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Have More Generous Welfare States Undermined Strong Employment Commitment? Trends over Time in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

A critical aspect of social protection has always been the trade-off between the adequacy and equity of benefits and their promotion of dependency and distorted work incentives affecting individuals' general work orientations. Previous findings indicate how commitment to paid work is stronger in coordinated production regimes and more encompassing welfare states, but analyses of trends over time in broader comparative perspective are still lacking, as is also simultaneous assessments of important aspects of job quality. The purpose of this study is therefore twofold. Firstly, trends in employment commitment since the late 1980s are evaluated. Secondly, we examine the role of welfare state institutions for explaining cross-national patterns in employment commitment in thirteen mature welfare states while also taking into account job quality. Preliminary analyses show how most attitude change took place in the earlier period between 1989 and 1997, when employment commitment increased in the encompassing welfare state of Norway but decreased in the two basic security countries Great Britain and the United States. During the later period between 1997 and 2005, for which a larger number of countries were compared, the picture is one of stability rather than change. Finally, results from hierarchical regressions combining survey data with new institutional data, confirm previous findings – employment commitment is still decidedly stronger within more generous welfare regimes, also when job quality is accounted for.

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A critical aspect of social protection has always been the trade-off between the adequacy and equity of benefits and their promotion of dependency and distorted work incentives, i.e. between intended and unintended consequences. When individuals are presented with reasonable alternative incomes, such as generous welfare benefits, disincentives to work may rise, as argued by e.g. Lindbeck (1988; 1995; 1998), Murray (1984), Okun (1975). The provision of strong and positive incentives for work is undeniably central to all policymaking, but strategies have differed markedly across welfare regimes. Some countries have followed the path of residual benefits at low levels in order to avoid unintended consequences. Yet, also more encompassing welfare states with higher benefit levels were intentionally designed to encourage labour market participation and were also strongly dependent on its attainment (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990:28). Often these countries combined a broad social policy agenda with expansive macro-economic policies and extensive active labour market policies aiming to guarantee full employment (see e.g. Benner 2003:132; Kvist and Ploug 2003:5-6). Such systems were also designed to provide work incentives and opportunities to make it both economically and normatively rational for individuals to take part in paid work, which in turn could benefit stronger employment commitment. This raises the comparative question of how welfare regimes through their incentive structures may have shaped individuals' commitment to take part in paid work, hereafter employment commitment, differently across countries.

Most pre-mid-1990s research focused on within-work place, within-organisation or within-country comparisons, or has been limited to two or a few country comparisons. Typically most interest has been with individual characteristics or the organization of work at the work place and less on the importance of cross-national institutional differences. The later broader comparative studies are still few. Results from these studies either demonstrate no clear relationship in the case where fifteen EU-member countries in 1996 were compared (Gallie and Alm 2000), or indicate higher employment commitment in countries known to be more generous welfare states, in two studies that compared six OECD countries in 1997 (Berglund 2001; Hult and Svallfors 2002). A first broad comparison that included institutional measures for twelve welfare states in 1997 showed employment commitment to be higher in encompassing generous welfare states (Esser 2005). Yet, it could be argued that the latter findings are congruent with the hypothesis of weakened employment commitment in more generous welfare states over time. Drawing on data for only one point in time invalidates conclusions about changes over time or for that matter whether employment commitment in the late 1990s is indicative of different or similar trends for different types of welfare states. Although employment commitment was stronger in the Nordic countries at this particular point in time, commitment might have been even stronger in an earlier

phase, but declining due to, e.g. serious disincentive effects, although still high in comparative perspective.

In this light the general aim in this study is somewhat restricted. We simply address the proposition that work morale has been undermined in more generous welfare states, while there is more limited scope for uncovering truly causal factors that may explain country differences and trends over time in commitment. Even if the historical (pre modern welfare state) levels of employment commitment differed greatly across the compared countries, possibly in close correspondence to the spreading of the protestant work ethic, we here seek an evaluation of how commitment across countries in past decades and in the present reflect welfare state institutional structures, as is often argued in policy debate. Welfare state institutions have in all countries compared been present for decades, thus sufficient amounts of time to have exercised considerable accumulated normative impact on people's attitudes by the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The main purpose of this paper is thus to evaluate how levels and trends in employment commitment relate to variations in welfare state generosity. Firstly, trends in employment commitment are evaluated with recently extended (repeated cross-sectional) comparative survey data. The longest time span (1989-2005) includes three points in time where four countries belonging to different welfare state models are compared – Norway, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. For the more recent time span (1997-2005) ten countries are compared. Secondly, the role of welfare regime institutions for explaining the present (2005) cross-national patterns in individuals' employment commitment across thirteen countries is examined, while also bringing in the importance of the organization of work through measures of subjectively perceived job quality.¹ For this purpose individual- and country-level data are combined in simultaneous multi-level analysis for the specification of their relative effects on employment commitment. Particular interest lies with an evaluation of how benefit replacement rates specifically are indicative for cross-national differences in commitment to paid work. In addition, analysis takes into account differences in female labour force participation and unemployment rates, which may also influence employment commitment. The comparative survey data is from the International Social Survey Program's (ISSP) Work Orientation Study modules of 1989, 1997 and 2005. Indicators of welfare regime generosity are mainly from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP).

¹ The countries included in the multi-variate analysis are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Germany is represented by respondents residing in the geographical area of former West Germany. The quality of the Finnish data needs to be further assessed.

The study proceeds by firstly addressing institutional incentives, a description of welfare states, findings from comparative research on job quality, and a summary of findings from previous broader comparative research on employment commitment. This section ends with a summary of expected employment commitment in relation to social policy incentives. Next, the importance of individual factors' are briefly discussed, after which the data, measurements and method are described. Subsequently the results are presented which finally are summed up in a (preliminary) concluding discussion.

Incentives in relation to welfare states, job quality and other structural factors

Incentives provided by institutional arrangements of e.g. social protection or the organization of work, may be regarded as external stimulants or motivations for an action that may otherwise not take place, i.e. distinct from coercively influenced action or in this case attitude change. Furthermore work is considered to be at the nexus of all types of welfare state institutions, whereby commitment to work will be structured by economic, political, social, and moral mechanisms. Regardless of what emphasis is given to actor-oriented rational-choice theory or the structuralist's more constrained view of individual action, institutions may be regarded as the link between agency and structure, to some extent affecting strategic actions, actors' rational calculation, as well as preferences and beliefs within normative orders (see e.g. March and Olsen 1984). Consequently, individuals are expected to express their employment commitment in a way that to some extent relates systematically to the incentive structures of welfare state institutions.

