

Immigrants' descendants in France and Germany: processes of social distancing and modes of participation¹

Ingrid Tucci

(DIW Berlin and ERIS/CMH Paris)

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Abstract

Despite some similarities in the social situations of the descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and those of North-African immigrants in France, the two groups are not subject to the same institutional, economic, or symbolic processes of social distancing. This study uses micro-data from France and Germany (SOEP and Enquête Histoire Familiale EHF) to show that these young people develop different modes of participating in the labour market. It stresses the influence of particular institutional and economic regulations and constraints on their modes of participation: First, the French and the German labour markets do not present the same opportunities and constraints to working class young people. Second, the “Other” is used differently in the French and German conceptions of integration, leading to different effects in institutional, political and symbolic terms. The results on educational achievement indicate that while young people of Turkish origin in Germany experience severe exclusion at school, young people of North-African origin in France experience polarization between those who manage to reach higher education and those who don't. The result for the Turkish youth is a situation of relegation to specific positions in the labour market and of “quasi-invisibility”. In contrast, the better educational attainment of the descendants of North-African immigrants in France leads to their higher visibility at the different levels of the social hierarchy, making them more subject to discrimination as a practice of social distancing. Paradoxically, however, their inclusion as French citizens does not lead to a better or more stable work situation. The adoption of the French universal principles among the youth of North-African origin and their belief in the Republican promise of equality leads precisely to their frustration. This experience presents a stark contrast to the early and ongoing experience of “Otherness” among the young people of Turkish origin in Germany. The societal consequences of these processes of social distancing thus differ markedly between both countries.

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Introduction

Since the 1980s riots have been regularly taking place in the French suburbs. In November 2005, those riots were so impressive that the European countries began to debate about the social situation of migrants and the eventuality that such riots may happen in their own societies. "Riots in Eurabia" was the headline of an article from the *Spiegel* just after the French *banlieues* had been the scene of violent conflicts between young people and the police. This title reflects the trend of "culturalisation" of social problems that can be observed in many European societies. Young people, especially those who grew up in Arabic-Muslim families, are considered a danger to social cohesion. Of course this discourse is not new. But it contributes to the creation of a difference and to a change in the collective representation people have about the "Other". Still today, immigration, immigrants and their families are considered as a social problem in the receiving societies: they put the structural integration of the Nation-state into question and challenge its cultural integration (Eder 1998). As the graphic presented in appendix 1 shows, Germans and French do not consider immigration as a threat or enrichment to the same extent. Surprisingly, the share of respondents to the European Social Survey who see the cultural life of their country threatened by immigration is much higher for France than for Germany. Here, many respondents felt a cultural enrichment from immigration. All in all, attitudes toward immigration seem to be somewhat more negative in France.

This comparative approach is motivated by the necessity of understanding how social inequality and its evolution are linked to the modes of participation immigrants' descendants develop, considering that they grow up in specific national contexts. Due to the installation of immigrant families in France and Germany following the recruitment of foreign workers after the Second World War, the ethnic-cultural dimension became more and more important in the formation and the perpetuation of inequalities. In this problematic situation, the educational achievement of immigrants' descendants and their positioning in the labour market is crucial for their future in Europe and also for maintaining social cohesion. It is interesting to note that riots like the ones that occurred in the French suburbs in the years 1980, 1990 and more recently in 2005 did not occur in Germany at any time. So it can be assumed here that immigrants' descendants do not have the same modes of participating in the society they live in. Quantitative analyses on immigrants' descendants are still scarce, especially those that adopt a comparative

perspective. This paper intends to bring some new elements of thinking about how immigrants' descendants position themselves in the social structure and what the obstacles they face are. The participation and the positioning in the labour market is an important transition in life. This depends largely on educational attainment but also on the structure of the labour market itself and on the context of social and economic mutations. This paper will show that the modes of participation of descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and of North-African immigrants in France rely on two almost distinct processes of social distancing. These processes are not exclusive and do not intervene at the same time in their trajectories.

Integration policy and Immigrants' descendants in France and Germany

France and Germany are important immigration countries in Europe, even if they did not consider themselves as such for a long time. However there is no doubt that migrants and their children are part of both countries' stories and that they largely contributed to making these countries economically successful after the Second World War. The recruitment of foreign workers organized in France and Germany was thought to be provisory but this immigration became durable and it took the successive governments a long time to understand that integration was a necessary step to make. It can be said here that integration policies in France and Germany range between universalism and particularism. On the one hand, especially in France, no differential treatment between individuals and groups of individuals is allowed by the Constitution, but on the other hand specific measures in the educational field were implemented in socially disadvantaged areas (ZEP) at the beginning of the 1980s – in the framework of the so-called “politique de la ville”. These measures are considered universal, even though young adults with a migration background are often the beneficiaries of these kinds of programmes. In Germany, the programme “Soziale Stadt” also aimed at promoting the integration of persons living in disadvantaged areas, but it should be noted that this programme was put in place in 1999, almost twenty year later than in France. In Germany, the so-called foreigners' councils have served as a mouthpiece for migrants and their children because of their strict exclusion from the political system. In France, the descendants of migrants can vote and are part of French society as citizens. In fact, the status as foreigners of many migrants in Germany, i.e. their exclusion from the political system, contributed to the formation of many associations that work for the needs of immigrants. The foreigners status of many

