL. TOTAL AND MANAGERS IN THE UPPER  
HALF, UPPER THIRD AND UPPER FIFTH OF THE TOTAL EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION AMONG ALL  
EMPLOYEES (25-55 YEARS). (PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCES)

Type of Gender Policy Model		Managers Among all Employees (%)	Gender Managerial Gaps at Different Earnings Levels			
			All Managers	Upper Half	Upper One third	Upper fifth
Earner - Carer	Denmark	6	5	6	5	4
	Finland	8	6	6	6	5
	Norway	10	6	7	7	5
	Sweden	4	2	2	2	2
Market Oriented	USA	16	1	5	5	5
	Ireland	13	6	8	8	6
Family Traditional	Austria	2	2	3	2	2
	Belgium	6	6	6	5	5
	France	7	4	4	4	3
	Italy	2	2	2	2	2

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix.

TABLE 5  
 THE PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN THE BOARDS OF THE LARGEST COMPANIES IN 16 COUNTRIES IN  
 2008, BY TYPES OF GENDER POLICY MODEL.

Type of Gender Policy Model	Companies On Index Covered	Percent Female Total Board Members (Including Employee Representatives)	Percent Female Regular Board Members (Excluding Employee Representatives)
Earner - Carer	Denmark	18	11
	Finland	24	20
	Sweden	27	25
	Norway	19	42
Market Oriented	Canada	-	-
	United Kingdom	-	-
	United States	-	-
	Australia	-	-
	Ireland	20	-
	Switzerland	-	-
Traditional Family	Austria	20	4
	Belgium	19	-
	France	36	9
	Germany	30	8
	Netherlands	21	-
	Italy	38	-

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix.

TABLE 6  
 PERCENT OF WOMEN IN LEGISLATURES AND IN CABINETS 1990 – 2005,  
 BY TYPE OF GENDER POLICY MODELS.

Type of Gender Policy Model	Women in Legislatures		Women in Cabinet		
	1990	2005	1991-94	2003-05	
Earner - Carer	Denmark	33	37	26	29
	Finland	39	38	40	41
	Norway	36	38	44	44
	Sweden	38	47	36	50
Market Oriented	Canada	14	21	17	23
	United Kingdom	8	20	6	26
	USA	6	15	14	17
	Australia	12	28	6	16
	New Zealand	18	32	16	27
	Ireland	8	14	10	18
	Switzerland	13	25	6	19
	Japan	6	11	5	15
Traditional Family	Austria	15	31	12	40
	Belgium	10	36	15	21
	France	6	14	13	21
	Germany	14	30	20	42
	Italy	11	16	6	7
	Netherlands	21	34	22	31

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix.