Even though we here focus on the role of welfare state institutions, other factors such as religious or political traditions may be of relevance for forming individuals' attitudes to work. Yet, it is argued that such factors in the past decades in fact are partly captured by welfare state institutional design, as the emergence and development of welfare state institutional design was much related to partisan politics as well as its confessional or non-confessional influences (see e.g. Korpi 2001).²

Welfare states

The seminal work by Esping-Andersen (1990) serves as a good starting point in terms of its early recognition of three worlds of capitalism, distinguishing social democratic, conservative and liberal welfare states. While we here also set apart three groups of welfare states, institutional labels proposed by Korpi and Palme (1998) are used in relation to how they exclusively refer to central institutional characteristics (such as e.g. principals for replacement). For reasons of

² Preliminary analyses in fact indicate how protestants tend to hold stronger commitment, which however does not help explain the significant differences in commitment between countries.

simplicity, the main distinctions are made between encompassing, corporatist and basic security welfare states across all four social protection dimensions included in this study (sickness cash, unemployment and family benefits, and social assistance), i.e. despite the fact that such terminology was developed with reference only to sickness cash and pension benefits.³

In *encompassing welfare states* earnings-related benefits at higher replacement rates are provided across all social insurance areas, also in terms of family benefits, which together with extensive day-care services for the youngest children, promoting dual earner families with higher female labour force participation. Also *corporatist welfare states*, in terms of sickness cash benefits and unemployment benefits, tend to provide higher replacement rates, but these benefits are usually provided to the active labour force within segments of occupational programs, consequently excluding groups more loosely attached to, or outside, the labour force (Korpi and Palme 1998). Family benefits and social assistance benefits are lower as compared to encompassing welfare states. Lower family benefits are also combined with more limited day-care services (part-time care centres for the somewhat older children), which instead encourages a more traditional division paid and unpaid work (Ferrarini 2006; Korpi 2000).⁴

In *basic security welfare states* benefits are generally low and usually provided as flat-rate benefits, but in cases also as earnings-related benefits but with low benefit ceilings or means-tested (mainly Australia and New Zealand). In relation to family policy programs, the low benefits combined with limited provision of public day-care services, encourages reliance on market resources or informal help for the supply of caring services (Korpi 2000). Also categorisation of social assistance may fruitfully focus on institutional characteristics such as replacement levels since these have been shown to be highly linked with first-tier replacement levels, particularly the degree to which social insurance provides income security (Nelson 2003:91-127).⁵

Job quality

We now turn to the importance of the organization or labour for employment commitment. In this respect, so called production regime institutions that usually are described as the organisation of production through markets and market-related institutions (in capitalist market economies),

³ N.b. that grouping of Denmark and Switzerland in this study differs from that of Korpi and Palme (1998).

⁴ This family policy model offers benefits mainly as maternity grants and/or childcare leave, and are usually combined with longer durations of maternity leave, public part-time day-care services for somewhat older children (from three years up to school age), which in sum provides incentives for the parent with the lowest earnings (usually the mother) to stay away from the labour market for a longer period of time after child birth.

⁵ For in-depth description of social insurance scheme typologies using data from the SCIP-database, see e.g. Korpi and Palme (1998) in the field of sickness cash benefits, Carroll (1999) in the field of unemployment insurance, and Korpi (2000) and Ferrarini (2006) with regards to family policies. For social assistance, see Eardley et al. (1996).

may be understood to frame the work situation and thereby contributing to shaping the working climate in labour markets and as such highly influential for individuals' attitudes to work. This macro-to-micro implication links production regime institutions with job quality, which in turn is imperative for individuals' employment commitment (Esser 2005), or motivation, job satisfaction and psychological health (Gallie 2007a:87). Further theoretical discussion about production regime institutions' design, logic and consequences is here left aside in relation to the choice of including subjective measures of job quality at the individual level rather than macro-level production regime institutional indicators.

Early on in the study of job quality liberal as well as neo-marxist perspectives focused on the importance of task control for self-realization by providing conditions for creativity and self-development (Braverman 1964). Blauner (1964) incorporated similar ideas into a more general theory of quality of work life, which later on have developed towards theories on organizational commitment (see e.g. Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990), and more recently there is also a convergence between psychologists and sociologists e.g. by the demand-control models developed by Karasek and Theorell (1990; Theorell 1998). A parallel is found in the importance given also to stability of work life through labour-market segmentation theory, see e.g. Berger and Piore (1980) or Edwards (1979).

Lately, neo-fordist arguments have been posed against post-fordist/-industrial arguments (see e.g. Handel 2005; Olsen *et al.* 2007), where research using objective indicators of job quality suggest significant work place changes in the direction hypothesized by neo-Fordist theory, i.e. declining job quality in terms of material rewards, job security and work pace, with more disputed claims in relation to work load (Handel 2005-70). In a literature review specifically focused on job security, Sverke *et al.* (2006:22) find that the accelerating rate of organizational change has brought on increased job insecurity, implying also continued increase in flexibility of the labour market. Yet, they do not find that "job insecurity may be an inherent and inevitable consequence of downsizing, structural change and organizational strivings for flexibility" (*ibid* 2006:22). Rather job insecurity must be regarded as a function both of the objective situation (such as labour market characteristics and organizational change) and the individual's subjective characteristics (e.g. family responsibility and employability). That objective changes translate directly into subjective experiences is clearly a problematic assumption as recognized within psychology (see e.g. Kahneman *et al.* 1999), as well as in comparative sociology by e.g. Gallie (2003:75) who sees "many pitfalls in the journey from policy formations to effective change in working conditions".⁶

⁶ For a preliminary analysis of the fit between objective measures of labour market organisation and regulation with subjective perception of work place quality see Esser and Olsen (2008).

Only recently have changes over time in how workers themselves perceive the quality of jobs been examined, and although a great deal of research has made claims that the general quality of jobs has declined or improved on various dimensions, Handel (2005) notes remarkable stability in subjective perception of job quality when developments in the United States are considered. In a cross-national perspective however findings are more varied. Drawing on public opinion surveys (and administrative data) Green (2005) shows how aspects of job quality are related and how changes stem from technological change and transformations in the politico-economic environment, but describes contrasting trends since the 1970s in relation to five central job quality dimensions. Average pay levels have risen along with economic growth in most affluent countries, with a major exception of the United States. Similarly skill requirements have increased, which in many cases offer a potential for more fulfilling work. Set-backs however include increases in inequality, a strong intensification of work effort, diminished job satisfaction, and less employee influence over daily work tasks. Similarly, Gallie (2007a) finds different trends in cross-national comparison, and finds quality of work to correspond poorly to the two principal production regime types in terms of employee job control, autonomous work teams, organizational participation and job security, but instead emphasizes the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian countries.