young adults born in Germany – in terms of their nationality – also contributed to the consolidation of this network of small organisations in which migrants are active and work to promote integration. This status difference between young adults with a migration background in France – they are French nationals – and Germany – they are still foreigners – reflects itself in the debate on their integration. Whereas France at the institutional level tends to argue in terms of social class and social exclusion, Germany continues to argue in terms of the integration of the “cultural Other” in the German community. Here, in Germany, questions related to the cultural dimension of integration and to the identification of migrants with the receiving country are much more important and very frequently used as arguments of polarisation in the public debate on integration and immigration (see for example the discussion on the *Leitkultur*). A short comparison of the discourses on integration indicates that in France, the scientific but also public debates deal more with how to fight exclusion and discrimination. In France it is more important to reach or maintain a certain societal integration or cohesion, than to integrate young migrants. This should happen automatically because children with a migrant background enter the community of citizens and go to school, which is the main instrument of integration, transforming them into political individuals. In Germany, the debates deal more with how to integrate individuals in German society than with social cohesion. Germany failed to incorporate children of immigrants in its community of citizens and is currently trying to find another way to promote their integration. The German approach is different from the French one because the conception of integration is different. However, in both countries, the integration of young adults with a migration background continues to be an important challenge.

Today, 8 % of the total population in France are migrants; 13 % in Germany (Table 1). Migrants from the Maghreb build the largest group in France, followed by the Portuguese. In Germany, the so-called Ethnic Germans ((Spät-)Aussiedler)² make up the largest groups, followed by Turkish and Italian migrants. As can be seen in Table 1 the percentage of foreigners in Germany is higher than in France (9 % compared to 6 %). The more restrictive laws on citizenship acquisition can explain this. It is not easy to count the number of immigrants’ descendants living in both countries but the task is the most difficult in the France. Those born in France received almost automatically the French nationality and many exceptions exist because of the French colonial history. Even if Germany introduced elements from the *ius soli* in its legislation on citizenship attribution

² The Ethnic Germans came after the fall of the Berlin wall from Poland, the Soviet-Union and Rumania and were reintegrated into the German nationality because of their German ancestry.

or acquisition in the year 2000, the majority of the immigrants' children would still have a foreign nationality. So it is, in a sense, more appropriate in Germany than in France to use the criteria of nationality to identify the descendants of migrants in official data. The diversity of situations affecting immigrants' descendants also makes counting them difficult. In France, about half of the young adults with a migration background have bicultural parents (Simon 2003). It is interesting to note here that children who have a Portuguese or a Turkish background have bicultural parents less frequently than others; for those with a North-African background this is much more frequently the case. For Germany, we do not have comparable numbers but some studies indicate that the exogamy rate among the Turkish community is low, even though the number of bicultural partnerships rose in Germany (Schroedter 2006 and Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2000).

Table 1 Population with a migration background in France and Germany

	FRANCE	GERMANY
Total population	60 995 911	82 465 300
Number of migrants †	4 930 000	10 399 000
- with French / German nationality ††	1 970 000	4 827 700
Share of migrants	8.1 %	12.6 %
Number of foreigners	3 510 000	7 320 600
Share of foreigners	5.7 %	8.9 %
Foreigners born in France/Germany	550 000	1 749 300
Share of foreigners born in France/Germany	0.9 %	2.1 %
Descendants of immigrants	4.6 million	4.3 million
Principal countries of origin	Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia (15 million), Portugal (560 000)	Ethnic Germans (4 million), Turkey (17 million), Italy (540 000)

Source: For France: Recensement 2004-2005, INSEE. For Germany: Mikrozensus 2005, Statistisches Bundesamt.

† For France, migrants are persons who were born abroad with another nationality than the French one. For Germany, migrants include Ethnic Germans.

†† For France, this category includes the naturalized. For Germany, it includes Ethnic Germans.

The number of immigrants' descendants in France is estimated at about 4.6 million: 29 % have at least one parent from the Maghreb, 30 % are of European origin (Simon 2003). According to the new data from Mikrozensus, the number of those who were born in

Germany but have a migration background is estimated at about 4.3 million ; 20 % of them have a Turkish background and 15 % a European background. About three quarters of them have a foreign nationality (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). Descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and of North-African immigrants in France make up the largest groups of migrant origin.

To give a further example of the different situations in France and Germany (because the questions related to the concentration of migrants in certain areas and because the influence of this concentration on the modes of participation of immigrants is important), it is interesting to look at the distribution of foreigners in the different French regions or German federal states (Bundesländer) (see Appendix 1). Compared to the distribution of the foreign population in France, the distribution of the foreign population in Germany seems more heterogeneous. In fact in most of the “Bundesländer” 40 % or more of the foreign population neither belong to the EU15, nor to Turkey, nor to the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, we can conclude from those numbers that in France, in certain regions, there is a large concentration of people who have the same migration background or origin. This concentration may be underestimated because those numbers only take into account the foreigners, i.e. only a small share of immigrants’ children. Even though we would need smaller areas for an adequate comparison, these tables indicate a structural difference between France and Germany, which suggests that migrants and their children have different opportunities in both countries.

