

Labour market changes and the transitions to first marriage and to first childbirth in Italy. A comparison between generations.

FIRST DRAFT

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Abstract

This paper studies changes in the timing of marriage and first childbirth between post-WWII Italian generations. In particular, it analyses how macro-level changes, such as processes of regulation and de-regulation of the Italian labour market and their effects on the individual work trajectories, affect the time of transition to parental roles.

Standing at the core of this paper is the idea that, given the characteristics of the sub-protective Italian welfare and the insider scenario boomed by the 80s-90s partial and targeted labour market deregulation, to be a young and instable worker or, more generally, a marginal or secondary labour market participant produces a delay in the transition to adulthood particularly for what a delay in marriage and childbirth for the last cohorts of the Italian population are concerned.

This question becomes even more central if we consider that non-standard or unstable work experiences as traps from which is hard to escape while hampering the transition into better employment conditions – which, in the context of an insurance-based welfare, directly translate in social rights. The negative effects of these processes regard mainly youngest cohorts, approximately individuals born from the second half of the Sixties on. In particular, individuals poorly endowed with personal and familiar resources are those who experiment this situation to a greater extent, enhancing in this way the role of the well known factors affecting social inequality. These people, “disembedded” from the “fordist” welfare guarantees, do not manage to catch the opportunities offered by the new “flexible” labour market and post-fordist productive environment.

The analysis will be conducted on ILFI (Longitudinal Survey of Italian Families), a prospective panel survey that includes retrospective information on education, work career and family dynamics. As regards to methods, duration EHA models are employed.

Results show how the combination of the mentioned institutional factors produces additional risks of social exclusion that are strongly cohorts-biased and that are adding to the pre-existing structural factors of social stratification and inequality.

1. Introduction

Over the last 40 years Italy has been one of the protagonists, together with major OECD countries, of demographic and labour market changes that have captured the attention of demographical, sociological and economic research.

Demographical changes are testified at aggregate level by the decline of marriage and fertility rates that started around the mid-70s as well as by the overall reach of a lowest-low fertility assessment.

These trends have been recorded also in different countries but have implied different outcomes in each case. Indeed in Italy and Southern Europe, the lowest-low fertility has been often associated with the phenomenon of latest-late transitions to adulthood (Billari, 2004; Billari et al, 2001, 2002; 2004). Up to the 50s, Italy has been characterized by a pattern of progressive lowering of age at which the first marriage and the first child were achieved but, starting from the 60s, the assumption of parental and conjugal roles tended to be delayed in time (Barbagli et al, 2003; Bernardi et al, 2005; Pisati, 2002; Lucchini et al., 2001; Billari, 2001; Ongaro, 2001).

In the Italian and Mediterranean cases, this delay has been transformed into a prolonged staying of young people under parent's roof: leaving the paternal house was a decision to be taken only when ready to create a new family (Billari,2008, 2001 Barbagli et al. 200x).

It is worth to recall that in those same years labour market was also undergoing profound transformations such as the increasing participation of women, a constantly growing difficulty to achieve an employment, the consequent spread of unemployment phenomena (especially in entrance) as well as of different forms of non standard and undeclared work positions thus characterized by uncertainty and precariousness (Schizzerotto, 2002, Bernardi et al, 2002; Barbieri et al., 2005, 2007, 2008).

The process of labour market flexibilization, which was carried on in Italy over the last 20 years, was also characterized by forms of partial and targeted deregulation (Esping-Andersen et al. 2000) that introduced new employment contracts facilitating employment of young people. These initiatives were specifically planned to respond to wide-spread unemployment and undeclared work episodes but also reduced significantly regulatory and welfare protections traditionally associated to permanent employment contracts (Barbieri, 2005; Contini et al. 2005; Esping-Andersen et al. 2000) exacerbating the gap between labour market insiders and outsiders. This duality between workers totally inserted in the labour market and enjoying guarantees and "marginal workers" who are instead at margins of occupational forms and guarantee system does actually constitute a major hindrance that young people and women must face when they approach labour market. All these changes must be understood in the broader context of Southern European familistic welfare system, typically characterizing Italy, for which the lack of social policies dedicated to young people (for example, unemployment protection) and the weakness of family provisions are additional factors which contributed to increase levels of uncertainty characterizing the initial phase of adult life (Billari, 2004; De Rose et al., 2008; Del Boca et al., 2005, 2006).

This paper is aimed at investigating the relationship between labour market conditions, working career and the realization of a new family (the transition to first union and the transition to first childbirth) among the cohorts born in Italy after the WWII. We will focus our analysis on generations that have reached adulthood since the 70s. The main intention is to understand if and how specific traits of men and women working career – above all,

experiences of working insecurity and precariousness– influence the realization of these demographic transitions as well as the assumption of conjugal and parental roles.

The paper is structured as follows: the next section will be dedicated to an overview of theories investigating the relationship between education levels and work conditions and the formation of families and reproductive behaviour. Objectives and research hypothesis will be articulated in paragraph 3 while data, variables and the analysis plan will be introduced in paragraph 4. Results will be shown and interpreted in paragraph 5 to finally move to conclusion in paragraph 6.

2. Marriage and Fertility in Italy – theoretical issues

Different hypothesis articulated over time in order to explain demographic changes and, above all, the delay in the transition to adulthood can be summed up in 3 main strands:

1) *independence hypothesis*: starting from increased women education rates and levels, the independence hypothesis focuses on the effects that scholarization has on women's participation in the labour market as well as on the incompatibility between female employment and family roles (Becker, 1973, 1981; Sweeney, 2002; ;

2) *career entry hypothesis*: it focuses on increasing uncertainty as far as difficulty of access to employment and the achievement of economic and work stability during youth are concerned (Oppenheimer, 1988, 1994; Billari, 2008);

3) *ideational shift hypothesis*: it mainly focuses on changes in value sets. In particular, it calls upon increasing emphasis on individual autonomy, on the rejection of institutional controls in the organisation of individual life course and on the spread of values related to the fulfilment of "higher order" needs (Surkyn et al, 2004; van de Kaa, 1987; Lastehaeghe et al., 1988) that might foster individualization processes in life courses (Inglehard, 1977; van de Kaa 200x).

These three hypotheses do not necessarily compete with each other (Lesthaeghe, 1998, Billari, 2007). Furthermore, empirical research has shown how economic and cultural factors are both crucial in order to explain demographic changes and differences between countries. For the purpose of this paper, we will follow directions suggested by the first two hypothesis since data we are conducting our analyses on do not contain any specific information on past attitudes and orientations towards marriage and reproductive choices.

2.1 Independence hypothesis

The microeconomic approach of New Home Economics (Becker, 1981) identifies the main cause of delay in new families formation and of fertility crisis with the increased economic independence of women.

One of the assumptions behind this identification is the gender-based division of labour between market and domestic. This assumption implies a substantial incompatibility between care and labour female activities. In this sense, women characterized by higher investments in terms of social capital tend to be less inclined towards marriage and motherhood. Indeed, wife and mother roles do entail a specialization in domestic labour

functional to a better performance of household economy which, according to Becker (1973, 1981) can be achieved only through couples division and consequent specialization of in market and domestic labour. Therefore, delays in demographic transitions are due to growing disadvantages women actually face when considering to play a family role.

Oppenheimer (1988, 1994, Oppenheimer *et al.*, 1997) instead opposes this theory and argues that attributing changes in the assumption of parental and conjugal roles both for men and women to the sole enhanced female independence provides an incomplete explanation. What is actually left aside, in her vision, is the totality of changes related to young men's economical positions. According to her view, these changes and the influence they might exert on marriage and fertility choices are generally overlooked (Oppenheimer 1994, Oppenheimer *et al.* 1997; Bernardi *et al.*, 2002).

It is empirically proven that not only female attributes have changed over time but that it is rather a complex mix of factors related both to men and women that is at play. Changes in labour market conditions and the variation in the chance of achieving a stable job do actually have an influence on choices made (Schizzerotto, 2002; Barbieri *et al.* 2005; Blossfeld *et al.* 2005, Lucchini *et al.*, 2004; 2001). It should not be forgotten that functional advantages entailed in Becker's specialization theory are grounded on the condition of male stable and continuous engagement in labour market –which is indeed the necessary condition to ensure to families satisfying life standards and well-being. If this condition is not satisfied, the couple will postpone the decision of starting a new family and will delay also the birth of their first child. In a condition of radical specialization of tasks between men and women, effects of unemployment and job instability would be even more dramatic as families would be hit in their primary subsistence resources.

2.2 - *Career entry Hypothesis*

Oppenheimer (1988, Oppenheimer *et al.* 1994.1997), while moving into the same paradigm as Becker, focuses his attention on the existing relationship between marriage and fertility choices on the one hand and the achievement of a stable job on the other. Thus, he analyzes the search for a partner and family-building choices according to the *job-searching theory*. From this perspective, the more uncertain the conditions of an exchange, the more individuals will tend to remain in their present situation and to postpone any kind of decision for the future. This inertial situation will persist until life conditions will reduce uncertainty levels for the future.