Whereas only a few years ago there was also little agreement on definition of key variables of job quality, there is mounting consensus around central dimensions for cross-national comparison (see e.g. Dahl *et al.* 2007; Gallie 2007a; Green 2005; Handel 2005; Olsen *et al.* 2007). These include extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards, work conditions, work place cooperation, task control or autonomy. An overall measure of job satisfaction is sometimes also included. Especially task control or autonomy has been considered to be more important for self-realization in work, personal satisfaction with working life and work motivation (Gallie 2007c:105). While main focus used to lie with intrinsic values, the importance of extrinsic rewards is also acknowledged today (Gallie 2007b:6).⁷

Unemployment and female labour force participation

Other contextual factors expected to influence employment commitment are unemployment and female labour force participation. Although these structural conditions in themselves may be considered partly a consequence of institutional context, inclusion of these factors in analyses permits an evaluation of these contextual factors' additional and independent effects.

⁷ From an entirely different perspective, “[e]mpirical labour economics largely considers that wages and hours of work are sufficient indicators of job quality[, but] using information on 14000 workers in 19 OECD countries it is shown that, first, workers actually say that wages and hours are amongst the least important characteristics of a job” (Clark 2004).

Firstly it has been argued that rising and/or high unemployment rates make for a shift away from materialist concerns, and that such a shift will increase emphasis on freedom, self-expression, and quality of life. By this logic, the importance of intrinsic (non-financial) work values in the employment situation is understood to be more extensively emphasized (Clark and Lipset 1991), wherefore stronger employment commitment is expected with higher unemployment. The opposite relationship may be predicted. With decreased disutility from deviation from the social (work) norm as the share of unemployment benefit recipients increases, it is argued that people will become less prone to take part in work (Lindbeck 1997). Given contradictory theoretical predictions, it thus remains an empirical question how unemployment may structure commitment.

In relation to female labour force participation, a plausible assumption is that commitment is related to how women are encouraged to participate in paid work. Since family policies provide qualitatively different opportunities in this respect (see e.g. Daly 2000; Ferrarini 2006), analysis evaluates any potential gendered effect mediated through institutional structures, but also whether there is a direct and separate effect of female labour force participation rate.⁸

Previous findings in comparative studies of employment commitment

Broader comparative research on employment commitment is limited. Two studies used ISSP survey data to compare six advanced industrialized countries. Both studies included Sweden, Norway, the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, but where Berglund (2001) also includes France, Hult and Svallfors (2002) instead include New Zealand. The conclusion drawn is that country differences corresponded to groupings within production regime typologies, with employment commitment being stronger in coordinated market economies (Sweden, Norway and Germany), especially in the Scandinavian countries, and weaker in liberal market economies (New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Drawing on data from the Employment in Europe Survey of 1996 that includes fifteen European Union member states, Gallie and Alm (2000) focused on differences between employed and unemployed, but found no evidence that (employment) commitment in general is related to the generosity of unemployment benefits.⁹ Although these studies find interesting cross-national differences, they mainly employ country-dummy variables as the sum-measure of all contextual effects. When Esser (2005) compared twelve welfare states in 1997 and included specific institutional measures of social protection, while also controlling for other contextual factors, employment commitment was

⁸ See Appendix for specifications and sources of measures.

⁹ An association does however appear between unemployment benefits and lower commitment in the specific case of married/cohabiting women in societies with a more traditional gender culture (Gallie and Alm 2000:121).

found to be decidedly higher in more generous welfare states such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden and lower in basic security welfare states such as Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (Esser 2005).

Expected commitment in relation to social policy program incentives

Although often overlapping, attitudinal outcomes must be understood as distinct from behavioural outcomes. A behavioural measure of a person's labour force participation tells us little about a person's attitude towards his or her work. From a stricter economic perspective the basic assumption is that leisure-time is usually valued higher than work-time and if given a free choice, individuals will opt for leisure. The straightforward expectation from this perspective is weaker and/or weakening employment commitment in welfare states providing more generous social insurances and social assistance.

Expectations from a broader institutional perspective differ in relation to how higher benefits are usually provided by the earnings-related principle. The argument from this perspective mainly draws on an understanding of how work and welfare are more tightly tied together through the reciprocity of requirements of reference and qualification periods, while of course always being conditional on the recipient being exposed to a specific condition of need (for example work incapacity for sickness cash benefits).¹⁰ Furthermore, benefits are higher with higher levels of pay and participation. In relation to unemployment benefits, aside from significant positive intrinsic values of work, as well as strong negative psycho-social effects of being out of work, matching-theory and findings consistent therewith (see e.g. Burdett 1979; Pollmann-Schult and Büchel 2005; Åberg 2003), show how more generous benefits may allow a better matching between individuals' skills, preferences and work positions, thereby providing better opportunities for taking part in labour on more favourable terms that may further strengthen more positive experiences of employment.

In a gender perspective, also the higher earnings-related family benefits provide incentives (for especially women) to participate in paid work although differently according to their design (see e.g. Daly 2000; Ferrarini 2006) and have also been shown to explain variations in gender-role attitudes across countries (Sjöberg 2004). In combination with broadly provided child care services for smaller children, higher earnings-related parental leave benefits motivate an earlier return to the labour market as compared to the continental European corporatist welfare states where family policies rather promote a more traditional division of labour during prolonged periods of parental leave.

¹⁰ Individuals' 'choices' between work and leisure must thus not be regarded as unrestrained or free.

Lastly, in relation to social assistance previous research finds that first- and last-tier institutions are actually better understood as mutually reinforcing parts of the welfare system, where the level of social assistance and especially earnings-related first-tier social insurance are strongly interdependent (Nelson 2003). With close ties between first- and second-tier institutions, the institutional disincentive effects of second-tier social assistance may be expected to be less pronounced in countries with strong first-tier institutions, as strong overall institutionalised work incentives and work orientation may permeate also to domains covered by second-tier institutions. In sum, from a broader institutional approach, in relation to the design of earnings-related benefits, higher and/or increasing employment commitment is expected within more generous welfare states.

Employment commitment at the individual level

While the main focus in this study is on institutions' influence on commitment, analysis needs to also assess and incorporate those individual-level characteristics that are important for explaining individuals' employment commitment. Yet, the broad comparative approach taken here does not permit further elaboration upon to what extent individual characteristics matter in different ways in different countries.