Concepts and Theoretical Framework

Defenders of the classical assimilation theory, which is mainly empirically based on the American society, argue that there is always a cultural core in society that act as a centrifugal force on immigrants and causes their assimilation over generations (Alba and Nee 2003).³ Differences in assimilation between groups are only due to different speeds in assimilation. In the end, inequalities along ethnic lines in the form of ethnic stratification should disappear. In Germany, Esser adapted the assimilation theory to the German case and came to the conclusion that, in theory, social integration is only possible through assimilation, otherwise ethnic differentiation or ethnic inequality takes place and social integration is in danger. According to Esser (2004), individual action is “the way” to reach

³ One important question on this subject is if such a common cultural core to which immigrants may assimilate also exists in Germany (see the debate on the so-called “Leitkultur”).

assimilation. This means that assimilation can take place only if immigrants develop individual strategies in order to compensate for their ethnic specific capital with the accumulation of capital that can be generalized in the receiving society. So, according to this approach, given the structural, institutional and cultural disadvantages immigrants and their children have, only assimilative strategies, e.g. investment in the capital of the receiving country, can help produce well-being and social recognition. This argument is theoretically good but if we look at the intergenerational mobility in German society as a whole, we observe that individuals who have come from the lower social classes, and whose parents are supposed to know which sort of capital and investments are valuable in society, are having difficulties achieving upward social mobility. They may have a better education level than their parents but they are confronted with serious employment problems. Furthermore this approach does not take into account the contextual factors such as integration policy, barriers to mobility, social reproduction patterns, etc., which also play a role in the achievements of immigrants' descendants. The national framework in which immigrants' descendants grow up can be seen as a structure of opportunity (Tarrow 1994) but also as a structure of limitations or restrictions. If one looks at the institutional and economic dimension of each national framework, differences between both countries appear that may influence the future of immigrants' descendants. These differences can be exemplified at the institutional level by looking at two institutions in particular: school and citizenship. Furthermore, the way cultural diversity is dealt with (Entzinger 2000) and which kinds of collective representations are associated with the phenomenon of immigration are also important to understand how immigrants' descendants evolve. Individual action is largely shaped by the opportunities individuals have, or think they have, and as a result different national contexts may lead to different outcomes in the various dimensions of integration such as education, employment, language proficiency, etc. For example, in the domain of education, the age at which school starts (6) and selection occurs in Germany (11) may be responsible for the lower educational achievement of immigrant children in Germany than in France, where children of immigrants have three more years to learn the German language. Since their selection occurs later (15), they have more time to pull themselves out of their disadvantaged initial position. Many cross-national studies related to the European countries have shown that different cultural, institutional and socio-structural contexts lead to cross-national differences in immigrants' integration and also in second-generation integration (see EFFNATIS 2001; Schnapper 2007; Tucci 2004; Tucci and Groh-Samberg 2008; Loch

1998, 2000). Recent research in the US has also witnessed several anomalies in the classical assimilation perspective and it seems justified to question the assimilation thesis, according to which immigrant success is inevitable in the long run. By introducing the concept of segmented assimilation, Portes and Zhou (1993) offered a more varied view of what the outcomes of integration might be. They observed that the empirical experiences concerning different immigrant communities in the US raise the question about the sector in which a particular immigrant group assimilates. Finally they identified three possible patterns of assimilation and each of these patterns connects class criteria with the criteria of cultural adaptation. There also seems to be different patterns of incorporation of immigrants' offspring in the countries of the European Union. Furthermore the segmented assimilation theory does not explain why some groups experience social mobility while others experience social stagnation or "declassing". A scholar in the field of migration research, Gans (1992), produced arguments showing a decline of the second generation in the US. According to this scenario, immigrant children may reject the traditional "immigrant jobs" because they have higher aspirations than their parents and have grown up with the cultural standard of the receiving country. Relating to the situation of immigrants in the US, the defenders of the classical assimilation theory considers that the prospects according to which the descendants of contemporary immigrants will have difficulties to experience upward mobility are too pessimistic. According to Alba and Nee (Alba and Nee 2003), different levels of assimilation only reflect different speeds in the adaptation process. But, the current economic situation in Germany and in France makes clear that structural changes pose problems for all members of the society. In other words, integration problems do not concern only immigrants and their children. The latest arguments, however, are especially concerned about such deep changes. The current economic slowdown, the rise in unemployment, the restructuring of the economy and the dismantling of the welfare state are all factors explaining why an increasing number of individuals, especially those of immigrant origin, remain excluded, experiencing poverty and social exclusion. Given this background, it seems justified to ask about the perspectives of the children of immigrants in Germany and to question the classical assimilation theory.

Finally, this paper intends also to take into account one important dimension in shaping the modes of participation of immigrants' children: the one related to the receiving society. In his model on assimilation, Gordon (1964) introduced two important dimensions: the *attitude receptional assimilation*, i.e. the lack of prejudice, and the *behavior receptional*

assimilation, i.e. the lack of discrimination. These dimensions were not always kept in the approaches and models developed later in migration sociology. Nevertheless, one difference between the French and German sociologies of immigration is that the French one takes more into account 1) the domination issue, in particular with the works of Sayad (1991; 1999) in explaining the situation of immigrants and their children in French society and 2) tends to consider integration as a process concerning all individuals in society, not only immigrants. The German sociology of immigration tends on the contrary to attribute this concept to immigrants and their children primarily.⁴

This is one reason why the concepts of *participation* and *modes of participation* were chosen in this paper. But other reasons exist. First, the concept of participation is multidimensional, like the concept of integration, and through its extension to the concept of modes of participation, it refers on the one hand to the diversity of the possibilities of action individuals have and on the other hand to the diversity of obstacles they have to overcome in order to fully take part to the society they live in. Second, it is in line with the segmented assimilation approach that identifies different assimilation paths. And finally, the participation concept – in contrast to the concept of integration – contains the idea of individual action. Not only that, it assumes that the individual, in addition to knowing the rules of the game, is also allowed to take part in the game. It is precisely here that the concept of social distancing emerges as an important issue. The notion of social distancing is at the core of the work of Shibutani et Kwan (1965). The persistence of what they call the color line⁵ creates further ethnic stratification. By acting according to the common sense and to enforced classification principles, individuals contribute to the reproduction of ethnic stratification. The reduction of social distancing is a result of a weakening of the ethnic-cultural dimension as a criterion on which social stratification is grounded.