In this sense, educational level would be a good predictor of achievements in labour market and, henceforth, of new unions' velocity since higher educational levels are associated to higher successful career chances. Thus, the more a work position is characterized by instability, the more individuals will tend to delay decisions that imply long-term commitments as well as the assumption of "irreversible" roles such as the one of parents.

The early experience of job uncertainty during work career sensibly affects all other dimensions of life-time: weak positions in labour market (unstable or precarious), especially if experimented at early ages, do translate into a significant slowing down of the pace towards marriage and the first child birth. This lower rhythm is inherently connected to the high level of individual responsibility connected with conjugal and parental roles that cannot transcend from economical autonomy and a stable work position necessary to be independent from the origin family and to sustain children costs (Bernardi *et al.*, 2005;

Oppenheimer, 1988; Blossfeld et al, 2005). Unlike Becker's approach, this perspective offers a new lens to look both at changes in men's behaviors as well as t women's work and family strategies.

2.3. Institutional factors

Explanatory mechanisms described above do work at the micro level but might have different social outcomes depending on the macro contexts in which they take place. Demographic changes are shaped and mediated by specific institutional factors (welfare state systems), by economic and social policies (labour policies) by cultural differences and by social expectations that have deep historical roots (Billari, 2004, 2007; Settersten 2008; Barbagli et al, 200x; Esping-Andersen, 2007; Del Boca et al., 2005, 2006). In other words, specific social and economic policies shaped in precise time and places as well as in the context of specific economic developments (that go well beyond the direct control of policy makers) can significantly influence ways and times of transition to adult life. It is not possible to interpret these transition processes without placing life paths in the broader context of globalization and internationalization of markets, nor without referring to the wider discussion on the spread of long term unemployment (Blossfeld et al., 2005, Mayer, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 2001, McDonald, 1997). Growing uncertainty about economic and social developments has become a permanent aspect of modern Western economies (Blossfeld et al, 2005) and plays a crucial role in the diffusion of these social processes. In this perspective, changes observed between different generations would be a consequence of the difficulty in adjusting to changed structural conditions of markets (Blossfeld, 2004; Bernardi et al, 2002; Brückner et al, 2005) paralleled by reforms of welfare systems and cuts in social security measures (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Neyer, 2003; Gornik et al, 1997, Stier et al, 2001).

Italy is characterized by a system of South-European familistic welfare which is centred on the protection of male-breadwinner work understood as the pre-requisite for allowing the whole family to access social protection services. Thus, this system tends to relegate care responsibility to the domestic environment and to inter-generational solidarity (Saraceno, 1998, 2003; Addis, 2000). In particular, Italian welfare assets offer little support to families (Neyer, 2003; Gornik et al. 1997). This poverty is well exemplified by the lack of public services for children and elderly people care and by a taxation system that penalizes couples with double income (Saraceno, 1998, 2003). These factors push families to adopt different strategies that often result in the variability of female employment behaviour which, in turns, translates into an abandonment of labour market in coincidence of family events such as marriage and children birth.

Further elements that should be added to the above picture are related to the regulative context of the Italian labour market and to its evolution over the last three decades. Deregulation of Italian labour market has known its slow start in the 80s in response to the situation reached around the mid-70s of maximum regulation and rigidity. Indeed, during the second half of the 70s, only employees of medium and big firms and tertiary sector saw their protection needs satisfied through public employment and credit, insurance, communications and transport services. (Frey *et al.*, 2002; Demekas, 1995; Samek Lodovici, 2000). Deregulation was meant to be an answer also to other problematic issues raised during the second half of the 70s and the 80s, such as macroeconomic problems posed by the definitive overcoming of Fordist intensive accumulation pattern and exogenous shocks such as oil crisis (Barbieri 2000).

In Italy this process took the shape of a "deregulation on the sidelines" recalling reform processes undertaken by other Central and Southern European countries also characterized by occupational welfare regimes. On the one hand, exceeding work offer (male, adult/elderly, low-skilled) was tackled through early exit policies (Esping-Andersen 1995, 2000, Streeck, 2003; Villa, 2007). On the other hand, accesses to employment positions were managed by "partial and targeted" deregulation (Esping-Andersen, Regini 2000).

These strategies further exacerbated the already deep segmentation of market between insiders and outsiders (Streeck 2003, Barbieri 2005). Thus, welfare-outsider figure has indeed changed over time. If, in the context of strict regulation during the 70s, this label was to be attached only to unemployed individuals or to under declared employees, nowadays also all employees with atypical contracts are to be identified as such. An outcome of this expansion is a reduction of citizen's right enjoyment for young workers, who are the most exposed to these new forms of work (Barbieri et al, 2005, 2007). Thus, the more critical point is that negative effects of these processes seem all to be channelled towards younger generations (Blossfeld, 2005, Esping-Andersen et al, 2000). Indeed, in comparison to previous cohorts, younger workers (individuals born from the 60s on) are experimenting to larger extent difficulties in finding a first job, in entering work relationships characterized by satisfying tutelage conditions and in creating a successful job career.

4. Research question and hypothesis

This paper is aimed at analyzing if and how choices such as marriage and parenthood are taken differently by people born and grown after WWII. In particular, it will evaluate how some characteristics of work career might influence the age of transition to adulthood and the probability to be married or parents at the age of 35.

Data refer to individuals born from 1950 to 1980. It should be noticed that older people have fully experimented the Fordist pattern of self-affirmation whilst those who were born from the second half of the 60s on have been among the first to experiment post-industrial life-course and precariousness in working conditions. It is exactly this second group that is experienced to a greater extent difficulties in entering the labour market, that is also more exposed to unemployment risk and to the chance of achieving unstable working positions (Barbieri et al, 2005, 2007; Schizzerotto, 2002, Scherer, 2004; Bernardi, 2003).

Hence, our first task will be to understand the way in which uncertainty in work relationships is influencing long term decisions as becoming parents or getting married. Moreover, we will pay specific attention to the analysis of differences in the realization of these processes among different cohorts. This matter becomes even more relevant as we consider that unstable, atypical and precarious work positions do not correspond to limited period of an individual life-time but are rather traps from which it is very difficult to escape to move afterwards to better work conditions. This idea of "long-term entrapment" is confirmed by recent empirical evidence (Barbieri et al., 2005, 2007; Contini et al, 2005).

In general, we hypothesize that facing uncertainty in labor market and/or experimenting unemployment, atypical or undeclared working positions will produce a delay in the transition to marriage and to the birth of the first child both for men and women.

As far as men are concerned, since the responsibility of sustaining families relies on their shoulders, achieving a stable economical condition and consolidating their work position following an upward mobility pattern are the two factors that influence to a greater extent their transition pattern. Coherently, descendant mobility experiences as well as reduction of salaries should exert a negative effect and therefore discourage from moving towards marriage and child birth. This happens because, from a career entry point of view, descendant mobility influences not only actual economic resources but also career future perspectives.

As far as women are concerned, given the multiplicity of strategies they can adopt, we expect less linear trends. Huinink and Mayer (1992) observed that differences among women tend to be more radical today rather than they were in past, in particular in relation to educational levels and their impact on career chances. In this context, different factors play a role: the temporal structure of life course, the critical assessment of (dis)advantages connected to marriage and motherhood, economic independency from original families and from husbands, the importance of investments made on work positions or on families.

In this case, according to the new Home Economy approach, times of transition should be slowed down if women highly invest on their human capital. In particular, high educational levels should play a direct negative influence discouraging from starting a new family (Blossfeld et al. 1991). Disincentives are to be imputed to the incompatibility between care and labour roles postulated by Becker's theory: indeed, domestic roles act as a deterrent for continuous work paths (Becker 1981). This effect is particularly evident in a context such as Italy, where welfare familistic structure tends to delegate to the domestic environment all care activities.

Consequently, starting a work career should affect transition times with an overall slow-down effect and with a significant modification of fertility-related decisions, since deciding to have a child would imply an interruption of work relationship at least for the maternity period. Nevertheless, it is possible to hypothesize that these negative effects could be mitigated by different contract and tutelage conditions as well as by the fact of being employed in the public sector, as these circumstances seem to facilitate the management of a double role (mother and worker).

In addition, levels of education and career should interact with each other. Studies on the transition to adulthood show that there is a direct link between longer permanence in the educational system and the delay in marriage and parenthood moments both for men and women (Blossfeld et al, 1991, Pisati, 2002; Lucchini et al, 2001). Thus effects of educational level go beyond: education also acts directly on career chances and on individuals' work choices because it provides those tools (higher skills and competences) that, according to the hypothesis career entry, should help reducing employment uncertainty by offering higher chances of better locations inside labour market and of more dynamic occupational mobility.