[further elaboration]

In sum, theories as well as empirical findings are often contradictory. Drawing upon recent findings from broader comparative studies, employment commitment is in general expected to be more dependent on socio-economic status, rather than age and family structure, although it is recognized that analysis also needs to take into account the latter type of plausibly important factors. In addition, this study attempts to account also for the importance of religious denomination and the intensity with which the individual practices his/her religion.¹¹

Data

Repeated cross-sectional data are from the International Social Survey Program, Work Orientations Modules of 1989, 1997 and 2005. This comparative survey program aims to produce high-quality comparable data on attitudes and values in industrialized countries, where the problems of establishing cross-national validity in question phrasing, concepts and meanings, are held to have been dealt with to a uniquely high extent. This includes e.g. careful translational

¹¹ Preliminary analyses, not shown, indicate how protestants tend to be more committed to paid work, but does not explain remaining significant differences in commitment between countries.

procedure from the master questionnaire developed within the ISSP's main drafting group, to national questionnaires prepared by national drafting groups (for further discussion see e.g. Becker *et al.* 1990; Davies and Jowell 1989; Svallfors *et al.* 2001). Although response rates unfortunately vary quite a lot across countries (quite usual in comparative research), the internal response rates are reassuringly high with regards to the dependent variables.¹²

Employment commitment is measured by two questions phrased as statements: "I would enjoy having a paid job even if I did not need the money", and "a job is just a way of earning money – no more", to which the following responses on a five-point scale were given: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree.¹³ Answers were recoded so that higher values correspond to stronger employment commitment combined in a summed average employment commitment index taking on values from one to five. Thus, at the high end of this continuum this measure is indicative of non-financial work commitment whereby individuals would like to take part in paid work even if there were alternative incomes such as benefits from the welfare state available. Low scores instead indicate a purely financial commitment to employment, whereby the difference between wages and available benefits becomes a crucial deciding factor for individuals' participation in paid work.¹⁴

For the multi-variate analysis individual level factors include age, civil status, presence of dependent child in household, education, social class and employment status. Measurement of age is straightforward, but to check for a curvilinear relationship, four age-groups were constructed: 18-24, 25-34 (reference category), 35-44, 45-54 and 54-59 years of age. Regarding household composition, single persons (including separated widowed or divorced) are contrasted against those married (or living as married). Regarding individuals' education, higher education measured as any tertiary education (complete or incomplete) is contrasted against lower degrees. Social class is measured through a recoding of international occupational class (ISCO) codes into a six-category EGP-classification scheme (see e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), which distinguishes between unskilled workers, skilled workers, routine non-manual employees, service classes I and II (higher- or lower-level controllers and administrators), and the self-employed.¹⁵ In

¹² Average response rates for the countries compared is for ISSP1989 data is 60 percent (four countries compared), 61% for data from ISSP1997 (ten countries compared) and 53% for ISSP2005 data (thirteen countries compared).

¹³ Employment commitment indicates the degree to which a person in general wants to be engaged in paid employment (see e.g. Jackson *et al.* 1983; Warr 1982), and more specifically so, regardless of need. By principal component analysis (by varimax rotation) conducted for each country separately as well as for the whole sample of countries, these questions were found to accurately and with acceptable robustness measure individuals' employment commitment across all thirteen countries.

¹⁴ Notably, this measure does not capture work intensity or individuals preferred number work hours. Neither does the question specifically relate to the respondent's current job.

¹⁵ Reclassification procedure involves recoding from 3- and 4-digit ISCO-codes (international standard classification of occupation) aided by syntax provided by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996), also available online (Ganzeboom 2007).

relation to employment status, four categories are distinguished: persons working full-time, person working part-time (less than 35 hours per week), unemployed persons and home workers (mostly housewives).¹⁶

Job quality measures

Following previous research (Gallie 2003; Gallie 2007a; Green 2005; Handel 2005; Olsen *et al.* 2007), we here focus on four central job quality dimensions: extrinsic rewards (income, job security, opportunities for advancement), intrinsic rewards (job challenge), work relations (employee-manager and employee-co-worker relations), work conditions (hard, dangerous or stressful jobs) and task control/autonomy (control of work hours, organization).¹⁷

The following fourteen statements/questions on job quality (Q1-Q14) were transformed into 8 measures covering the four central dimensions of job quality: extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards, working conditions/work intensity, interpersonal relations and job control.¹⁸ Overall, the internal non-response rates for these measures were very low (around 2-3 percent).

Extrinsic values were evaluated by three statements (Cronbach's alpha 0.56) to form the first index measure: (Q1) my job is secure, (Q2) my income is high, (Q3) my opportunities for advancement are high. *Intrinsic values* were evaluated by two statements (Cronbach's alpha 0.74): (Q4) in my job I can help other people, (Q5) my job is useful to society. For both domains, responses were available on scale 1-5: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. *Working conditions* is a composite measure of two questions (Cronbach's alpha 0.68) asking how often a respondent (Q6) has to do hard physical work, and (Q7) works in dangerous conditions, whereas *work intensity* is measured by two questions (Cronbach's alpha 0.62) about how often the respondent (Q8) comes home from work exhausted, and (Q9), finds his/her work stressful. Responses were given on scale 1-5: always, often, sometimes, hardly ever, never.

Interpersonal relations are evaluated by asking two questions (Cronbach's alpha 0.66) about how the respondent would describe the relations at his/her workplace between (Q10) management and employees, and (Q11) between workmates/colleagues, where responses ranged from very good, quite good, neither good nor bad, quite bad, very bad. *Job control* is evaluated by

¹⁶ Country differences in part-time work definitions limit comparability. Since too few men work part-time, evaluation only concerns women.

¹⁷ A measure of overall job satisfaction was excluded as it tells little about external aspects a job quality (and thus little about how country-specific institutional context may influence this dimension).

¹⁸ By principal component analyses (varimax rotation) these dimensions were found to be internally consistent, although Cronbach's alpha was somewhat low on one dimension (extrinsic rewards). Analyses were performed for each country separately as well as for the entire sub-sample of countries, and validate the distinction between hard and dangerous jobs as distinct from stressful and exhausting jobs, and the exclusion of the general question of "independent work" from the intrinsic reward dimension. Overall, dimensions elaborated here are in line with implications from previous research (see e.g. Gallie 2003; Gallie 2007a; Olsen *et al.* 2007).

three separate questions on how the respondent can control (Q12) starting and finishing times and (Q13) how the daily work is organized, to which three responses were given: cannot change/not free to decide, decide within limits and /entirely/ free to decide. The third question (Q14) asks how difficult it is to take an hour or two off during working hours for personal or family matters, to which four alternative responses were given: not difficult at all, not too difficult, somewhat difficult and, very difficult. Each of these questions were dichotomized distinguishing high quality jobs as those where the respondent had greater control over his work situation, i.e. was entirely free to decide or could decide within limits about work hours and work organization, and experienced little difficulty in taking a few hours off for private matters.

Welfare regime generosity measures

The indicator of welfare regime generosity was calculated as the average net replacement level of benefits across four major types of social insurance programs: unemployment benefits, sickness cash benefits and parental leave benefits in 2000 and social assistance in 2005.¹⁹ These benefits provide the most common ‘alternative incomes’ in situations when active aged people temporarily cannot take part in paid work. Benefits are net of taxes in relation to the net average production worker wage (APWW). Data on social insurances are from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP), and data on social assistance for 2005 are from the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Data Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Data (SaMip).²⁰

[Figure 1]

Figure 1 shows the total welfare regime generosity across four major social protection areas for thirteen countries, and the relative proportions of each social insurance/assistance of the average index – ranked by regime and total generosity.²¹

Clear regime differences are discerned. Total generosity is highest in encompassing welfare states (69 percent on average), of medium size in corporatist welfare states (59 percent on average) and the lowest in basic security welfare states (33 percent on average), although there is a country

¹⁹ Macro-level models that only included one macro-level institutional variable were also analysed but did not add to the results presented, see also comment in results below.