Following some of the theoretical approaches presented here, this paper would like to show that immigrants' descendants have different opportunities and restrictions in France and Germany and that social distancing happens at different times in their trajectories. The importance of school as an institution in France, transforming children into French citizens

⁴ In the French sociology of migration, the concept of integration replaced the concept of inclusion and also of assimilation. The latest concept has been heavily influenced by colonial politics towards the inhabitants of the Maghreb states. In Germany, the concept of integration and assimilation are both used even though, in the political discourse, that of integration is more common.

⁵ “invisible wall, consisting of a set of common understandings concerning proper conduct. Objections that someone is acting improperly imply a set of norms as to what constitutes his rights vis à vis other people. There are unwritten rules – and sometimes written ones as well – as to what is appropriate for people of each sort.” (p. 28)

and “political individuals,” as well as using citizenship as a means to incorporate immigrants’ children into French society are very strong inclusive elements compared to the restrictive access to German citizenship and the German school system, which does not have this objective of making children political subjects – due to the experience of the influence of the Nazi regime on schooling. It is also argued in this paper that the segment in which immigrants’ descendants position themselves in France and Germany depends on economic change and its repercussions on the labour market. Immigrants were, in both countries, mainly concentrated in the sectors of industry and construction. Because of their migration biography, children of immigrants, especially of those who came from labour migration or asylum, have less favourable starting conditions in the “receiving society”. The de-industrialisation process may have led to a blocked intergenerational succession in this field. But the industrial decline was much stronger in France than in Germany, even though it began later (see Appendix 2). Between 1965 and 2004, West-Germany⁶ lost 14 % of its employment in this sector, whereas the decrease reached 25 % in France. As a result, for children from the working class, it is much more difficult to find jobs in this sector in France than in Germany. A glance at the sectoral distribution (see Appendix 2) indicates that foreigners are still largely concentrated in industry in Germany at the beginning of the 21st century, while the sectoral distribution of foreigners in France is quite similar to that of French workers. This is a sign showing the segmentation of the labour market along nationality lines. It is also known that educational expansion has led to increased educational mobility for the children of the working class. Educational aspirations of children of immigrants in France are above the average (Brinbaum and Kieffer 2005) and, according to PISA data, pupils have higher educational aspirations in France and Germany (see Appendix 4). So the question is, how did the children of immigrants profit from this educational expansion, and what does their transition into the labour market look like, considering the structure of the respective labour markets?

Data and Method of Identification of the Descendants of Migrants

The sources used in this paper are 1) the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany and 2) the Enquête Histoire Familiale and Histoire de Vie for France.

⁶ Of course the choc of the de-industrialisation was strong in Eastern Germany after the reunification leading to high unemployment rates in this part of Germany. And we could even argue here that the young adults from Eastern Germany have a similar destiny than the young adults who grew up in the working class regions of France that were particularly concerned by the restructuring.

The SOEP is a longitudinal survey of Germany's resident population that has been carried out annually since 1984. The sample is representative of the entire population of Germany living in private households. In the SOEP the population with a migration background can be identified using information on the country of birth or the citizenship of the respondents. However, the perspective adopted in this paper is that of immigration rather than of nationality. Given that some immigrants' descendants have German citizenship, it would be inadequate to base the results on the population of foreign nationality only. Salentin and Wilkening (2003) showed, for example, that studying immigration by using the nationality as the identifying criteria leads to a false view of the immigrant population because those who acquired German citizenship are those who have probably the best language proficiency and economic well-being. Keeping them outside of the analysis leads to an over-estimation of the integration deficits of the immigrant population. Furthermore, respondents who were born in Germany may have an indirect migration background, i.e. immigrants' descendants we have to use the information about citizenship and about previous citizenship for those who already acquired German citizenship (naturalization). The information about previous citizenship, for those who naturalized, is only available in the 2002-data. For this reason the analysis is related to this wave of the SOEP. In 2002 about 23 000 persons aged 16 and older were interviewed. At the first sampling of the foreign population in 1984, the foreigners from the classic recruitment countries were over-sampled.

The survey "Histoire Familiale" (EHF) was conducted in 1999 during the census. The sample is very large, much larger than the SOEP sample: About 380000 men and women aged 18 or older were surveyed. The survey "Histoire de Vie" (HdV) was conducted by INSEE in 2003 and a total of 8403 persons aged 18 and older were surveyed. Persons with a migrant background were over-sampled but the sample size is small. One goal of this survey was to analyse mechanisms of identity formation and to study how individuals integrate into society by developing their individuality. Both surveys contained questions about the country of birth of the parents, and this question was used to identify the descendants of migrants who were born in France. In general, for all the data used in this paper, descendants of migrants were either born in France and Germany and have a migration background, or they were born abroad but immigrated before the age of 15. This definition is broad but the country of birth will be taken into account in the various analyses. For each country three groups of origin were formed: French (N=102426/2024)⁷/ German autochthonous (N=7078), descendants of Turkish migrants in Germany (N=345)/ of North-African migrants

⁷ The first number refers to the Survey Histoire Familiale and the second one refers to the Survey Histoire de Vie.