Data, Variables Models

Our empirical analyses draw on the five panel-waves (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005) of the Indagine Sulle Famiglie Italiane (ILFI - Longitudinal Survey of Italian Families). Education, work careers and family dynamics for all individuals are collected

retrospectively. We estimated exponential transition rate models to evaluate the impact of the labour market participation on the age at first marriage/cohabitation and to first childbirth. We considered in the analysis subject born from 1951 to 1980. Each episode start at 15 years old and is censored at 45. We estimated separate model for man and women.

We considered 4 groups of variables: socio-demographics characteristics, educational career, work career, a macro indicator of the level of insecurity in the labour market.

1) *Socio-demographic characteristics:*

- *Age, Age squared,*
- *Birth cohorts (1951-55; 1956/60; 1961/65; 1966/70; 1971/80)*
- *Region of birth (North, Centre, South and isle, EE);*
- *Social Origin:*
 - o *Origin class (EGP): I+II; III;IV; V+VI+VII*
 - o *Cultural capital (Graduated mother, Graduated father),*
 - o *Mother worked;*
 - o *Number of brothers and sisters at 14*

2) *Education career:*

- o *Education (Casmin) (time varying) primary (1ab), vocational qualification (1c); intermediate general and vocational qualification (2ab); general maturity certificate (2c); tertiary education (3ab).*
- o *Exit from the school system (dummy).*

3) *Work career:*

a) *Work arrangement:* the classification makes out different contractual precarities of employment positions. In detail we draw on information about the type of employment (dependent or self-employment); the kind of contract for dependent workers (permanent, fixed-term; training contract, no contract) and the kind of self-employment (with or without employees, freelancer), the type of employment (seasonal/occasional) and occupation (Isco for digit) where necessary (Barbieri and Scherer, 2008). This classification leads us to distinguish three kinds of employment situation: Typical employment, atypical employment and other “non-standard” jobs (Barbieri e Scherer, 2005 2007; Barbieri e Bison, 2004).

- o *Typical employment:*
 - *Wage earners:* these are worker who perform their duties in dependent position, full-time, on open-ended contract and receive a wage or a salary.
 - *Self-Employed workers:* these are autonomous workers (entrepreneurs, *professionals*, tradesman, etc), (with or without partners) and members of small cooperatives, who primarily perform their activity in their own business, offices, organizations and whose remuneration is earned on issue of an invoice or a bill.
- o *Atypical employment:*
 - *Fixed-term workers:* these are workers with regular contracts, employed in dependent positions, on fixed-term position and who receive a wage.

- *Formally independent workers*: these are (a) workers who carry out tasks on a self-employed basis in subordinate positions (consultants and freelancers) and do not have employees; (b) members of cooperatives (with more than 20 members) who undertake dependent activity (identifiable with the functions defined by ISCO codes from 4000 to 9000); (c) self-employed workers who perform their activity on the employer's premises; (d) self-employed seasonal workers who perform dependent tasks identified by ISCO codes from 3000 to 9000); (e) wage earners who receive remuneration on issue of an invoice or a bill.
- *Other non standard*(seasonal/off-the-books) :
 - *Seasonal or occasional workers*: these are workers that have seasonal or occasional jobs in dependent positions, with regular contracts, and who receive a wage.
 - *Workers without contract (irregular workers)* who include: a) worker with continuous jobs without contracts: this are workers who have continuous jobs in dependent position but do not have contracts, and for whom the employer does not pay social security contribution; b) workers with seasonal or occasional jobs without contracts: these are workers with seasonal or occasional jobs in dependent position, on a fixed-term basis, and who do not have contracts, and for whom the employer does not pay social security contributions.

○ *Out of work-*

b) *Occupational Class*. Among the employed we distinguish different occupational classes using Erikson and Golthorpe's class schema (I+II; IIIa; IIIb; IV; V). We consider the occupational class as a proxy of economic insecurity. "Since people employed in unskilled occupations earn lower incomes and have fewer saving opportunities than those employed in the service class or in skilled occupation, they can be considered to be more economically insecure (Bernardi e Nazio, 2001, pag 8).

We considered also other 5 indicators of the "quality" of working career with respect to experiences of economic and occupation instability and the level of protection of work place. They are:

c) *Public sector*: contracts within the public sector tend to be permanent and, as a result, are a guarantee of employment after childbirth (Adserà, 2001, Bernardi et al., 200x). Parental leave as well as maternity benefits and work schedules tend to be more liberal and accommodative in the public sector than elsewhere, further facilitating the entrance of women in the labour force without having to give up childbearing Adserà, 2001, pag. 21)

d) *Overqualified*: the deficiency of the work position with respect to the own level of education. It is measured as a prestige score lower than one standard deviation of the mean value of the relevant educational group (Barbieri e Scherer, 2007);

e) *Occupational mobility as upward* (> 10 units) in work status (De Lillo – Schizzerotto scale);

f) *Occupational downward* (< 10 units) in work status (De Lillo – Schizzerotto scale) (Blossferd et al, 2007; Barbieri et al. 2007);

g) *Transition from atypical to secure (permanent) contracts*.

4) Macro variable. To control for economic business we control for *youth unemployment rate* (age 15-25 Oecd dataset). Youth unemployment was chosen because of

its higher sensitivity to economic change (Barbieri et al, 2007). “In general, unemployment reduces the expected welfare of the population independently of their fertility decisions not only through a lower expected income but also, with risk aversion, through the increase in employment uncertainty (Adserà, 2001, pag.xxx).

Logistic regression on the situation at 35. The main objective of these models is test if the experiences of atypical work and unemployment could affect the chance to be in a relation (marriage or cohabitation) and to be parent at 35, when the people’s life courses should be sufficiently structured and the transition to adulthood completed. The models compare the family situation at 35 only for people born between 1951 and 1970. We estimated separate models for man and women and for specific group: women with at least a work experience and - only for the condition of parent - men and women in a union at 35. The variables considered in the analysis are: socio-demographic characteristics (as above); work arrangement at first occupation; occupational class at first work; age at first occupation (before 18; 18/21; 22/25; 26/29; 30/35); number of episode in atypical works; number of episodes of unemployment after the first work, months spent looking for a job after the first occupation.

5. Results. The transition to first union and to first childbirth in Italy.

5.1 - Descriptives

During the last 40 years the Italian marriage and fertility rates have fallen while the ages at first union and first childbirth have steadily increased. Tables 1 and 2 compare the age at first marriage/cohabitation and at first childbirth between post-WWII Italian generations. Among women the median age at first marriage moved from 22, 5 of older cohorts (1951/55) to 30 of youngest cohorts while among men increased from 26,5 to 33. We found the same trend for the transition to parenthood. The age at first childbirth increased from 24.5 to 32.7 for women and from 28.5 to over 35 for men¹.

If we extend the analysis to cohorts born before 1950, we see that the age at the two transitions of people born after 1965 are similar to the age at first partnership and at first parenthood of their grandparents (people born during the thirties) (Pisati, 2002; Lucchini e Schizzerotto, 2001; Dalla Zuanna, 2006). During the 20th century, the trend of age at first marriage and age at first childbirth showed a U-shape. The minimum point was reached by man and women born during the fifties. On one hand, they were the first generation that had experienced a significant increase in the amount of years spent at school, on the other hand, they quickly entered in the labour market, profited by the strengthening of the Italian welfare system and of the highly regulated labour market (Lucchini Schizzerotto, 2001; Bernardi et al., 200x). These factors improved the chance to reach the essential working and economic security to start a new family in a short time with respect to the previous and the following generations. On the contrary, individuals within the youngest cohort started their transition to work in a context where there are wider economic and labour market difficulties like the increase of unemployment or insecure and unstable work conditions,

¹ If we exclude cohabitation from the analysis, the median ages don’t change.

and the general inefficiency of the social security system to face toward the new economic conditions and to support suitably the work supply.

To these shifts in the timing of first partnership and first parenthood did not succeeded a significant increase of cohabitation (Tab. 3) or the change in the normative order of the two events. This order foresees that children must be born and grow up in a stable family based on marriage. Table 4 shows that less of 5% of birth take place out of a marriage or cohabitation. Over the cohorts there was an increase of the incidence of cohabitations at first relation, but it reaches lower level with respect to other European countries (De Rose, et al 2008). These stability in the succession of this two family events allow to assume that in the “latest-late transition” countries the shift to any kind of partnership and the shift to parenthood are delayed due to common underlying factors (Billari, 2008)

Finally, we notice how over the cohorts the difference between median age at first union and median age at first childbirth has increased. Table 5 shows the share of this change. In literature this trend is interpreted as the results of two phenomena. The first concerns the increase of the expenditure to rise children (De Santis, 1997), the second pertains the change of women’s working behaviours, and their difficulties to accommodate work choices with reproductive desires (Pisati, 2002, Billari, 2007) as hypothesized by Becker’s theory.

5.2 - The transition to first union

We are going to examine the interpretation of the results of transition’s models to first union (marriage or cohabitation). Separated models for men (tab x) and women (tab y) were assessed.