²⁰ Benefit replacement rates were calculated as the average rate in case of 1 or 26 weeks of unemployment or sickness, but in relation to 52 weeks of reliance on family benefits or social assistance. Benefits are net of taxation as a proportion of an (net) average production worker's wage for type case households (for further description, see Appendix). For the importance of comparing net outcomes (i.e. post transfer and taxation outcomes), see Ferrarini and Nelson (2003). Although more encompassing measures of welfare regime generosity (e.g. coverage-ratios, qualifying conditions and membership requirements) should be acknowledged, the indicator chosen is held to reasonably well match the broader comparative aim of this study.

²¹ N.b. that grouping of Denmark and Switzerland in this study differs from that of Korpi and Palme (1998).

exception within each regime. Generosity is decidedly lower in Denmark as compared to the two other Scandinavian countries, but higher in Germany as compared to other corporatist welfare states, and higher also in Canada as compared to the five other basic security welfare states.

Denmark is recognized as a more mixed model but is here grouped with the Scandinavian countries in relation to how its overall institutional configuration is more similar to these countries in important ways, most with respect to active labour market and dual-earner policies and high levels of social spending on social services encouraging full employment and high female labour force participation (see e.g. Greve 2004) and extensive day-care services for the youngest children, thus promoting dual earner families (Ferrarini 2006). All social insurance benefits are also designed according to the income security principal – as a percentage of previous earnings – although a low benefit ceiling lowers the actual replacement rate relative to the average production worker wage.²²

Among the corporatist countries sickness cash and unemployment benefits are in general higher than family benefits and social assistance, especially in Germany and Belgium as compared to Japan and Switzerland. Furthermore, while sickness cash benefits are higher than unemployment benefits in the former countries, the opposite relation is found in the latter. Germany's distinctive character is related to its noticeably higher levels of sickness cash benefits and family benefits, which brings the total average generosity level to that of the Swedish model.

In basic security countries generosity is low with the exception of Canada. Canadian sickness cash benefits and unemployment benefits are in fact earnings related replacing 55 percent of previous gross earnings, although sickness cash benefits are limited to a maximum of 15 week duration (which lowers the rate as compared to unemployment benefits with 45 weeks of duration, where the type cases compared are a 26 week spell of sickness or unemployment period). Furthermore, social assistance in almost all countries makes out a substantial part of the total generosity measure. Worth noting is also the absence of a national sickness insurance program in the United States and how the means-tested benefits across all policy domains in Australia and New Zealand provide generosity comparable to levels in most basic security welfare states.

Method

For the multi-variate analyses of employment commitment in 2005 multi-level analysis is used, which is appropriate when individuals are clustered within countries. By this method effects of

²² The formal replacement rates of Danish unemployment and sickness cash benefits were 90 and 100(?) percent of gross earnings respectively (in 2000), although limited by the maximum benefit ceiling. The *net* replacement rate is 57 percent. In effect, generosity of earnings-related benefits is often determined by maximum benefit ceilings, which tend to be higher for sickness cash benefits and parental leave insurance than for unemployment benefits.

predicting variables are correctly referred to their specific levels and the variance is separated between levels (see e.g. Jones and Duncan 1998). All estimated models are random intercepts models, allowing average commitment to vary across countries. For reasonable accuracy in estimations, in relation to the limited number of higher-level units (countries), a maximum of two macro-level variables are included simultaneously in the models presented.

Rather than including macro-level production regime indicators, analysis instead includes subjective measures of job quality at the individual level, which offers three main advantages. Firstly, welfare and production regime indicators are highly correlated (see e.g. Esser 2006), which precludes simultaneous inclusion due to problems of multicollinearity. Secondly, objective measures at the macro-level and subjective indicators at the individual level may differ, where the subjective job quality measures may offer a ‘tighter’ measure of work organization, although as previously mentioned, not assumed to fit perfectly with objective macro-level measures. Finally, the inclusion of job quality indicators also offers a hard-test to the importance of welfare state institutional effects on employment commitment by taking into account compositional differences in job quality. If effects prevail despite the inclusion of these controls, such findings may be seen as particularly convincing.

Results

Firstly we examine changes in employment commitment over time. Table 1 shows the average across the four countries for which data is available for three points in time.²³ Following theoretical expectations and previous research, we examine commitment separately for working men, working women, unemployed persons and housewives.

[Table 1]

Looking firstly at the upper panel and the commitment among working persons, the Norwegians can be seen to have the highest initial (1989) levels of commitment, women as well as men, whereas the lowest commitment (men and women) at this point in time is found in Germany. Of the two middle positions, the Americans’ commitment (men’ and women’s) is decidedly higher than that of the British. Notably, women are in general more strongly committed than men. Also average commitment in all countries for the entire time period commitment is above the middle score on the commitment scale (1-5).

Looking at the changes for all countries over the entire period 1989-2005, the ‘total’ trend for working men is characterized by stability, while there is a slight and significant overall increase of commitment among working women. However, the commitment across the four countries

²³ Preliminary analysis of over-time changes in predicted means (controlling for sex, age, marital status, dependent child in household and education) confirm the pattern presented in Table 1.

appears to be diverging. For working men all significant changes take place between 1989 and 1997 where commitment in the encompassing welfare state of Norway and corporatist Germany increased, while it decreased in both basic security welfare states. By 2005 the lowest commitment is now found among British working men. The trend among women is somewhat similar. The Norwegians commitment increases over the entire period. Also the German women's commitment increases as a consequence of a large increase between 1989 and 1997, whereas it decreased somewhat in the latter period. To the contrary, the British commitment declines significantly between 1989 and 1997. A slight but non-significant increase in the latter period however leaves the change over the entire period non-significant. American women's commitment remains fairly stable at an intermediate level over the entire time period. Thus the total positive trend in employment commitment among working women is due to strengthened commitment in Norway and Germany.

Turning to the lower panel in Table 1 showing the average commitment among unemployed persons and housewives, these sub-samples are quite small, wherefore seemingly large changes do not turn out to be statistically significant. It can however be noted that average commitment in these groups is decidedly lower. Only the commitment of unemployed persons and housewives in Britain are at a similar (low) level or slightly higher the commitment among their working fellow (wo)men. Average commitment is also for these groups at all times above the mid point, although with two exceptions for the unemployed and housewives in Germany in 1989. Preliminary analyses of predicted means while controlling for compositional effects of sex, age, marital status, dependent child in household and education, add little to the results presented.