(N=9103/318) in France (Tunisia, Algeria or Morocco) and descendants of migrants from South-Western Europe in both countries (N=7992/254 for France and N=252 for Germany). These numbers, as well as all the analyses presented here, refer to the population aged 18 to 40 years.

Educational Inequalities More Pronounced in Germany

The positioning in the labour market depends largely on the educational level, but also on the social background of individuals. The comparisons between France and Germany highlight how educational chances differ between both countries and how successful the educational system is in giving children of immigrants access to educational degrees that can be transferred to certain occupations in the labour market.

According to the data used for this paper, between-group differences exist in both countries concerning the educational achievements of young adults. In France, the percentage of children of immigrants who leave school without any degree, in particular of those who have both parents born in North-Africa, is higher than for the young adults of French origin (Table 2). As French literature has shown, descendants of European migrants tend to be more often in vocational and professional tracks. But compared with the situation in Germany, between-groups inequality is less pronounced. In Germany there is a large concentration of the descendants of Turkish migrants in the tracks of the *Hauptschule*: 30 % of them have only this diploma (Table 3). The percentage of those who have the so-called *Abitur* is half of what it is among the Germans. In particular, access to university degrees is still rare for them.

Table 2 Educational achievement (degree) in France by origin

	Without degree	Diplôme BEPC ou inférieur	Baccalauréat	Short vocational training	Long vocational training	University degree	Total	Mean age
France	12,4	9,9	5,6	32,4	12,0	27,7	100	30.9
North-Africa	17,8	10,9	6,8	29,6	10,5	24,3	100	29.2
<i>Both parents born in North-Africa</i>	<i>21,4</i>	<i>10,9</i>	<i>6,6</i>	<i>32,6</i>	<i>10,6</i>	<i>18,0</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>31.2</i>
South-Western Europe	16,7	11,1	4,6	37,1	10,9	19,6	100	30.9

Source: Enquête « Histoire Familiale » 1999, weighted results. ^

Table 3 Educational achievement (degree) in Germany by origin

	Without degree	Hauptschule Realschule	Abitur	Short vocational training	Long vocational training	University degree	Total	Mean age
Germany	1,4	14,3 (6,6)	8,8	52,0	7,6	15,8	100	30,8
Turkey	4,9	39,1 (30,0)	3,8	46,1	2,3	3,7	100	29,3
South-Western Europe	4,7	20,9 (14,0)	10,1	41,3	11,2	11,8	100	29,1

Source: SOEP 2002, weighted results. (..) : percentage of those who only a diploma from the « Hauptschule ».

One problem in making this comparison is that the descendants of immigrants have a lower social class on average. They grew up in working-class families and they are hardly comparable to the average German population of the same age.

Table 4 Educational achievement (degree) by origin and social background

	<= BEPC <= Haupt- schulabschluss	Abitur/ Realschul- abschluß/ Baccalauréat	Short vocational training	Higher education		
				Professional	University	
France						
All						
Without migrant background		22.3	5.6	32.4	12.0	27.7
With migrant background		28.3	5.8	33.1	10.7	22.1
Working class						
Without migrant background		29.9	4.0	40.2	11.5	14.4
North-Africa		34.2	5.1	35.5	10.2	14.9
North-Africa (both parents)*		34.0	5.2	35.9	10.3	14.6
South-Western Europe		28.2	3.8	40.9	10.5	15.7
Germany						
All						
Without migrant background		7.9	16.6	52.0	7.6	15.8
With migrant background		29.0	14.5	44.4	5.5	6.6
Working class						
Without migrant background		11.8	11.3	62.5	7.2	7.2
Turkey		28.6	17.4	49.1	3.4	1.5
South-Western Europe		24.3	11.9	51.6	7.0	5.2

Source: Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999 and SOEP 2002. Weighted results.

Keeping this in mind, it is possible to observe the effects of social class in each country (Table 4). The results indicate that the disadvantages of the descendants of North-African immigrants in France are largely due to their social class. (see also Tucci 2008). In Germany, social class and migration background are combined in explaining disadvantages. Only a few young Turks have a university degree compared to Germans of the same social class. They are also under-represented in vocational training for careers.

These are descriptive results but multivariate analyses confirm these findings (Tucci 2008). The effects on the descendants of Turkish migrants are very high, even those who were born in Germany. This confirms the finding from the PISA survey: second-generation pupils do worse in terms of educational achievement than first-generation pupils (OECD 2004). The French system of education seems to not only be better at compensating for inequalities related to social class but also those related to the “ethnic-cultural” background of individuals. Many elements can explain this fact. The creation of the “*collège unique*” in 1975 and the goal set in the 1980s by the Ministry of Education, Jean-Pierre Chevènement to push “80% of each generation to the Baccalauréat”, had the consequence of opening general tracks to all students independently of their social class. In Germany the tripartite educational system still exists and continues to push students into certain tracks. The importance of vocational training in Germany contrasts with the negative perception of such tracks in France, where general education is considered as being more valuable. This difference concerning educational opportunities reflects itself in the growing percentage of those who have a university degree: between 1991 and 2002 this share increased from 20% to 37% in France but it stagnated in Germany at 22% (OECD 2004, 2005). According to the PISA data, the share of young people who aspire to a university degree is twice as high in France as in Germany, and the educational aspirations are higher in France in particular among the so-called second generation (OECD 2006). In the education system, the participation of descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany is relegated to tracks that are less valuable in the labour market. In France, the higher percentage of those with a university degree among the descendants of North-African immigrants – and also the high percentage of those who left school without any degree – signals a polarisation in the educational system in this country.