Coherently with the descriptive analysis, there is a clear cohort’s effect that emerges from the models and that spotlights the progressive delay of younger generations at the beginning of a first union. This trend is significant and consistent especially for subjects born from 1966. The introduction of macro variable seems to interact with the birth cohorts and products an approach in relatives terms for the first three cohorts analysed (born between 1951 and 1960), but it doesn’t change the distance and therefore the delay of the following cohorts in transitioning to the first union. This assertion remains valid for both men and women.

Ambient conditions characterized by larger uncertainty in respect to the labour market certainly influence negatively the formation of unions. It is also well known that in the last decades the levels of uncertainty and difficulties in accessing to the labour market have been progressively increasing (Barbieri and Scherer 2008, Blossfeld, 2005;).

In accordance with other analysis on “the Italian case”, we found a geographic segmentation of transitions times (in Southern Italy the access to the first union is quicker) and the influence of the model of familiar socialization. The last one seems to directly influence the female ages of transition. In fact, the decision of becoming wife and mother is postponed by women who had working mothers(Dalla Zuanna, xxxx).

The models evidence how the raising of educational qualification corresponds to a slowdown of times to enter the first union for both men and women. This result is equilibrated by the assessment of definitive exit from the educational system. In fact, it determines a significant acceleration to the measured transition, especially for women (Blossfeld, xxxx; Lucchini et al, 2002). With regard to men, the exit from educational

system has a positive effect but it doesn't seem to be a sufficient condition for realizing the first union.

On the other hand if women's exclusion from the labour market increases the possibility of transition, the interactions with class-cohorts shows that this positive effect is valid only for women born in the '50s and progressively decreases with the cohorts' evolution. For the youngest cohort (1970-80) the passage through the labour market is a constitutive element of women's life.

About the examination of parameters of working condition, we find out that a regular job is fundamental for men. Unemployment is the worst condition and implies the impossibility of obtaining economic independence, essential to build a new family.

Focusing on working condition, the importance of working in regular and guaranteed situations clearly emerged. In particular, irregular and seasonal jobs determine a negative effect in the transition to the first marriage. The uncertainty of the duration and the absence of unemployment supports make these working situations hardly compatible with the role of bread-winner.

With regard to atypical job the negative effect affects especially the younger cohort which is more exposed to these contractual forms.

The other indicators of inclusion in a segment of protect labour market, that is occupation in public sector or transition from an atypical job to a full-time job, show a positive sign (even if not significant) in influencing the transition.

These results must be combined with the coefficients of occupational class that show how the ones that are non manual skilled workers (mainly I-II e IIIa) seem to have faster time of transition. These occupational classes have economical treatment markedly better than those of manual workers or unskilled employees, and probably more certain than that of autonomous workers.

A non-intuitive result is the positive sign executed by the episodes of descendent mobility. The interaction with the occupational class shows how this result is true only for manual workers with permanent contracts, who have relatively more underprivileged conditions that feel less the effect of the damage caused by the loss of status and working prestige, and limited perspective of career.

Regarding women we retrieve the same negative effect of irregular working condition there was for men (irregular and seasonal jobs).

Atypical work doesn't negatively influence the transition to the first union. On the contrary the interaction with the class-cohort points out an opposite trend in respect to the expectation: a greater disadvantage for women of older cohorts and a sort of corrective effect among younger cohorts that nullify the negative coefficient of atypical contracts. Working instability in regular work does not interfere with age of women's marriage. This assertion is supported by null effect valued by the parameter that assesses the passage from atypical job to secure works.

The economical condition influences more consistently this dynamic than contractual security. In fact, women get a positive effect of more qualified working positions in forming unions.

Besides, experiences of ascendant mobility for more qualified women go in the same direction. Therefore the improvement and consolidation of economical and working conditions seem to have a propulsive effect on the transition to marriage, above all for

women who invested a lot in human capital (as if it was a necessary condition, before of performing roles that traditionally aren't much compatible with the labour market participation.)

5.3 - The transition to first childbirth

Similarly to the above discussion on timing of the transitions to the first union, the trend of the transition to first childbirth shows a more intense negative effect for the last two cohorts. The considerations about the effects of social origins, educative career and exit from educational system are as much similar.

A difference between the two trends is observed when working career is taken into consideration.

Male transition is enhanced by a regular job and the consolidation of working condition through experiences of either ascending mobility or passage to a permanent work. It looks like non standard working contracts do not impact on the transition, but once the education level is controlled for, it is possible to observe that the transition rate of individuals with higher qualification is slower. There is a negative effect of atypical occupational condition for subjects born after 1970, who had their first work experience in a deregulated labour market.

Coherently, experiences of downward mobility affect negatively the transition rate of autonomous workers, whose incomes suffer deeper of market fluctuations. The positive effect of downward mobility for manual workers should not surprise because they are characterized by steadier salaries.

Women tell a different story.

The completion of education, the exclusion from labour market and marriage are positive conditions for having a child.

Precarious, non-regulated and atypical job relations have negative effects for employed women, especially within the younger cohort. The trends that emerge in this case for atypical work are opposite to that of the transition to marriage. The diffusion of non-standard works influences women's reproductive behaviours, but doesn't influence their possibility of having a stable union.

The decision of becoming mother is not influenced by working in a protected and guaranteed condition or in public sector. The adequacy of the job relation to the investment in human capital and, having started and consolidate a career path support women in their reproductive choices. These effects don't change when the civil status is considered.

In accordance to the trend observed for first union, there is a strongly positive effect of the improvement of occupational status among women with high educational levels while there is a negative effect of ascendant mobility for women with low qualification. The consolidation of working and economic conditions operates positively on the possibilities of becoming mothers only for the ones with high levels of investment in human capital, who can positively support future possibilities of maintaining the gained position and of not having the working career damaged by reproductive choices. Conversely, the scarce endowment of human capital offers in perspective less personal resources for maintaining the hard-won job if familiar role require. It is ascertained that the educational level is a good indicator (signal) of the possibilities of maintaining a job independently by familiar

responsibility (Scherer et al. 2008, ...). A higher instruction level guarantees a better working position. Women with a high level of education have more possibilities in public sector, and in general in more protected frames, while women that are not educated must turn to less qualified and protected occupations, that are also less compatible with familiar commitment. In this sense in our models we find that everyone who doesn't have manual jobs with low qualification presents slower times of transition to the first child.

Finally, working in de-qualified job positions has a positive effect on the propensity to become mothers. The analyses of process of integration into the labour market highlight that the de-qualified job positions tend to exert negative consequences on the individual career because they bear a social stigma (Scherer, 2004). Actually, accepting under-qualified work signals a lack of a suitable work experience and a scarce appraisal of one's human capital. Moreover, overqualified workers have generally wider risks to be trapped in the disadvantaged starting position (Barbieri e Scherer, 2005). The inadequacy of the work position and the insufficient chance of career probably push women to find gratification in the family. This effect is much stronger for women with higher level of qualification. Such a case having a job is not a valid competitor to the reproductive choices.

5.4 – Family situation at 35

According to the above mentioned literature, transition to adulthood within the Italian context is supposed to be at age of 35. It is therefore crucial to appreciate what conditions impact on the propensity to be in a stable relationship and be a parent at 35 years of age. Precisely, do occupational precarity (i.e. repeated experiences of atypical contracts) or unemployment episodes affect the possibility of being married and being parent at the age of 35? And it is so, how?

In this paragraph we present the results on family situation (be married or cohabit and be a parent) at 35, when the transition to adulthood should be completed and the individual life course should be structured. Our purpose is to evaluate if and how occupational precarities, as repeated atypical work experience, and work instability as unemployment episodes affect the possibility to be in a union or parent at 35.

Evidence shows gender-related effects.

For men there are two aspects that invalidate the chance to have a family at 35: a delayed start of the first work and unemployment experiences following the first occupation. The latter produces an increasing negative effect as long as a subject remains without employment. Evidence has if that having a stable income and maintaining economic independence are determinant to the purpose (Oppenheimer, 1997; Bernardi, 2007).

As far as the atypical work experiences are concerned, the negative consequences of the permanence in this occupational condition emerge only when we narrow down the analysis to married men at 35. When men are in a relationship the instability of their work position affect in a negative way their reproductive behaviours.

Conversely, atypical work experiences decrease the chance of women being wives and mothers at 35. Start a career with non standard jobs does not represent *per se* an obstacle. But when atypical work experiences are repeated and they turn into a trap (Barbieri et al.

2005; 2007 Scherer, 200x) then they have negative outcome. This result holds for all group of women analyzed.

6. Discussion

The main topic of this paper was the analysis of the consequences of insecurity and precariousness in occupational conditions on timing of transition to the first union and the first childbirth.

Ever since the cohorts born from the fifties we observed a steady increase of ages at first marriage and first childbirth. These postponements are relevant mainly for men and women born after the second half of the sixties. This birth cohort is the first to experience the consequences of the diffusion of unemployment and precarious work positions in the first part of career, the diffusion of atypical work conditions and the growing inadequacy of social protection system to face the new economic and social changes.