To recap, findings by Esser (2005) clearly pointed to higher levels of employment commitment in Scandinavian encompassing welfare states but lower levels in basic security welfare states. Yet, critics (rightly) argued that such results are still congruent with expectations of weakened employment commitment in more generous welfare states over time, since earlier levels of employment commitment could have been even higher but declining due to serious disincentive effects. The available survey data for three points in time and for four countries belonging different welfare state models, do not lend evidence to this line of reasoning. Rather the contrary.

Yet, these four countries may not be representative for the three main welfare regimes distinguished. We therefore turn to the question of how well these four countries represent any broader pattern of changes in employment commitment over time, possibly indicative of specific trends for encompassing, corporatist and basic security welfare states? The recently available

comparative data facilitates an evaluation of ten countries and the change in average commitment between 1997 and 2005.

In Figure 2 the average commitment across countries in 1997 is plotted against the average in 2005. Thus, employment commitment in countries found above the diagonal line has increased, while employment commitment in countries below this line has decreased, although the change is significant only in those countries marked with a filled symbol. Clearly the overall pattern is one of stability. When working men's commitment is compared there are no significant changes over time. Commitment is strongest in two Scandinavian countries (Norway and Denmark) but lowest in Great Britain. Low levels are also found in Germany, the United States, Canada and Japan and New Zealand.

[Figure 2]

Working women's commitment has changed in half of the countries compared, in diverging directions. Commitment increased in Norway and Canada, while it decreased in Germany, Japan and Denmark, i.e. no indications of similar changes in countries that belong to the same type of welfare state model. The relative ranking of countries has also changed somewhat, where Swiss and German women take somewhat higher positions. Furthermore, it can be seen how countries cluster further up the diagonal line, i.e. indicating how women's commitment on average is stronger than men's.

In the lower part of Figure 2, again, there are not many significant changes over time when unemployed persons' and housewives' commitment is compared, in part due to the low number of respondents in these groups. A few significant changes can be noted. Commitment among the Swiss unemployed and housewives increased substantially, while it decreased among Japanese housewives. Again, employment average commitment for these groups is notably lower as compared to working persons' commitment.

To sum up this far, the trend in employment commitment is more characterized by stability than change. In countries where changes occurred, these do not confirm expectations from an individual economist theoretical perspective. In the earlier period (1989-1997) employment commitment weakened in the two basic security welfare states while having become stronger in the encompassing welfare state of Norway.

To take the analyses on step further, we next confront the argument that differences in employment commitment may be better explained by how work is organized, whereby job quality may be the more influential country-specific (or compositional) explanatory factor. The next question then is whether welfare state institutions may explain observed differences across countries in the present, while also (subjective) measures of job quality at the individual level are

taken into account. The latest survey data is combined with new institutional data in multi-level analyses (hierarchical regressions), which proceeds in two steps. Firstly individual-level predictors are evaluated after which country-level factors are added to the full micro-level models to assess their explanatory value while all micro-level factors are controlled for, thus also taking into account socio-demographic and job-related compositional differences across countries.

[Table 1]

Table 1 shows effects on employment commitment of individual factors. For the most part results are in line with theoretical expectations and previous findings. Education and social class are the overall stronger predictors of employment commitment than age, household composition (marital status and the presence of a dependent child in the household). Effects of education and social class are positive and significant, where commitment increases with “higher” social class, and where the commitment among self-employed is also quite high. In the first model we also see how women are more committed than men, which confirms indications from trend analyses above. The same model shows also the importance of employment status. Part-timers are in general more committed than full-timers, which is also the case when only working women are compared in models 4 and 5. Unemployed persons and housewives are generally less committed, which also confirms previous findings (Esser 2005).

Age is a less important factor. Model 1 shows significant effects in relation the youngest age group, who are more strongly committed than persons aged 25-34. Models 5-6, show how this effect is a result of how younger working women are significantly more committed. In contrast older working men (aged 35-59) are less committed than the reference group of men aged 25-34, although only when job quality controls are included in the model (Model 3). Also the presence of a dependent child in the household appears to be of relevance to working fathers whose commitment is lower than men in households without children, when job quality is controlled for.

Lastly, as expected, effects of job quality are positive (with one exception) and significant in almost all instances. Overall, effects are non-gendered, although with some specifications. For men, effects of work intensity and work relations are somewhat weaker, whereas for women what sticks out is the higher importance of perceived control over work hours. In these models that include all eight measures of job quality simultaneously, the perceived possibly to take a few hours off from work for private matters, appears to be little importance, men and women alike. Furthermore, men’s employment commitment appears not to be unrelated to hard and dangerous work conditions, whereas there is no relation between women’s commitment and stressful and exhausting jobs. Yet, effects in relation to all these qualities are in fact positive and

significant when included separately into the regression (models not shown), i.e. indicating some problems of multi-collinearity.²⁴

In relation to individual-level hierarchical regressions, it should also be noted that results pertain to comparisons of the entire population of individuals (in all countries) and are not country specific. It is, for example part-time workers in all countries that are compared to all full-timers across countries. Thus, results do not tell us whether effects hold true for each specific country.

Before we turn to the analyses of country-level factors for explaining cross-national differences, we may interpret the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). This is an estimate of the proportion (percentage) of unexplained variance attributable to the second level (country-level), in this case calculated simply as the country level variance divided by the sum of country and individual level variance (and multiplied by 100). All models are within the span of 3.5-4.7 percent, where as a rule of thumb, an ICC of 1, 4, 8 and 14 per cent corresponds to a standardised effect sizes in general viewed as small, medium, large and very large respectively (Duncan and Raudenbusch (1999)). Not unexpectedly this variation is somewhat higher among working women. Interestingly enough and somewhat surprising, job quality variables appear to only marginally explain country differences in employment commitment. Among working men the ICC decreases with merely 0.27 percentage points, i.e. a 7 percent decrease, when job quality variables are included in the model (comparing model 2 and 3), while the decrease is somewhat larger, but still small, when working women's commitment is compared, 0.68 percentage points, i.e. a 14 percent decrease (models 4 and 5 compared). In other words, subjectively perceived job quality does not appear to be a significant explanatory factor for explaining cross-national differences in employment commitment.²⁵ Most of the variation in employment commitment (as expected) depends on individual differences and not on which country a person lives in. Yet, the present country differences are significant and of normal or medium size when attitude differences between countries are considered.²⁶

Next, effects of macro-level indicators are presented in Table 2. Overall, no support is found in relation to the expectations that higher welfare regime generosity is related to weaker employment commitment – for working men or working women. All models show how effects of welfare regime generosity instead are positive and significant, implying stronger commitment

²⁴ The highest bivariate correlations between the eight measures of job quality (the three variables on job control) are however in the medium range (0.46-0.51).

²⁵ It thus is an open question as to how objective measures of labour market organisation and regulation in fact correspond to the subjective perception of work place quality (see e.g. Esser and Olsen 2008).