Modes of Participating in the Labour Market

Given the differences in the educational attainment of young adults according to their social class and origins, and given the differences between Germany and France in this domain, the descendants of migrants do not have the same “luggage” when entering the labour market. The descriptive results concerning unemployment rates (Table 5) reveal that descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and North-African immigrants in France have a higher unemployment rate than those belonging to other groups. The fact that the two first groups have a similar disadvantage is surprising given that those of Turkish origin have on average

much lower educational degrees. However, the high unemployment rate among them is partly due to the high unemployment among the women of this origin. In contrast, young women of North-African origin do not differ that much from the men of the same origin in France.

Table 5 Unemployment rate by origin

	All	Men	Women
France			
Without migrant background	13.0	10.2	16.1
North-Africa	26.1	24.3	28.2
North-Africa (both parents)	31.7	30.9	32.6
South-Western Europe	14.0	11.3	17.0
Germany			
Without migrant background	9.5	8.4	10.7
Turkey	22.0	14.5	(36.4)
South-Western Europe	3.1	(3.8)	(2.0)

Source: Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999 and SOEP 2002. Weighted results.

Table 6 Probability of being unemployed (Logit-Model, Odds ratios)

	France		Germany	
	I	II	I	II
Origin (Ref.: Without migrant background)				
North-Africa/Turkey	1.901**	1.834**	1.744**	1.477+
South-Western Europe	1.050	1.011	0.300**	0.269*
Occupational status of the father (Ref.: Blue-collar)				
White-collar		1.089**		1.710**
Self-employed		0.782**		1.082
Inactive		1.753**		2.037*
Missings		1.346**		1.922**
N	89329	89329	5163	5163
R ²	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.07

Source: SOEP 2002 and enquête „Histoire Familiale“. +: P<0.1, *: P<0.05, **: P<0.01.
Control variables: Gender, Age, Household size, Marital status, Educational level.

The results from the multivariate analyses (Table 6) indicate that young adults with a Maghrebian and Turkish background have a twice as high probability of being unemployed as

autochthonous young adults, although the exclusion of the latter from the labour market can be largely attributed to their social origin. The effect for this group decreases at the 10 % level after taking into account the occupational status of the father. The disadvantage of young adults of North-African origin in France remains highly significant.

Table 7 **Probability of being unemployed, by educational level**
(Logit-Model, Odds ratios)

	<u>Without degree</u>		<u>With university degree</u>
	France	Germany	France
Origin (Ref.: Without migrant background)			
North-Africa/Turkey	1.852**	1.572	1.628**
South-Western Europe	0.913	0.288*	1.040
N	17350	770	25079
R²	0.09	0.06	0.06

Source: SOEP 2002 and enquête „Histoire Familiale“. +: $P < 0.1$, *: $P < 0.05$, **: $P < 0.01$.
Control variables: Gender, Age, Household size, Marital status, Social background.

Furthermore, the model was estimated separately according to the degree obtained and the results presented (Table 7) confirm the disadvantage of the young adults of Maghrebian origin: the effect for this group is always significant and the odds ratio is greater than one. For Germany, no comparable effect is to be found for the young adults of Turkish origin - the model for the higher educated was not estimated for Germany due to the low number of cases among the Turkish group. These first results signal that exclusion takes place early in the trajectories of individuals in Germany, i.e. at school, whereas it takes place later in France, i.e. when they enter the labour market.

However, the relegation of the young adults of Turkish origin continues on the labour market. They are over-represented in the industrial sector but especially in the hotel and restaurant sector (Table 8). In this sense, their employment structure differs largely from that of the youths of North-African origin in France. The distribution of the latter is more similar to that of the autochthonous group. However they tend to be over-represented in the service sector and under-represented in the industrial sector. Various studies confirm those results (for further details see Tucci 2008). Young adults with a migrant background have a higher probability of working in the industry and as blue-collar workers than autochthonous young adults, whereas the young adults of North-African origin really escape those segments of the labour market and have a higher probability of working in the

service sector than autochthonous young adults. So the modes of participating in the labour market are different despite the “similarity” of the migration history that characterizes their respective groups.⁸

Table 8 Sectoral concentration of employed populations by origin (ratio)

	Agriculture	Industry	Construction	Commerce	Hotels and restaurants	Services	Total Services
Without migrant background	120	103	90	98	88	100	99
North-Africa	29	74	82	102	117	113	111
North-Africa (both parents)	19	77	91	93	131	113	110
South-Western Europe	39	112	149	118	108	89	96
Without migrant background	105	95	100	97	91	103	101
Turkey	4	163	67	80	301	68	83
South-Western Europe	0	130	108	74	66	97	90

Source: SOEP 2002 and enquête „Histoire Familiale“ 1999, weighted results.

The labour market segmentation along ethnic-cultural lines in a traditional sense still seems to perpetuate itself today but immigrants and their descendants have created new niches of employment for themselves in Germany, in the absence of mobility opportunities on the labour market. Self-employment among immigrant communities, especially the Turkish one, emerges as an important issue in Germany. The SOEP data do not allow deeper analysis of self-employment among immigrants’ descendants; descriptive results only indicate that the self-employment rate is as high among the descendants of Turkish immigrants as among young adults of German origin (about 8 %). In their comparison of the situation of young adults of Moroccan and Turkish origin in the Netherlands, Crul and Vermeulen (2003) underline the importance of entrepreneurship among the latter and link it to the strong social cohesion and to the importance of family relationships among this community. This could be a difference too between the descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and North-African immigrants in France.