The effects of work career on demographic behaviour are gender related and different trends can be traced the two transitions studied.

Men experience negatively the effect of the lack of work - especially long term unemployment - and the exclusion from regular occupations, with stronger consequences where higher level of economic insecurity is recorded. The conditions that affect positively the timing establishing a new family are, on one hand, the episode of upward mobility (i.e. a tangible improvement of the personal economic situations), on other hand, having a occupation in a secure and protected segment of the labour market. The negative experiences in working career (downward mobility) impact mainly on self employment or small businessmen, which have more unstable incomes.


Regarding the female universe, the participation to the labour market is not *per se* a disadvantage on the chance to start the first union, but rather it has turned into a key experience of the female life cycle before marriage. The outcomes of working career emerge when we focus on the transition to motherhood. We found two dynamics mediated by the level of education.

The first dynamic concerns the work career success and the strengthening of the occupational position. These events influence positively the transition to first childbirth only for women with high endowment of human capital. The effect is negative for women with low qualification, for whom the conciliation between work and family roles may be penalize the perspective career chances and the capability to preserve the gained occupational position.

The second dynamic regards, instead, the situations of occupational failure, e.g. working in de-qualified positions, which affects positively the transition to parenthood. The overqualified workers with low chance of career are relatively quicker in having the first child.


In the end, the consequences of the labour market deregulation and the following spread of atypical work contracts manifest their negative effects on the timing of transition of people born from the Seventies onwards, with significant outcomes on female reproductive behaviours. When the atypical work relations are reiterated and become a trap, than the precariousness and insecurity of these occupational conditions fall out on fertility choices.

Tab. 1 – Survivor functions: speed of entry into first union by birth cohort (women and men)



Source: Ilii 2005

Tab. 2 – Survivor functions: speed of first childbirth entry by birth cohort (women and men)



Source: Ilii 2005

Tab 3 – Type of first union by birth cohort

	Birth cohort					Total
	1951/55	1956/60	1961/65	1966/70	1971/75*	
MEN						
Religious marriage	88.7	87.0	87.8	85.1	78.0	86.2
Civil marriage	9.0	8.7	6.1	5.9	8.1	7.6
Cohabitation	2.3	4.3	6.1	9.0	14.0	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N.	388	369	377	289	186	1609
WOMEN						
Religious marriage	90.1	89.4	87.7	85.7	86.2	87.9
Civil marriage	7.9	8.2	7.6	6.3	6.9	7.4
Cohabitation	2.0	2.4	4.7	8.0	6.9	4.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N.	405	415	424	364	333	1941


*cohort censored at 30. Iffi, 2005

Tab 4 – Civil status at first childbirth by birth cohort (women and men)

	Birth cohort					Total
	1951/55	1956/60	1961/65	1966/70	1971/75	
MEN						
Religious marriage	88.2	86.0	87.7	89.1	76.3	86.9
Civil marriage	8.0	6.6	5.0	4.3	8.8	6.4
Cohabitation	0.8	3.9	3.3	3.3	2.5	2.7
Other	3.0	3.6	4.0	3.3	12.5	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N.	363	335	301	211	80	1290
WOMEN						
Religious marriage	88.9	86.0	86.5	87.0	85.1	86.9
Civil marriage	7.0	6.7	5.7	5.5	5.6	6.2
Cohabitation	1.6	2.1	3.8	3.8	1.2	2.6
Other	2.6	5.2	4.0	3.8	8.1	4.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N.	386	386	371	292	161	1596

*cohort censored at 30. Iffi, 2005

Tab 5 – Survival function, speed of entry into first childbirth after first union, by birth cohorts



Women	25%	50%	75%		Men	25%	50%	75%	
1951/55	9	16	29	397	1951/55	10	17	37	378
1956/60	10	19	40	400	1956/60	10	22	45	357
1961/65	11	24	55	414	1961/65	12	29	69	368
1966/70	12	29	59	355	1966/70	12	27	60	283
1971/80	12	28	62	315	1971/80	12	30	62	177
Total	11	22	48	1881	Total	11	23	54	1563

Source: Iffi 2005

Tab 6 – Age at first union (Marriage and Cohabitation). Transition exponential model (MEN)

MEN	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	-22.36 ***	0.76	-22.79 ***	0.78	-22.30 ***	0.76	-22.74 ***	0.78
Age	0.10 ***	0.00	0.10 ***	0.00	0.10 ***	0.00	0.10 ***	0.00
Age squared	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00
Birth cohort (ref: 1951-55)								
1956-60	-0.20 ***	0.07	-0.07	0.08	-0.22 ***	0.08	-0.09	0.09
1961-65	-0.32 ***	0.07	-0.17 **	0.09	-0.32 ***	0.08	-0.18 **	0.09
1966-70	-0.73 ***	0.08	-0.60 ***	0.09	-0.73 ***	0.08	-0.61 ***	0.09
1971-80	-1.01 ***	0.09	-0.92 ***	0.10	-0.97 ***	0.10	-0.88 ***	0.10
Region (ref: North)								
Centre	0.18 **	0.08	0.18 **	0.08	0.19 ***	0.08	0.19 ***	0.08
South	0.45 ***	0.06	0.45 ***	0.06	0.45 ***	0.06	0.45 ***	0.06
EE	0.20	0.14	0.21	0.14	0.19	0.14	0.20	0.14
Class origin (Ref: V+VI+VII)								
I+II	-0.15	0.14	-0.14	0.14	-0.13	0.14	-0.13	0.14
III	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	0.07
IV	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06
Graduated mother	0.01	0.24	0.01	0.24	0.00	0.24	0.00	0.24
Graduated Father	-0.03	0.16	-0.03	0.16	-0.02	0.16	-0.03	0.16
Mother worked	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.05
N of brothers and sisters (Ref: 1)								
2	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.07
3 or +	0.28 ***	0.07	0.27 ***	0.07	0.28 ***	0.07	0.27 ***	0.07
figlio unico	0.16 **	0.08	0.16 **	0.08	0.16 **	0.08	0.15 **	0.08
Education (Ref: 1ab)								
1c	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
2a+2b	-0.34 ***	0.07	-0.34 ***	0.07	-0.34 ***	0.07	-0.34 ***	0.07
2c	-0.71 ***	0.14	-0.70 ***	0.14	-0.72 ***	0.14	-0.72 ***	0.14
3 ab	-0.17	0.12	-0.17	0.12	-0.16	0.12	-0.16	0.12
exit from EducSys	0.28 **	0.12	0.29 **	0.12	0.29 **	0.12	0.29 ***	0.12
Work arrangement (Ref: Permanent work)								
Self employment	-0.03	0.15	-0.04	0.15	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.15
Atypical	-0.08	0.10	-0.10	0.10	0.01	0.22	-0.01	0.22
Off-the-books/seasonal	-0.22 **	0.10	-0.22 **	0.10	-0.24 **	0.10	-0.24 ***	0.10
Out of work	-1.07 ***	0.10	-1.06 ***	0.10	-1.05 ***	0.10	-1.04	0.10
Occupational class (Ref: V+VI+VII)								
I+II	0.22	0.15	0.22	0.15	0.23	0.15	0.23	0.15
IIIa	0.17 **	0.09	0.18 **	0.09	0.21 **	0.09	0.22 ***	0.09
IIIb	-0.20 *	0.11	-0.19 *	0.11	-0.12	0.11	-0.11	0.11
IV	0.03	0.16	0.04	0.16	0.02	0.16	0.02	0.16
Public sector	0.13	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.15	0.11
Overqualified	0.07	0.11	0.08	0.11	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.11
Occ. mobility upward	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.08
Occ. mobility downward	0.24 **	0.11	0.24 **	0.11	0.58 ***	0.15	0.58 ***	0.15
Transition atypical to standard work	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11
Atypical work*cohorts								
Aty*1956/60					0.27	0.32	0.31	0.32
Aty*1961/65					-0.09	0.30	-0.06	0.30
Aty*1966/70					-0.06	0.29	-0.05	0.29
Aty*1971/80					-0.40	0.31	-0.41	0.31
Occ.mob. Downword*egp								
Downword*I+II					-1.42 *	1.02	-1.32	1.02
Downword*IIIa					-0.63 **	0.28	-0.62 **	0.28
Downword*IIIb					-0.64 **	0.29	-0.62 **	0.29
Downword*IV					-0.46	0.37	-0.46	0.37
Youth unempl.rate			-0.02 ***	0.01			-0.02 ***	0.01
No. of subjects=2707	LL=-1457,97		LL=-1451,71		LL=-1450,82		LL=-1444,61	
No. of failures = 1604	LR chi2(36)=2434,02		LR chi2(37)=2446,47		LR chi2(44)=2448,25		LR chi2(45)=2460,65	
Time at risk= 436695								

Tab 7 – Age at first union (Marriage and Cohabitation). Transition exponential model (WOMEN)