²⁶ As a rough indication of significant cross-country variation the estimates of variance can be compared against the size of their standard errors (i.e. by same procedure as variable estimates).

in countries with higher levels of welfare regime generosity. When each model includes only the measure of welfare regime generosity (added to the full micro-level model), substantial amounts of country-level variance is explained, as is shown by the calculated reduction of the intraclass correlation coefficient. For men it is reduced by 32-42% and for women by 50-67%. Thus, this gendered difference indicates how institutions appear to be more important for structuring women's commitment.

[Table 2]

In addition commitment is lower in countries with higher unemployment. The inclusion of this structural variable even further increases the explained cross-national variation. Intraclass coefficient is reduced by 66-74 percent when men's commitment is considered and by as much as 79-92 percent in the case of women. Somewhat surprising, female labour force participation is not correlated with employment commitment. Although all estimates are positive they are not significant, and these models do not add to the explanation of country differences. Or in other words, country differences still remain even when (substantial) differences in female labour force participation are controlled for. Country-level results' robustness to exclusion of country outliers or for exclusion of countries with low response-rates remains to be checked.²⁷ Yet, plots of country-level residuals (controlling for full set of micro-level indicators) do not lead us to suspect any significant changes to the general pattern described.

In addition to the models shown in Table 2, effects of a range of alternative welfare regime generosity measures were also evaluated. These showed how the specific combination of indicators across the four dimensions included in the total index measure (unemployment benefits, sickness cash benefits, social assistance and parental leave benefits) mattered only marginally. Effects of these combinations were also positive and significant, although explaining somewhat varying proportions of country differences in employment commitment.²⁸

Conclusion (preliminary)

This paper examined the trend in employment commitment over time since the late 1980s and also evaluated the role of welfare state institutions for explaining current cross-national patterns in employment commitment among the working populations across thirteen mature welfare states while also taking into account job quality.

²⁷ Plots of country-level residuals (controlling for full set of micro-level indicators) do however not lead us to suspect any significant changes to the general pattern described. ISSP2005 low response rate is found in Canada (30%), Belgium (39%), Australia (44%), Great Britain (44%).

²⁸ Only sub-sample of working men checked.

Preliminary analyses of trends show how changes for the most part occurred in the earlier period between 1989 and 1997, where it increased in the encompassing welfare state of Norway but decreased in two basic security countries Great Britain and the United States, while there were few changes in the latter period, for which a larger number of countries could be compared. These findings do not lend support to expectations from a narrower economic perspective that commitment may have been declining from initially higher levels due to serious disincentive effects. Rather they lend some support to the opposite expectations from a broader institutional perspective of high and/or increasing levels of employment commitment.

Findings of hierarchical regressions combining the latest survey data from 2005 with new institutional data show how employment commitment is decidedly stronger within more generous welfare regimes today, even when important indicators of job quality are accounted for, again more supportive of expectations in line with a broader institutional perspective.

In sum, work morale cannot be described as undermined within generous welfare states today. At the same time, correlation must not be mistaken for explanation. The correlation between stronger commitment and more generous welfare states necessitates further research into which societal and social mechanisms that may in fact explain observed country differences. It has here been argued that the strong reciprocity between work and welfare by the design of earnings-related benefits in more generous welfare states are of central importance for having maintained or possibly even encouraged a strong work norm and high levels of employment commitment in a historical perspective. Yet, this certainly does not suggest policy recommendations to raise benefit levels in order to strengthen employment commitment. The proper conclusion from the presented findings is rather that it appears to be quite possible to maintain a strong work morale in more extensive welfare states.

Appendix (incomplete)

Social insurance data is from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP), which is under construction at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University and to be publicly released in March 2008. The database contains information on social rights accruing through old-age pensions, sickness, unemployment, work-accident insurance, child benefits as well as marriage subsidies in eighteen countries from 1930 to 2000. This data has subsequently been extended with new information on different parental leave benefits and for six new welfare democracies.²⁹ Data on social assistance is from the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Data-Set (SaMip), also based at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (Stockholm University). It contains data on social assistance and related policy programs of last-resort regarding the level of means-tested benefits in 22 industrialized welfare democracies year-by-year for the period 1990-2005 (see also further documentation in Nelson 2007). The data used in this study refers to the average replacement rate of social assistance as a mean of benefits available to the three type households for which data has been calculated, net of taxes, excluding housing costs. Data on female labour force participation rates in 2002 (persons aged 25-54) are from OECD (OECD 2004:303-6) and standardized unemployment rates (as an average for 2004-2005) are from OECD (2007).

²⁹ The SCIP dataset is to be publicly released in January 2008. Data for the new welfare democracies in East and Central Europe and on parental leave benefits is confined to a fewer points in time and covers fewer institutional facets of social insurance programs.


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Figure 1 Total welfare regime generosity as the average net benefit replacement rate across unemployment benefits, sickness cash benefits, total family benefits (parental leave benefits & general family support) and social assistance as a percentage of an average production worker wage, and their relative proportions of the average index, 13 countries in 2000.



Sources: SCIP, SaMip, for further description of the data, see appendix.

Table 1 *Employment commitment (index value 1-5) among working persons, unemployed persons and housewives aged 18-69 in four countries 1989-2005 (country averages).*

	1989	1997	2005	89-97	97-05	89-05		1989	1997	2005	89-97	97-05	89-05
	<i>Working men</i>							<i>Working women</i>					
NO	3.64	3.80	3.82	+	0	+	NO	3.74	3.86	3.95	+	+	+
DE	3.19	3.40	3.37	+	0	+	DE	3.21	3.60	3.44	+	-	+
GB	3.32	3.14	3.18	-	0	-	GB	3.44	3.33	3.37	-	0	0
US	3.54	3.44	3.48	-	0	0	US	3.55	3.48	3.48	0	0	0
tot	3.46	3.52	3.50	+	0	0	tot	3.51	3.61	3.57	+	0	+
	<i>Unemployed persons[^]</i>							<i>Housewives[^]</i>					
NO	3.56	3.52	3.27	0	0(-)	0(-)	NO	3.37	3.54	3.27	0(+)	0(-)	0
DE	2.81	3.10	3.19	+	0	0(+)	DE	2.90	3.30	3.28	+	0	0(+)
GB	3.23	3.28	3.19	0	0	0	GB	3.25	3.20	3.20	0	0	0
US	3.35	3.16	3.33	0(-)	0(+)	0	US	3.19	3.06	3.20	0(-)	0(+)	0
tot	3.28	3.38	3.24	0(+)	0(-)	0	tot	3.21	3.23	3.23	0	0	0

+/- significant in-/decrease ($p < 0.05$)³⁰ 0 non-significant change


DE Germany NO Norway, GB Great Britain, US the United States

[^] All attitude changes with regards to the unemployed and the housewives are non-significant with the exception of increased employment commitment among German unemployed and housewives between 1989 and 1997. Indications of +/- within parenthesis indicate an absolute attitude change larger than 0.10.