Finally, the strong presence of young people of migrant origin in the service sector in France, i.e. the fact that they become similar to the majority in their employment structure, leads me to look at another dimension of the working situation which is also important: the stability of employment. Interestingly, even after controlling for relevant variables such as

⁸ The similarity is based here on the fact that their parents were employed heavily in the manufacturing sector at the beginning of the mid twentieth century. But of course, those groups have different histories with regard to the fact that immigration in France relied on colonial relations with the sending countries whereas it relied on the recruitment of a foreign labour force in Germany. This difference is also important to understand the relationships between the majority and minorities in both countries but less important to understand their modes of participating in the labour market.

educational level, gender, age, sector of occupation and occupation, the results presented below indicate that young adults of North-African origin have a higher and significant probability of having a short-term contract than descendants of South-Western immigrants and autochthonous citizens. In the model for Germany, the effect on the descendants of Turkish immigrants goes in the same direction but is not statistically significant. In fact, it loses significance when the sector of occupation is introduced into the model. This means that their relegation into jobs and industries that are “traditional” for immigrants explains the stability of their employment. But here it is important to be careful in the interpretation because the samples do not have the same size. It would be interesting to analyze this issue with a larger dataset such as the Mikrozensus for Germany.

**Tabelle 5 Probability of having a stable job
(Logit-Model, Odds ratios)**

	France	Germany
Origin (<i>Ref.: Without migrant background</i>)		
North-Africa/Turkey	0.783**	0.691
South-Western Europe	1.117*	0.723
Observations	47028	2910
Constant	3.270**	3.648**
R²	0.12	0.10

*Quelle : SOEP 2002 und enquête „Histoire Familiale“. +: $P < 0.1$, *: $P < 0.05$, **: $P < 0.01$.
Control variables: Gender, Age, Marital status, Educational level, Occupation, Sector.*

The results concerning the educational chances and the labour market participation of young adults suggest that there is a big discrepancy between the “promise” related to the higher qualifications and status as citizens of young people with a migrant background in France and the reality of their non-recognition in the labour market. While social distancing is grounded in the school system in Germany, leading to a relegation into lower qualifications, it is also grounded in the labour market in France. As young adults of North-African origin become similar in terms of the occupations they aspire to – away from the typical industrial jobs their parents held – they get “punished” and discrimination is used by the majority as a way to produce the social distance needed in order to distinguish oneself from the minorities.

Conclusion: Relegation and Discrimination - Two Types of Social Distancing

The results suggest that immigrants' descendants are disadvantaged in part because of their working-class background in both countries. But the comparative perspective indicates that the organization of the German school system is not advantageous for children from lower social backgrounds and from other cultural backgrounds. In contrast, the French school system is largely orientated towards general education and access to university is not limited to certain categories of people. However it is important to note here that the French system is much more elitist than the German one because social background in France determines access to the so-called *Grandes Ecoles*. In contrast the high value placed on vocational training in Germany is positive as it enables young people to pursue a profession while general education – more valued in France – may be more difficult to transfer into a specific occupation on the labour market. Even if those differences are quite important and should be kept in mind, the results presented in this paper are in line with those from national studies. The cross-national comparison also reinforces the argument that the ethnic-cultural background is “more important” in Germany than in France in shaping the social structure. It could be argued that these results can be attributed to the different cultural origin of the groups that are studied in this paper. But in fact, this cultural argument could mean that French and Germans – for example – cannot be compared because they presumably differ with regard to their culture.

This analysis enables us to conceptualize the social processes through which immigrants' descendants are excluded from certain social positions in society. Two processes of social distancing emerge from the analysis of access to school titles and of labour market participation: social distancing through relegation in the case of the descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and through discrimination in the case of the descendants of North-African immigrants in France.

These processes are not exclusive and do not intervene at the same time in the trajectories of individuals. The table below (Table 10) summarizes the mechanisms that are at the source of both processes. They are of an 1) economic, 2) institutional, and 3) symbolic nature. In spite of this, the institutional and the symbolic levels are intrinsically linked to each other. In the German case, the restrictive access to the German “community of citizens” (Schnapper 2003) can be regarded as a mode of legitimating the relegation of immigrants' descendants. Immigrants and their children continue to be seen as foreigners, even though some of them have German nationality. They are “enclosed” in a social space that is in a sense exclusive. Simultaneously, immigrants' descendants interiorized this limit

between themselves and “the Germans”. The process of social distancing through relegation makes it “easier” for immigrants and their children to “stay among themselves”. Social cohesion among the community resulting from this relegation into specific segments of society, i.e. its stabilizing character, facilitates in turn the acceptance of the relegation and of the limits imposed.

Tabelle 10 Two types of social distancing

Process of social distancing	... through relegation	... through discrimination
Function	Keeping order	Call to order
Mechanisms		
- Economic level	Segmented labour market	Competition on the labour market
- Institutional level	School (exclusion) Citizenship (exclusion)	School (integration) Citizenship (inclusion)
- Symbolic level	Classification schemes, symbolic power <i>Interiorisation of the sense of limits</i>	Classification schemes, symbolic power <i>Lost of the sense of limits</i>
Effects		
- Individual	Resignation, disinterest, “staying among themselves”	Frustration, rejection, ”ethnic” withdrawal
- Societal	Absence of social tensions	Social tensions (riots, political protestation)

In France, the situation is different. The citizen status of the majority of immigrants’ children extends what Bourdieu (1997) calls the “space of possibilities” and hides the symbolic frontiers that separate them from the dominant group. In parallel, the principles of universalism and equality elevate their aspirations; and the school system, despite some problems that cannot of course be denied, manages to push them to acquire higher qualifications. But as they become similar to the dominant population and try to enter the labour market and to position themselves higher in the social hierarchy, they also become more visible on the labour market and are more subject to subtle practices of social distancing. In this sense, discrimination occurs in social spaces where the state does not “intervene anymore”, which is not the case in the school system.