WOMEN	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	-18.79 ***	0.59	-19.59 ***	0.61	-18.87 ***	0.59	-19.62 ***	0.61
Age	0.09 ***	0.00	0.09 ***	0.00	0.09 ***	0.00	0.09 ***	0.00
Age squared	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00
Birth cohort (ref: 1951-55)								
1956-60	-0.15 **	0.07	0.16 *	0.08	-0.15	0.10	0.15	0.11
1961-65	-0.44 ***	0.07	0.02	0.10	-0.36 ***	0.10	0.06	0.12
1966-70	-0.71 ***	0.07	-0.27 ***	0.10	-0.68 ***	0.10	-0.28 **	0.12
1971-80	-1.13 ***	0.08	-0.74 ***	0.10	-0.89 ***	0.11	-0.56 ***	0.12
Region (ref: North)								
Centre	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
South	0.23 ***	0.06	0.24 ***	0.06	0.24 ***	0.06	0.24 ***	0.06
EE	0.32 ***	0.13	0.33 ***	0.13	0.32 ***	0.13	0.33 ***	0.13
Class origin (Ref: V+VI+VII)								
I+II	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.12	0.04	0.12	0.04	0.12
III	-0.17 ***	0.06	-0.17 ***	0.07	-0.16 ***	0.07	-0.16 ***	0.07
IV	-0.01	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06
Graduated mother	-0.20	0.20	-0.17	0.20	-0.17	0.20	-0.16	0.20
Graduated Father	-0.13	0.14	-0.13	0.13	-0.15	0.13	-0.15	0.13
Mother worked	-0.12 ***	0.05	-0.12 ***	0.05	-0.12 **	0.05	-0.12 ***	0.05
N of brothers and sisters (Ref: 1)								
2	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
3 or +	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.07
Figlio unico	0.31 ***	0.07	0.30 ***	0.07	0.31 ***	0.07	0.29 ***	0.07
Education (Ref: 1ab)								
1c	-0.03	0.10	-0.01	0.10	-0.03	0.12	-0.01	0.12
2a+2b	-0.49 ***	0.07	-0.49 ***	0.07	-0.49 ***	0.07	-0.48 ***	0.07
2c	-0.77 ***	0.11	-0.77 ***	0.11	-0.80 ***	0.11	-0.81 ***	0.11
3 ab	-0.33 ***	0.10	-0.36 ***	0.10	-0.34 ***	0.11	-0.38 ***	0.11
exit from EducSys	1.15 ***	0.09	1.13 ***	0.09	1.13 ***	0.09	1.12 ***	0.09
Work arrangement (Ref: Permanent work)								
Self employment	0.04	0.23	0.13	0.23	0.09	0.24	0.16	0.24
Atypical	-0.03	0.10	-0.04	0.10	-0.39 *	0.28	-0.27	0.28
Off-the-books/seasonal	-0.29 ***	0.10	-0.30 ***	0.10	-0.28 ***	0.10	-0.29 ***	0.10
Out of work	0.10	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.27 **	0.12	0.24 **	0.12
Occupational class (Ref: V+VI+VII)								
I+II	0.25	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.20
IIIa	0.31 ***	0.10	0.31 ***	0.10	0.29 ***	0.10	0.30 ***	0.10
IIIb	-0.07	0.10	-0.04	0.10	-0.08	0.10	-0.05	0.10
IV	0.00	0.25	-0.10	0.25	-0.06	0.26	-0.13	0.26
Public sector	0.10	0.15	0.09	0.15	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.14
Overqualified	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.06	0.14	0.06	0.15
Occ. mobility upward	0.04	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.15	0.06	0.13
Occ. mobility downward	0.04	0.13	0.01	0.13	0.03	0.13	0.01	0.14
Transition atypical to typical	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.14	0.03	0.14	0.01	
Atypical work*cohorts								
Aty*1956/60					0.61 *	0.36	0.50	0.36
Aty*1961/65					0.24	0.33	0.11	0.33
Aty*1966/70					0.32	0.36	0.17	0.36
Aty*1971/80					0.36	0.33	0.19	0.33
Out of work*cohorts								
Out of work*1956/60					-0.08	0.15	-0.09	0.15
Out of work*1961/65					-0.23	0.15	-0.16	0.15
Out of work*1966/70					-0.14	0.15	-0.05	0.15
Out of work*1971/80					-0.57 ***	0.16	-0.47 ***	0.16
Overqualified*education								
Overqualified*1c					0.14	0.35	0.17	0.35
Overqualified*2ab					0.10	0.18	0.10	0.18
Overqualified*2c					0.02	0.41	0.05	0.41
Overqualified*3ab					0.22	0.35	0.16	0.35
Upward (+20% dls) in work status * education								
Upward*1c					-0.16	0.34	-0.18	0.34
Upward*2ab					-0.11	0.21	-0.11	0.21
Upward*2c					1.21 ***	0.42	1.23 ***	0.42
Upward*3ab					0.31	0.30	0.32	0.31
Youth unempl.rate			-0.04 ***	0.01			-0.04 ***	0.01
No. of subjects=2810	LL=-2313,89		LL=-2289,03		LL=-2298,45		LL=-2276,84	
No. of failures = 1938	LR chi2(36)=1824,88		LR chi2(37)=1873,72		LR chi2(52)=1854,81		LR chi2(53)=1898,10	
Time at risk= 364493								

Tab 8 – Age at first child birth.. Transition exponential model (MEN)

MEN	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 7	
	Coef.	S.Er	Coef.	S.Er	Coef.	S.Er	Coef.	S.Er	Coef.	S.Er
Constant	-20.80 ***	0.77	-21.22 ***	0.79	-15.92 ***	0.74	-20.89 ***	0.78	-16.40 ***	0.76
Age	0.08 ***	0.00	0.09 ***	0.00	0.04 ***	0.00	0.08 ***	0.00	0.05 ***	0.00
Age squared	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00
Birth cohort (ref: 1951-55)										
1956-60	-0.21 ***	0.08	-0.12	0.08	-0.15 *	0.08	-0.22 ***	0.08	0.00	0.09
1961-65	-0.45 ***	0.08	-0.35 ***	0.09	-0.39 ***	0.08	-0.47 ***	0.08	-0.28 ***	0.09
1966-70	-0.79 ***	0.09	-0.73 ***	0.09	-0.37 ***	0.09	-0.79 ***	0.09	-0.26 ***	0.10
1971-80	-1.10 ***	0.11	-1.07 ***	0.12	-0.60 ***	0.12	-1.06 ***	0.12	-0.47 ***	0.12
Region (ref: North)										
Centre	0.16 *	0.09	0.16 *	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.18 **	0.09	0.10	0.09
South	0.56 ***	0.07	0.56 ***	0.07	0.45 ***	0.07	0.55 ***	0.07	0.43 ***	0.07
EE	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.24	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.25	0.16
Class origin (Ref: V+VI+VII)										
I+II	-0.19	0.16	-0.19	0.16	-0.36 **	0.16	-0.19	0.16	-0.39 **	0.16
III	-0.09	0.08	-0.09	0.08	-0.01	0.08	-0.10	0.08	-0.04	0.08
IV	0.14 **	0.07	0.14 **	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.13 **	0.07	0.07	0.07
Graduated mother	0.19	0.28	0.18	0.28	-0.10	0.29	0.20	0.28	-0.09	0.29
Graduated Father	-0.08	0.19	-0.08	0.19	0.21	0.20	-0.06	0.19	0.21	0.20
Mother worked	-0.10 *	0.06	-0.10 *	0.06	-0.03	0.06	-0.10 *	0.06	-0.02	0.06
N of brothers and sisters (Ref: 1)										
2	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.08
3 or +	0.35 ***	0.08	0.34 ***	0.08	0.20 ***	0.08	0.34 ***	0.08	0.19	0.08
figlio unico	0.05	0.09	0.04	0.09	-0.05	0.09	0.04	0.09	-0.05	0.09
Education (Ref: 1ab)										
1c	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	-0.03	0.11	0.14	0.12	0.02	0.12
2a+2b	-0.31 ***	0.08	-0.30 ***	0.08	-0.03	0.08	-0.28 ***	0.08	-0.02	0.09
2c	-0.77 ***	0.16	-0.76 ***	0.16	-0.41 ***	0.16	-0.72 ***	0.17	-0.36 **	0.17
3 ab	-0.22 *	0.14	-0.22 *	0.14	0.18	0.13	-0.15	0.14	0.26 *	0.14
exit from EducSys	0.27 *	0.14	0.28 **	0.14	0.44 ***	0.14	0.28 *	0.14	0.43 ***	0.14
Work arrangement (Ref: Permanent work)										
Self employment	0.12	0.17	0.11	0.17	0.14	0.17	0.09	0.17	0.04	0.18
Atypical	0.16	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.23 **	0.11	0.09	0.26	-0.03	0.28
Off-the-books/seasonal	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.11	0.25 **	0.11	0.16	0.12	0.39 ***	0.13
Out of work	-1.01 ***	0.12	-1.00 ***	0.12	-0.53 ***	0.12	-0.99 ***	0.12	-0.47 ***	0.13
Occupational class (Ref: V+VI+VII)										
I+II	-0.09	0.17	-0.08	0.17	-0.30 *	0.17	-0.05	0.17	-0.22	0.17
IIIa	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.10	-0.12	0.10	0.08	0.10	-0.07	0.10
IIIb	-0.25 **	0.12	-0.24 **	0.12	-0.12	0.12	-0.20 *	0.13	-0.09	0.13
IV	-0.07	0.18	-0.06	0.18	-0.06	0.18	0.01	0.18	0.10	0.19
Public sector	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.12	-0.20 *	0.12	0.00	0.12	-0.19 *	0.12
Overqualified	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.12	-0.07	0.12	0.02	0.12	-0.10	0.12
Occ. mobility upward	0.20 **	0.08	0.20 **	0.08	0.18 **	0.08	0.18 **	0.08	0.17 **	0.08
Occ. mobility downward	0.33 ***	0.11	0.34 ***	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.58 ***	0.16	0.32 **	0.16
Transition atypical to typical	0.18	0.12	0.17	0.12	0.05	0.12	0.18	0.12	0.06	0.12
Atypical work*cohorts										
Aty*1956/60							0.21	0.38	0.13	0.39
Aty*1961/65							0.32	0.32	0.53	0.33
Aty*1966/70							0.11	0.31	0.27	0.32
Aty*1971/80							-0.30	0.39	-0.14	0.40
Atypical*education										
Aty*1c							0.20	0.39	0.10	0.40
Aty*2ab							0.02	0.26	0.30	0.27
Aty*2c							-0.12	0.48	-0.14	0.49
Aty*3							-0.24	0.31	-0.21	0.32
Off- the books/seasonal*education										
Off-the books*1c							-0.43	0.41	-0.50	0.41
Off-the books *2ab							-0.77 **	0.38	-0.52	0.38
Off-the books *2c							-0.92	1.02	-0.47	1.02
Off-the books *3							-0.53	0.44	-0.44	0.44
Occ.mob. Downward*egp										
Downward*I+II							-1.05	1.02	0.06	1.03
Downward*IIIa							-0.31	0.26	-0.28	0.26
Downward*IIIb							-0.33	0.30	-0.06	0.30
Downward*IV							-0.77 **	0.40	-0.61	0.41
Youth unempl.rate			-0.02 ***	0.01					-0.04 ***	0.01
Married					1.74 ***	0.04			1.75 ***	0.04
No. of subjects=2707										
No. of failures = 1319										
Time at risk= 490790										
	LL=-1437,41		LL=-1432,53		LL=-189,74		LL=-1428,73		LL=-169,62	
	LR chi2(36)=2018,90		LR chi2(37)=2028,66		LR chi2(44)=2448,25		LR chi2(52)=2036,28		LR chi2(54)=4554, 49	