Source: ISSP 1989, 1997, 2005, own calculations.

³⁰ Slightly lower significance in three cases: GB men 89-05 $p < 0.07$, US men 89-97 $p < 0.09$, GB women 89-97 $p < 0.08$.

Figure 2 Employment commitment (index value 1-5) among working persons, unemployed persons and housewives aged 18-69 in ten countries 1997 and 2005 (country averages).



◇ non-significant change 1997-2005 ◆ Significant change 1997-2005 ($p < 0.05$)³¹

Note: For unemployed and housewives only eight countries are compared due to small number of respondents ($n < 10$) who were unemployed in Canada and Japan and housewives in Sweden and Denmark.

Source: ISSP 1997, 2005.

³¹ Except German women ($p < 0.8$), Swiss unemployed ($p < 0.10$) Japanese and Swiss housewives ($p < 0.06$).

Table 2 *Micro-level predictors for employment commitment, persons aged 18-59 in 13 countries. Estimates from random intercept multi-level models.*

	Model	All		Working men				Working women			
		1	s.e.	2	s.e.	3	s.e.	4	s.e.	5	s.e.
<i>VARIABLES</i>											
	Intercept	3.153***	0.065	3.209***	0.083	1.648***	0.168	3.200***	0.062	1.970***	0.147
Sex (ref: male)	Female	0.103***	0.021								
Age group (ref: 25-34)	18-24	0.132*	0.053	0.099	0.084	0.109	0.093	0.208**	0.067	0.248***	0.063
	35-44	-0.002	0.020	-0.056	0.041	-0.092*	0.036	0.026	0.038	0.023	0.041
	45-54	-0.025	0.028	-0.065	0.030	-0.084*	0.039	-0.010	0.058	-0.017	0.052
	55-59	-0.034	0.039	-0.061	0.064	-0.101°	0.058	-0.026	0.058	-0.027	0.060
Civil status (ref: single)	Married/cohab.	0.033	0.034	0.061	0.043	0.050	0.038	0.033	0.041	0.027	0.043
Child (ref: no child)	Child in household	-0.022	0.028	-0.053	0.042	-0.067°	0.038	-0.006	0.049	-0.029	0.048
Education (ref: low)	Univ. education	0.231***	0.017	0.202***	0.026	0.132***	0.029	0.266***	0.037	0.257***	0.039
Social class (ref unskilled worker)	Skilled manual	0.036	0.026	0.035	0.032	0.006	0.037	-0.066	0.078	-0.084	0.096
	Routine non-man.	0.228***	0.033	0.211***	0.050	0.080	0.064	0.257***	0.053	0.201***	0.054
	Service II	0.338***	0.028	0.311***	0.045	0.127*	0.067	0.371***	0.047	0.285***	0.039
	Service I	0.474***	0.038	0.479***	0.048	0.211**	0.076	0.494***	0.070	0.379***	0.060
	Self-employed	0.506***	0.035	0.451***	0.053	0.294**	0.100	0.583***	0.083	0.464***	0.084
Employment status (ref: full-time)	Part-time worker ³²	0.090**	0.029					0.078*	0.036	0.078°	0.043
	Unemployed	-0.231***	0.053								
	Housewife	-0.202***	0.052								
<i>Job quality variables</i>											
	Extrinsic rewards (pay, security, advancement)					0.124**	0.040			0.074**	0.023
	Intrinsic rewards (help others, useful to society)					0.144***	0.019			0.093***	0.019
	Work conditions (hard, dangerous)					0.015	0.030			0.082***	0.023
	Work intensity (stressful, exhausting)					0.070**	0.021			-0.009	0.014
	Work relations (bad)					0.085***	0.024			0.098**	0.032
	Control work hours (ref: low control)					0.148***	0.028			0.140***	0.029
	Control work organisation (ref: low control)					0.116*	0.045			0.111*	0.049
	Control hour off (ref: low control)					0.011	0.047			0.019	0.042
<i>VARIANCE</i>											
	Country level	0.031	0.010	0.033	0.012	0.028	0.013	0.035	0.011	0.028	0.009
	Individual level	0.787	0.046	0.835	0.051	0.765	0.050	0.705	0.050	0.664	0.045
ICC (Intraclass correlation coefficient)		3.79		3.80		3.53		4.73		4.05	
No. observations		9333		4223		3724		4107		3638	

°/*/**/*** p < 0.10/0.05/0.01/0.001 Source: ISSP 2005, own calculations.

³² Less than 35 hours, although with some variation across countries.

Table 3 Macro-level predictors for employment commitment, persons aged 18-59 in 13 countries. Estimates from random intercept multi-level models (standard errors within parenthesis).^a

	Working men				Working women			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
			Including controls for job quality				Including controls for job quality	
WRG (welfare regime generosity)	0.918*** (0.202)	0.457° (0.262)	0.907*** (0.174)	0.563* (0.271)	1.043*** (0.138)	0.596*** (0.160)	1.029*** (0.088)	0.700*** (0.156)
<i>STRUCTURAL VARIABLES</i>								
Unemployment rate	-0.072*** (0.014)		-0.068*** (0.011)		-0.065*** (0.015)		-0.064*** (0.008)	
Female labour force part. (ages 25-54)		0.851 (0.879)		0.366 (0.754)		0.962 (0.593)		0.473 (0.547)
<i>VARIANCE</i>								
Country level	0.011 (0.005)	0.020 (0.005)	0.007 (0.003)	0.016 (0.004)	0.007 (0.003)	0.014 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)	0.009 (0.004)
Individual level	0.835 (0.051)	0.835 (0.051)	0.765 (0.050)	0.765 (0.050)	0.705 (0.050)	0.705 (0.050)	0.664 (0.045)	0.664 (0.045)
<i>ICC (INTRACLASS CORRELATION)</i>								
micro variables only	3.80	3.80	3.53	3.53	4.73	4.73	4.05	4.05
WRG	2.57	2.57	2.05	2.05	2.35	2.35	1.34	1.34
WRG & structural variable	1.30	2.34	0.91	2.05	0.98	1.95	0.30	1.34
<i>ICC REDUCTION (%)^b</i>								
WRG	32.5	32.5	42.0	42.0	50.2	50.2	66.9	66.9
WRG and structural	65.8	38.5	74.3	42.0	79.2	58.8	92.6	66.9
Number of observations	4223	4223	3724	3724	4107	4107	3638	3638
Model fit ($\Delta 2LL$)	14.1***	6.7*	17.9***	10.2**	17.9***	11.8**	27.2***	13.3***

a Not in table: estimates of full micro-level models (Models 2-5 in Table 2).

b ICC reduction and model fit ($\Delta 2LL$) is relative to full-micro models (Table 2).

Sources: ISSP 2005, own calculations, SCIP 2008; OECD 2007.