Interestingly we can observe that the discrimination emerged as an important issue in France. Even though the directive of the European Union in 2000 pushed the member states to act against discrimination and to introduce a new legislation sanctioning discrimination practices, Germany has not given priority to this issue in the past years like France has. The French government put the HALDE (*Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l'Égalité*) in place in 2004 and published the first report in 2005 while Germany didn't pass the *Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz* (AGG) or launch the *Antidiskriminierungsstelle* (ADG) until 2006 – furthermore this institution didn't get a director until early 2007 and the first report on discriminations won't be published until 2009. Until now, school and the educational achievements of young people with a migrant background have been the main topics in Germany in the field of integration, while in France the question deals much more with the fight against discrimination in the labour market.

As this paper demonstrates, despite some data limitations, social distancing does not occur at the same time in the trajectories of descendants of immigrants in France and in Germany, and finally, those two processes have distinct consequences at the individual as well as at the societal level. Discrimination functions like a “call to order” (Bourdieu 1997). The elevation of aspirations among the young adults of foreign origin in France and the will to “become similar” – this does not mean “to assimilate” – encounter a harsh reality that underlines the differences between ethnic-cultural groups. The result is a high frustration at the individual level that can generate social tensions at the societal level. But it can also generate more public debate on questions related to the role of ethnicity and social class in explaining social inequalities. The recurring riots signal a social change in the French society. In the German case, exclusion from the community of citizens – in political and in social terms – can lead to resignation and to disinterest. However the immigrant community has a stabilizing function. This situation should be self-evident since nothing has been done to incorporate foreign nationalities into the larger German community until now. This stabilising effect of the immigrant community can in a sense be positive because helps keep order in German society. But as a result of this, i.e. of the absence of societal tensions, the discrimination and integration issue may not be well enough addressed in the public debate.

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
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Appendix 1

Perceptions of immigration in France and Germany



Source : European Social Survey 2001, weighted. Scale: 0 to 10. Answers ranging from 0 to 3 are grouped in the category « Good for... ». Answers ranging from 8 to 10 are grouped in the category « Bad for... ».

Appendix 2

Share of the foreign population in France by regions and main national origins in 1999

	Share of foreigners in the total population (%)	Origin (%)			
		EU15	Maghreb	Turkey	Others
Alsace	7.3	38	23	22	17
Aquitaine	3.7	57	27	3	13
Auvergne	3.3	54	24	11	12
Bourgogne	4.0	44	32	8	13
Bretagne	1.1	42	20	11	27
Centre	4.0	41	31	11	17
Champagne-Ardenne	3.8	37	38	9	15
Corse	9.9	30	64	0	6
France-Comté	4.9	27	38	18	16
Ile-de-France	11.9	33	30	4	33
Languedoc-Roussillon	5.8	40	46	2	12
Limousin	2.8	44	24	14	17
Lorraine	5.5	48	31	13	9
Midi-Pyrénées	3.9	51	30	2	16
Nord-Pas-de Calais	3.3	33	52	2	13
Basse-Normandie	1.4	40	23	15	22
Haute-Normandie	2.7	27	40	7	25
Pays de la Loire	1.3	35	31	9	26
Picardie	3.4	38	37	6	19
Poitou-Charentes	1.6	56	20	3	21
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	6.3	32	52	2	14
Rhône-Alpes	6.4	36	39	10	15
Total Métropole	5.6	37	35	6	22

Source : Les Echos, Atlas des régions Tome 1, 2004, (INSEE- data).


Share of the foreign population in Germany by Bundesland and main national origins in 2005

	Share of foreigners in the total population (%)	Origin (%)			
		EU15	Turkey	Former Yugoslavia	Others
Baden-Württemberg	11.9	28	23	16	33
Bayern	9.5	23	20	13	44
Berlin	13.7	11	26	5	58
Brandenburg	2.6	7	3	2	87
Bremen	12.7	11	35	6	48
Hamburg	14.2	14	22	11	53
Hessen	11.4	24	27	12	36
Mecklenburg- Vorpommern	2.3	7	4	3	86
Niedersachsen	6.7	18	21	9	52
Nordrhein- Westphalen	10.7	22	31	9	39
Rheinland-Pfalz	7.7	22	23	7	47
Saarland	8.3	34	16	6	44
Sachsen	2.8	7	3	2	88
Sachsen-Anhalt	1.9	8	5	4	83
Schleswig-Holstein	5.4	18	23	3	55
Thüringen	2.0	7	4	3	86
Total Allemagne	8.8	21	24	10	44

Source : Statistisches Bundesamt.


Appendix 3

Evolution of employment in the industrial sector in France and Germany (former RFA) between 1970 and 2004 compared to the number of employments in this sector in 1965



Source : OECD, *Statistiques trimestrielles de la population active*, 2004.


Sectoral distribution in France and Germany according to the origin (nationality)



Source : *European household Panel (ECHP) 2001, weighted*.

Appendix 4

Share of pupils who want to earn a degree from the "tertiary" [??]



Source : OECD (2006) : *Where immigrant students succeed*, Paris, p. 210