Tab 9 – Age at first child birth.. Transition exponential model (WOMEN)

WOMEN	Model 1		Model2		Model3		Model4		Model5	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	-18.49 ***	0.56	-19.32 ***	0.59	-9.64 ***	0.57	-18.59 ***	0.57	-10.14 ***	0.60
Age	0.08 ***	0.00	0.08 ***	0.00	0.01 ***	0.00	0.08 ***	0.00	0.01 ***	0.00
Age squared	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00
Birth cohort (ref: 1951-55)										
1956-60	-0.17 **	0.07	0.10	0.08	-0.07	0.07	-0.08	0.11	0.12	0.11
1961-65	-0.51 ***	0.07	-0.14	0.09	-0.21 ***	0.08	-0.41 ***	0.11	0.01	0.12
1966-70	-0.76 ***	0.08	-0.42 ***	0.10	-0.24 ***	0.08	-0.74 ***	0.12	-0.04	0.13
1971-80	-1.22 ***	0.09	-0.92 ***	0.10	-0.31 ***	0.09	-0.93 ***	0.13	-0.05	0.14
Region (ref: North)										
Centre	0.15 **	0.07	0.15 **	0.07	0.14 *	0.07	0.16 **	0.07	0.15 **	0.07
South	0.30 ***	0.06	0.29 ***	0.06	0.30 ***	0.06	0.30 ***	0.06	0.29 ***	0.06
EE	0.29 **	0.15	0.28 **	0.15	0.04	0.15	0.28 **	0.15	0.05	0.15
Class origin (Ref: V+VI+VII)										
I+II	-0.08	0.14	-0.07	0.14	0.00	0.13	-0.07	0.14	0.01	0.13
III	-0.11	0.07	-0.10	0.07	0.07	0.07	-0.09	0.07	0.08	0.07
IV	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.10 *	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.06
Graduated mother	-0.10	0.23	-0.08	0.23	0.05	0.24	-0.10	0.23	0.03	0.25
Graduated Father	-0.27 *	0.16	-0.25 *	0.16	-0.37 **	0.16	-0.29 *	0.16	-0.35 **	0.16
Mother worked	-0.09 *	0.05	-0.10 **	0.05	0.06	0.05	-0.09 *	0.05	0.05	0.05
N of brothers and sisters (Ref: 1)										
2	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.13 *	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.11 *	0.07
3 or +	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.19 ***	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.19 ***	0.07
Figlio unico	0.28 ***	0.08	0.27 ***	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.27 ***	0.08	0.03	0.08
Education (Ref: 1ab)										
1c	-0.01	0.11	0.00	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.04	0.12	0.20	0.12
2a+2b	-0.57 ***	0.07	-0.57 ***	0.07	-0.04	0.07	-0.64 ***	0.08	-0.09	0.08
2c	-0.84 ***	0.12	-0.85 ***	0.12	-0.10	0.13	-0.95 ***	0.13	-0.15	0.14
3 ab	-0.44 ***	0.11	-0.48 ***	0.11	0.34 ***	0.11	-0.55 ***	0.11	0.24 **	0.12
exit from EducSys	1.32 ***	0.12	1.30 ***	0.12	0.41 ***	0.12	1.29 ***	0.12	0.38 ***	0.12
Work arrangement (Ref: Permanent work)										
Self employment	-0.04	0.24	0.01	0.24	-0.25	0.25	-0.02	0.24	-0.28	0.25
Atypical	-0.05	0.12	-0.08	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.07	0.27	0.28	0.27
Off-the-books/seasonal	-0.34 ***	0.12	-0.36 ***	0.12	-0.01	0.12	-0.33 ***	0.12	0.00	0.12
Out of work	0.37 ***	0.09	0.39 ***	0.09	0.20 **	0.09	0.52 ***	0.13	0.25 **	0.13
Occupational class (Ref: V+VI+VII)										
I+II	0.35 *	0.20	0.35 *	0.20	-0.05	0.21	0.32	0.21	-0.04	0.21
IIIa	0.23 **	0.11	0.25 **	0.11	-0.13	0.11	0.23 **	0.11	-0.11	0.11
IIIb	-0.47 ***	0.12	-0.44 ***	0.12	-0.29 ***	0.11	-0.50 ***	0.12	-0.31 **	0.12
IV	0.17	0.26	0.11	0.26	0.13	0.27	0.18	0.27	0.20	0.28
Public sector	0.05	0.15	0.07	0.15	-0.01	0.15	0.06	0.15	0.03	0.16
Overqualified	0.56 ***	0.12	0.56 ***	0.12	0.22 *	0.12	0.36 **	0.16	0.12	0.16
Occ. mobility upward	-0.07	0.11	-0.07	0.11	-0.12	0.11	-0.31 *	0.17	-0.22	0.17
Occ. mobility downward	-0.08	0.15	-0.11	0.16	0.04	0.16	-0.13	0.16	-0.02	0.16
Transition atypical to typical	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.15	0.12	0.15	0.06	0.16
Atypical work*cohorts										
Aty*1956/60							0.16	0.36	0.08	0.36
Aty*1961/65							-0.39	0.35	-0.27	0.36
Aty*1966/70							0.12	0.36	0.15	0.36
Aty*1971/80							-0.61 *	0.37	-0.77 **	0.38
Out of work*cohorts										
Out of work*1956/60							-0.21	0.15	-0.09	0.15
Out of work*1961/65							-0.18	0.15	-0.01	0.15
Out of work*1966/70							-0.08	0.16	-0.06	0.17
Out of work*1971/80							-0.48 ***	0.18	-0.09	0.18
Overqualified*education										
Over*1c							-0.06	0.40	-0.08	0.40
Over*2ab							0.36 *	0.20	0.26	0.21
Over*2c							0.60	0.45	0.12	0.45
Over*3ab							0.90 ***	0.33	0.65 **	0.33
Upward (+20% dls) in work status * education										
Upward*1c							-0.21	0.37	-0.29	0.38
Upward *2ab							0.38 *	0.23	0.16	0.23
Upward*2c							1.15 ***	0.43	0.32	0.44
Upward*3ab							0.77 **	0.32	0.46	0.32
Youth unempl.rate			-0.04 ***	0.01					-0.02 ***	0.01
Married					4.92 ***	0.12			4.88 ***	0.12
No. of subjects=2810										
No. of failures = 1651										
Time at risk= 429519										
	LL=-2153.60		LL=-2129.91				LL=-2136.37			
	LR chi2(36)=1698.55		LR chi2(37)=1745.94				LR chi2(52)=1733.01			

Table 10: SITUATION at Age 35 - Living in a couple (married or cohabiting) at age 35 versus not being in couple (logistic regression)

	Women		Women (at least 1 work experience)		Men	
	Model1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Birth cohorts</i>						
1951-55	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
1956-60	-0.03	0.20	0.03	0.22	-0.20	0.19
1961-65	-0.19	0.20	-0.09	0.22	-0.20	0.19
1966-70	-0.43 **	0.21	-0.33	0.23	-0.97 ***	0.20
<i>Region</i>						
Nord	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Centre	0.11	0.20	0.11	0.21	0.51 ***	0.19
South-Isle	0.26	0.18	0.32 *	0.20	1.00 ***	0.17
EE	0.49	0.46	0.15	0.47	0.32	0.36
<i>Class origin</i>						
I+II	-0.29	0.32	-0.32	0.34	-0.15	0.32
III	-0.09	0.20	0.03	0.22	0.10	0.19
IV	0.02	0.18	0.04	0.19	0.32 ***	0.17
V+VI+VII	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
<i>Graduated mother</i>	0.08	0.55	0.08	0.60	0.30	0.60
<i>Graduated Father</i>	-0.07	0.35	0.09	0.40	0.05	0.37
<i>Mother worked</i>	-0.20	0.14	-0.04	0.16	-0.10	0.14
<i>Education</i>						
1ab	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
1c	0.21	0.37	0.34	0.39	0.19	0.27
2ab	-0.38 *	0.21	-0.25	0.25	-0.04	0.20
2c	-0.45	0.33	-0.19	0.39	-0.34	0.32
3ab	-0.27	0.28	0.09	0.33	0.03	0.29
<i>Age at first work</i>						
<18 anni	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
18/21	-0.09	0.24	-0.16	0.25	-0.35 ***	0.21
22/25	-0.67 **	0.28	-0.81 ***	0.29	-0.78 ***	0.23
26/29	-0.76 **	0.32	-0.95 ***	0.33	-1.51 ***	0.29
30/35	-0.80 ***	0.34	-0.94 ***	0.35	-2.42 ***	0.36
NLF	-0.64 **	0.30			-1.94 ***	0.36
<i>Occupational class (first)</i>						
I+II	-0.46	0.47	-0.69	0.48	0.50	0.39
IIIA	-0.07	0.27	-0.21	0.28	0.06	0.21
IIIB	-0.25	0.24	-0.29	0.24	-0.06	0.23
IV	-0.44	0.61	-0.48	0.60	-0.22	0.44
V+VI+VII	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
<i>Work arrangement</i>						
Permanent work	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Self employed	0.44	0.53	0.43	0.53	0.16	0.41
Atypical work	0.41	0.32	0.43	0.33	0.15	0.32
Off-the-books/seasonal	-0.01	0.20	-0.03	0.20	0.22	0.20
<i>N. atypical exp.</i>						
0	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
1	-0.26	0.27	-0.32	0.27	0.05	0.27
2	-0.32	0.38	-0.40	0.38	0.66	0.42
3 o +	-0.82 **	0.47	-0.92 ***	0.47	0.61	0.54
<i>Unempl. exp</i>	-0.33	0.23	-0.33	0.23	-0.40 ***	0.22
<i>Month Unempl exp.</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00 ***	0.00	-0.01 ***	0.00
<i>Constant</i>	2.47 ***	0.26	2.33 ***	0.27	1.63 ***	0.21
<i>N.</i>	1,585		1,301		1,485	
<i>Pseudo R2</i>	0.05		0.05		0.11	

Source: Ilii, 2005

Table 11: SITUATION at Age 35 - Being parents at age 35 versus not being parents (logistic regression)

epi35	Women		Married women		Women (at least 1 work experience)		Men		Married men						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5						
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE					
<i>Birth cohorts</i>															
1951-55															
1956-60	-0.47	***	0.19	-0.46	***	0.27	-0.53	***	0.21	-0.29	*	0.17	-0.22		0.24
1961-65	-0.63	***	0.19	-0.57	***	0.27	-0.67	***	0.21	-0.55	***	0.17	-0.65	***	0.24
1966-70	-0.93	***	0.20	-0.85	***	0.29	-0.92	***	0.22	-1.07	***	0.18	-0.69	***	0.27
<i>Region</i>															
Nord															
Centre	0.21		0.18	0.30		0.25	0.22		0.19	0.36	**	0.17	0.14		0.24
South-Isle	0.49	***	0.17	0.72	***	0.24	0.55	***	0.18	0.96	***	0.15	0.59	***	0.21
EE	0.72	***	0.42	0.27		0.52	0.58		0.45	0.32		0.33	0.43		0.51
<i>Class origin</i>															
I+II	-0.08		0.30	-0.24		0.41	-0.15		0.32	-0.30		0.31	-0.47		0.42
III	-0.10		0.18	-0.21		0.26	0.01		0.20	0.08		0.17	-0.02		0.23
IV	-0.05		0.16	-0.25		0.23	0.03		0.18	0.42	***	0.15	0.37	*	0.22
V+VI+VII															
Graduated mother	0.45		0.52	0.88		0.74	0.49		0.56	0.29		0.55	0.32		0.71
Graduated Father	-0.63	***	0.32	-0.83	***	0.42	-0.58	*	0.35	0.15		0.35	0.33		0.49
Mother worked	-0.08		0.13	0.10		0.19	0.01		0.15	-0.22	*	0.12	-0.15		0.18
<i>Education</i>															
1ab															
1c	0.28		0.34	0.28		0.47	0.35		0.36	0.01		0.24	-0.40		0.33
2ab	-0.75	***	0.19	-0.65	***	0.29	-0.77	***	0.23	-0.32	*	0.18	-0.52		0.28
2c	-0.56	***	0.32	-0.49		0.47	-0.35		0.37	-0.69	**	0.31	-0.84	*	0.46
3ab	-0.90	***	0.26	-0.82	***	0.39	-0.73	***	0.30	-0.49	*	0.27	-1.04	***	0.41
<i>Age at first work</i>															
<18 anni															
18/21	0.14		0.22	0.07		0.31	0.14		0.23	-0.07		0.18	0.28		0.27
22/25	-0.46	***	0.26	-0.38		0.37	-0.51	*	0.27	-0.29		0.21	0.34		0.32
26/29	-0.47		0.30	-0.32		0.43	-0.55	*	0.31	-0.94	***	0.27	0.23		0.41
30/35	-0.83	***	0.31	-0.98	***	0.43	-0.91	***	0.32	-2.08	***	0.37	-0.71		0.53
NLF	-0.47	***	0.28	0.37		0.46				-1.15	***	0.36	1.44		1.08
<i>Occupational class (first)</i>															
I+II															
IIIA	-0.16		0.25	-0.17		0.35	-0.21		0.26	-0.05		0.20	-0.13		0.28
IIIB	-0.50	***	0.22	-0.54	***	0.31	-0.50	**	0.23	-0.39	*	0.20	-0.53	**	0.26
IV	-0.70		0.57	-0.24		0.82	-0.72		0.57	-0.08		0.41	0.06		0.55
V+VI+VII															
<i>Work arrangement</i>															
Permanent work															
Self employed	0.57		0.50	0.24		0.71	0.56		0.50	-0.07		0.38	-0.15		0.48
Atypical work	0.18		0.31	0.21		0.46	0.18		0.32	0.09		0.28	0.19		0.36
Off-the-books/seasonal	-0.14		0.18	-0.12		0.24	-0.17		0.18	0.25		0.18	0.23		0.24
<i>N. atypical exp.</i>															
0															
1	0.22		0.26	0.30		0.38	0.19		0.26	0.00		0.24	-0.22		0.31
2	0.37		0.38	0.91		0.64	0.32		0.38	0.49		0.36	-0.13		0.45
3 o +	-0.73	*	0.45	-0.60	*	0.63	-0.78	*	0.45	-0.15		0.44	-0.85	*	0.51
<i>Unempl. exp</i>	-0.17		0.22	0.12		0.31	-0.17		0.22	-0.22		0.20	0.01		0.28
<i>Month Unempl exp.</i>	0.00		0.00	-0.01		0.00	0.00	***	0.00	-0.01	***	0.00	0.00		0.01
<i>Constant</i>	2.47	***	0.25	2.95		0.35	2.41	***	0.26	1.21	***	0.19	2.04	***	0.27
<hr/>															
N.	1,585		1,323		1,301		1,485		1,137						
Pseudo R2	0.09		0.10		0.09		0.12		0.08						

Source: Iffi 2005

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